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“This is an excellent study of an important and timely topic that is of 
relevance not only for the people involved but for the wider areas of 
Israel and the Arab world. It is a comprehensive detailed description and 
analysis of a process of change and transformation that started in 1948 
and continues until the present.” 
— Donald AbdAllah Cole, The American University in Cairo
“The author is a geographer interested in town planning, who also 
has a solid grounding in anthropology. Two things make the book 
very attractive: that it is totally focused on town planning, and that 
the fi eldwork was spread out over a decade which permitted the 
author to concentrate on the frequent changes in the plans and in their 
implementation.”                                — Emanuel Marx, Tel Aviv University
The resettlement of the Negev Bedouin (Israel) has been wrought 
with controversy since its inception in the 1960s. Presenting evidence 
from a two-decade period, the author addresses how the changes that 
took place over the past sixty to seventy years have served the needs 
and interests of the State rather than those of Bedouin community at 
large. While town living fostered improvements in social and economic 
development, numerous unintended consequences jeopardized the 
success of this planning initiative. As a result, the Bedouin community 
endured excessive hardship and rapid change, abandoning its nomadic 
lifestyle and traditions in response to the economic, political, and social 
pressure from the State and received very little in return.
Steven C. Dinero is Associate Professor of Human Geography at 
Philadelphia University. He has published extensively on such topics 
as community planning and development, gender, identity formation, 
religion, education, and tourism in post-nomadic environments. 
His recent work addresses the impacts of globalization and climate 
change upon indigenous peoples, and the role of new technologies in 
helping such communities respond and adapt to these environmental 
challenges.
Cover image: Woman fetching water. 














Bodily, geographic, and 
architectural sites are 
embedded with cultural 
knowledge and social 
value. The Space and 
Place series provides 
ethnographically rich 
analyses of the cultural 
organization and 
meanings of these sites 
of space, architecture, 
landscape, and places of 
the body.
S P A C E 
&  P L A C E
V O L U M E  3
Berghahn Books
N E W  Y O R K   .  O X F O R D 
www.berghahnbooks.com
ISBN 978-1-84545-762-4
9 7 8 1 8 4 5 4 5 7 6 2 4
A N T H R O P O L O G Y
S P A C E 
&  P L A C E
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
S  L
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Space and Place
Bodily, geographic, and architectural sites are embedded with cultural 
knowledge and social value. Th e Anthropology of Space and Place series 
provides ethnographically rich analyses of the cultural organization and 
meanings of these sites of space, architecture, landscape, and places of the 
body. Contributions to this series will examine the symbolic meanings 
of space and place, the cultural and historical processes involved in their 
construction and contestation, and how they are in dialogue with wider 
political, religious, social, and economic institutions.
 
Volume 1
Berlin, Alexanderplatz: Transforming Place in a Unifi ed Germany
Gisa Weszkalnys
Volume 2
Cultural Diversity in Russian Cities: Th e Urban Landscape in the post-Soviet Era
Edited by Cordula Gdaniec
Volume 3
Settling for Less: Th e Planned Resettlement of Israel’s Negev Bedouin
Steven C. Dinero
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
S  L
Th e Planned Resettlement
of Israel’s Negev Bedouin
[ • ]
Steven C. Dinero 
Berghahn Books
New York • Oxford
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
First published in 2010 by
Berghahn Books
www.berghahnbooks.com
© 2010, 2019 Steven C. Dinero
Open access ebook edition published in 2019 
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages
for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this book
may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information
storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented,
without written permission of the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Dinero, Steven C.
  Settling for less : the planned resettlement of Israel’s Negev Bedouin / 
Steven C. Dinero.
   p. cm. — (Space and place ; v. 3)
  Includes bibliographical references and index.
  ISBN 978-1-84545-762-4 (hardback)
  ISBN 978-1-78920-109-3 (open access ebook)
 1. Bedouins—Israel—Segev Shalom.  2. Migration, Internal—Israel—Negev.  




British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 978-1-84545-762-4 (hardback)
ISBN: 978-1-78920-109-3 (open access ebook)
An electronic version of this book is freely available thanks to the support of libraries
working with Knowledge Unlatched. KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make
high quality books Open Access for the public good. More information about the initiative
and links to the Open Access version can be found at knowledgeunlatched.org
 is work is published subject to a Creative Commons Attribution Noncommer-
cial No Derivatives 4.0 International license.  e terms of the license can be found 
at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For uses beyond those 
covered in the license contact Berghahn Books.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
For Penina
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
[ CONTENTS ]
List of Figures ix
List of Tables x
List of Illustrations xi
List of Maps xii
Preface xiii 
Acknowledgements xx
Note on Arabic and Hebrew Transliteration and Translations xxiv
 
Planning in the Negev Bedouin Sector 1
 
Segev Shalom—Background and Community Profi le 36
 
Planning, Service Provision, and Development in Segev Shalom 64
 
Health and Education 92
 
Negev Bedouin Identity/ies Development in Segev Shalom 119
 
Th e Resettled Bedouin Woman 145
 
Bedouin Tourism Development Planning in the New Economy 166
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
 





This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
[ FIGURES ]
 .. Bedouin Town Physical Layout 13
 .. Segev Shalom Population Increase 46
 .. Percentage of Employed Segev Shalom Residents 
Who are Working in the Town Itself 76
 .. Percent Employed Outside the Home, Segev Shalom 
Survey Respondents 76
 .. Segev Shalom Ownership of Material Goods (%), 
1993–2007 77
 .. Segev Shalom Residents Raising Livestock, Fruits 
and Vegetables (%), 1993–2007 78
 .. Primary Reasons for Resettling Cited by Segev Shalom 
Residents (%), 1993–2007 79
 .. Percentage of Households Connected to the Local 
Utilities, 1993–2007 80
 .. Segev Shalom Residents Rating the Town Services 
Highly (%), 1993–2007 81
 .. Political Indices, Segev Shalom 1996–2007 and 
the Pezurah 2007 87
 .. Percentage of Survey Respondents Expressing 
Satisfaction with Healthcare Service Provisions in Segev Shalom 
(by Survey Year) 104
 .. Percentage of High School Graduates in Segev Shalom 109
 .. Adult Literacy Rates (%), One or More Languages, 
Segev Shalom 109
 .. Percentage of Adults (M/F) Literate in at Least One 
Language, Segev Shalom 151
 .. Women Accessing Higher Education Vs. Th ose with 
No Formal Education 151
 .. Segev Shalom Residents Employed Outside the Home, 
Male and Female 152
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
[ TABLES ]
 .. 2007 Segev Shalom Survey Respondents—Descriptive 
Statistics 72
 .. 2007 Social and Economic Indicators: Education and 
Employment 73
 .. 2007 Housing, Utilities and Reasons for Relocation 74
 .. Segev Shalom Residents’ Perspectives, 2007 84
 .. Identity Labels 129
 .. Do You Feel that You Are Treated Equally with 
Other Israelis? 130
 .. Stated Regularity of Mosque Attendance/Religious 
Participation of Respondent/Family Members 130
 .. Segev Shalom Voting Participation 133
 .. Is the Present National Government Working for the 
Social/Economic Interests of the Bedouin Community? 135
 .. Expressed Belief that the Islamic Parties Can Help 
Further the Interests of the Bedouin Community 135
 .. “Slum Tours” Th roughout the Developing World 172
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
[ ILLUSTRATIONS ]
 .. Shekhuna Alef—1993 39
 .. Shekhuna Bet—1993 40
 .. Shekhuna Bet—2007 41 
 .. Shekhuna 6—2007 42
 .. Main Intersection—2007 47 
 .. Dentist’s Offi  ce—2007 47 
 .. Halal Butcher—2007 48
 .. Shwarma Restaurant—2007 48
 .. Bakery—2007 49
 .. Th e Segev Shalom Kupot Holim in 2007 98
 ., .. Th e Segev Shalom Middle School and 
High School—2007 111
 .. Arabic and Hebrew Election Poster in a 
Bedouin Town: “A Strong Israel with Peres”—1996 132
 .. Central Mosque, Segev Shalom 139
 .. Bedouin Women’s “Traditional” Roles—
Milking a sheep 146
 .. Baking Pita on the Patio of the Villa 149
 .. One of Many Young Women who don Full 
Abaya and Niqab in the Streets of Segev Shalom—2007 157
 ., .. Th e “Bedouin Tent” Outside Eilat—2007 169
 .. Photographing Grief, Hiram/Attir—July 2007 176
 .. Suleiman El-Hrenik Making Tea for the 
Author—2007 182
 .. Hebrew Tourist Brochure: “Suleiman’s Shiq” 184
 .. Could Th is be the Face of the Future?—
Tel Sheva, 2007 199
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
[ MAPS ]
 .. Location of the Recognized/Legal Negev Bedouin Towns 
(as of 2000) 5
 .. Th e Location of the Recognized Towns in Relation to 
Nearby Jewish Communities and the Siyag 8
 .. Segev Shalom Physical Plan (2003) 38
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
[ PREFACE ]
23 March 2007; Near Hatzerim, Israel—
 Sheep. I am surrounded by them. As the sun lowers ahead of us, the dogs 
barking feverishly and nipping at their hooves, they move slowly forward 
in a wave, groups breaking off  to one side or the other only to return to the 
main herd as we proceed down the hill. Th e noise of hooves and maa-ing 
is all around us. Th e goats among the herd stop more often, standing on 
their hind legs—climbing up in some instances—into the low shrubs to get 
at some of what must be the tastier leaves. As the girls herd from left, right, 
and center, some walking, some riding donkeys, one restraining a reluctant 
ewe forcing it to slow down in order that its lamb might suckle, the boys 
come over the hill to our right leading the half dozen camels still at this 
site—the few dozen others from the herd are several kilometers to the south 
where there is more room for them to graze.
 Suddenly they all converge, the kids, the hundreds of sheep and goats, the 
camels, the donkeys, the dogs, the 3 Holstein calves which do not fi t into this 
scene at all but which are increasingly prevalent in the northern Negev—all 
at once in one thunderous rush they begin running headlong toward the 
open pen, the water tankers, the tent where smoke is wafting out as tea and 
coff ee are about to be served—Home. 
 And then I see my 10-year old son, and my 7-year old daughter and wife 
ahead of us as the animals all charge in their direction. I cannot but won-
der if they are feeling the rush that I am feeling now. It is a rush that I fi rst 
felt when, as an American high school student from Buff alo on an exchange 
program in Qiryat Gat in 1978, I caught my fi rst glimpses of the bedouin 
out the Egged bus window on my way to the market in Be’er Sheva, where I 
would sit for hours drinking tea and catching furtive glances of those who 
sat on the ground or at nearby tables, wondering about their lives.
*  *  *
I wrote these words several months ago and thousands of miles away from 
where I now sit in my Philadelphia offi  ce. Working now as a middle-aged 
professor, I can say that the rush I felt that day was no less great than what I 
felt when I was that impressionable teenaged high school exchange student. 
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Indeed, 30 years later, I remain as interested and concerned as ever—if not 
more so—for the future welfare of the Negev bedouin community. Th at 
this formerly nomadic people is a community in transition, a community 
experiencing great change in a relatively brief period, is well-known, recog-
nized, and widely publicized. 
But my particular interest in the bedouin of the Negev may be narrowed 
to a limited set of questions. Since the early 1990s, I have been conducting 
research in one of the government-planned Negev bedouin towns, Segev 
Shalom/Shqeb. From then until now, I have sought to better understand 
how community planning and development principles have been used in 
order to help transition a formerly pastoral-nomadic community from 
tents to towns, from shepherding to wage labor, and from an ascriptive- to 
an achievement-oriented social order.
As will be seen in the pages that follow, I approach this seemingly 
straightforward issue with some signifi cant provisos. First, I begin with 
the basic premise that nomadism is more than a geographic mechanism 
or referent solely to be associated with the availability of pasturage for 
fl ocks, drinking water, and the like (Salzman 1980). Rather, nomadism is 
a complete social, economic, and political system that well supercedes the 
boundaries of mere geography. When, therefore, this system is altered or 
placed under stress, be it by natural or human-made forces, the entire sys-
tem must react, respond, and adapt. And in the present case, it has done 
just this, sometimes in a predictable manner, but often in ways that are far 
less so predictable.
Th is brings me to my second proviso: the diff erence between planned 
change and that which is unanticipated. All planners know the well-worn 
phrase: ‘Men plan, God laughs.’ But a response to this might be: were peo-
ple not to plan, that result might bring tears. Alternatively, if planning is not 
undertaken with good intent, with positive ideals in mind, and, dare I say it, 
with love, then yes, the unplanned, the unanticipated, the unexpected may 
not only be the result despite planning—it may be preferred to it. Planning 
is a tool; some who have used planning in the State of Israel since its incep-
tion have made omelets, some have made souffl  és, and some have made 
messes. But then, is that the fault of planning or of planners?
A third and fi nal proviso must be noted here, and that is that the bedouin 
of the Negev are not the Amish of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. Th at is 
to say, they do not “shun” electricity, and do nut shun things “modern,” 
but rather adapt whenever and wherever they can or must to the needs of 
the day. Th ey do not aspire to live like the Western Orientalist’s “Lawrence 
of Arabia”-type image of what was (if ever it was) the idyllic bedouin cul-
ture and society. Th e bedouin have changed, they are changing, they will 
change. Change, in and of itself, is not what is at issue in this book. 
xiv Preface
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What is at issue, and as Chapter 1: Planning in the Negev Bedouin Sector 
will address, is the nature of this change as it has been traced historically, 
and the degree to which this change was planned by a government that, 
from its founding, has set its sights on this community and will not rest un-
til every bedouin has become what it wants, rather than what the bedouin 
want, the community to be. Th e question that will be addressed here then is 
how the changes that have taken place over the past six to ten decades have 
served the needs and interests of the bedouin community, as compared 
to how these changes have been pursued in order to serve the interests of 
Israeli Jews at large. Moreover, when change is imposed from above and is 
undertaken in a manner that is heavy-handed (ham-handed is not cultur-
ally appropriate here), any developments that result are almost certainly to 
be held suspect. 
Th is is not only true of the bedouin, of course, but it also can be found 
in any community anywhere in the world. But, in the Negev bedouin case, 
this planning initiative is nested within several complicating layers of so-
cial, political, and economic stresses that make it unique. For not only are 
the bedouin a minority in terms of their lifestyle (i.e., nomads versus sed-
entary peoples), as can be found throughout the Middle East and North Af-
rica and throughout much of the world, but they are also ethnic minorities 
(Arabs) and religious minorities (Muslims)—that is, the groups who are 
yet in confl ict with the dominant Jewish State that is charged with looking 
out for their welfare and development. Th us, one can view the planning 
agenda outlined throughout this chapter within a social context of clashing 
values, worldviews, and attitudes embedded within the economic/political 
regional dynamic, informed at the macro level by the broader Arab-Israeli 
confl ict, and at the micro level by the Palestinian-Israeli confl ict. It is no 
wonder then that virtually every aspect of this issue is so highly charged 
and politicized.
And yet, one rarely reads in the growing literature on the topic the per-
spective of the ordinary bedouin on what is happening in their community. 
To be sure, bedouin professors present their ideas and concerns cogently 
on a regular basis, but the common town resident is rarely heard. Nor, nec-
essarily, does one hear the voices of those Jewish Israelis who have devoted 
their careers to the purpose of planning in the bedouin sector. 
Rather, one may read about the bedouin, many speaking of them as “vic-
tims,” while others charge that they are Israel’s next greatest threat to inter-
nal security, safety, and stability. And yet few if any of these listen to what 
those in the bedouin or planning communities have to say, and fewer still 
seek to give voice to those perspectives. Th is chapter, and those that fol-
low, are replete with lengthy quotes seeking to serve as a corrective to this 
issue. It is not my goal here to speak for the bedouin or for the planners 
Preface xv
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who work on their behalf; they are quite capable of voicing their views for 
themselves. 
In order to try to bring such broad issues down to a more approach-
able human scale, Chapter 2: Segev Shalom—Background and Community 
Profi le will consider the concerns of one small location within the bedouin 
community, Segev Shalom. Like any case study, Segev Shalom has unique 
traits that do not allow for extrapolation to all of the other planned towns 
in the Negev today, let alone those parts of the bedouin community that re-
main unrecognized, “illegal,” spontaneous, and unplanned. And yet, there 
are many lessons that can be learned from this case study, and that do pro-
vide building blocks for an understanding of where the bedouin have been, 
where they are heading, and how development and planning might be used 
in a manner that may yet further contribute toward the development of this 
minority community. 
Th ere is no question that the bedouin community is non-monolithic. 
On the other hand, however, the argument suggesting that because of this, 
little can be done in this sector, is a red herring. Much can be done to un-
derstand the bedouin of the Negev by using case studies. One must simply 
recognize that when it comes to the bedouin of the Negev, each individual 
case may hold unique qualities and characteristics, but overall the whole 
bedouin population shares a variety of needs and concerns, which, more 
often than not, tend to supercede individual needs and interests.
In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I provide the bulk of material pertaining to the 
specifi c aspects of the Negev bedouin community centered at Segev Sha-
lom. Much of the material presented in these three chapters was gathered 
using four anonymous, independent, scientifi c household surveys imple-
mented over a fi fteen-year period (1993, 1996, 2000, and 2007). Th ese sur-
veys, which sought to quantify both the state of bedouin town residents’ 
“Quality of Life” (QOL) (a controversial and subjective measurement, to be 
sure), as well as residents’ opinions about their own living circumstances 
and conditions, allowed me to gather a large amount of descriptive quan-
titative data relatively quickly, which then could be analyzed, tested, and 
linked over time. While the results of each survey present, perhaps, but a 
snapshot of sentiment and circumstances at that particular time, the results 
of the four surveys when compared over an extended period reveal several 
of the trends identifi ed throughout this study. In order to further clarify 
these movements and developments, such standard planning methods 
were combined with anthropological and sociological methods throughout 
the period of study as well, including the use of personal interviews, focus 
groups, and participant/observation activities. 
In Chapter 3: Planning, Service Provision and Development in Segev Sha-
lom, I discuss the planning and use of service provisions over a period of 
xvi Preface
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more than a decade in Segev Shalom. As discussed in Chapter 1, the pri-
mary objective of the resettlement agenda from the governmental point of 
view is the provision of public services to the Negev bedouin community. 
Th us, using Segev Shalom as a case study, I examine in this chapter the 
extent to which these services are being provided. More to the point, I also 
examine the degree to which these services have been taken on and fully 
utilized during the 1990s and 2000s, and the extent to which the residents 
of this particular bedouin community are enjoying them.
Continuing in this vein, I then examine in Chapter 4: Health and Educa-
tion two main areas of social service provisions in the town: health, educa-
tion, and, to a lesser degree, social welfare. Th e reasons for isolating these 
areas are straightforward: fi rst, the literature typically addresses these as the 
areas that off er insights into a better understanding of the degree to which 
true social development is taking place in developing communities, such as 
that of the bedouin. Secondly, and related to this, these are the areas where 
the government suggests that the most progress is being made in transi-
tioning the bedouin into a developed society. In short, these areas provide 
ideal barometers for measuring the extent to which “modernization,” as it is 
typically defi ned in the Western development literature, is truly taking hold 
in the sedentarizing Negev bedouin community.
And yet, it will be shown that planned change among the bedouin of the 
Negev has fallen short of government expectations or hopes. In the mean-
time, unplanned changed has resulted from the resettlement initiative, 
which is not only unexpected, but poses potential concerns for the Israeli 
collective going forward. As I discuss in Chapter 5: Negev Bedouin Iden-
tity/ies Development in Segev Shalom, augmented senses of identity/identi-
ties construction and expression is one major area of interest. For as most 
of the members of the bedouin community no longer undertake seasonal 
migration, no longer hold fl ocks, and no longer reside in the iconic black 
goat-hair tent, the question of “where have all the bedouin gone?” (Cole 
2003) is an appropriate one. When added to the query, “in the Negev today, 
what then is a bedouin?,” one fi nds a spectrum of identities being held and 
embraced, each with its own set of uncertainties, trajectories, challenges, 
and potential sources of confusion.
As Chapter 6: Th e Resettled Bedouin Woman reveals, if there is one area 
of change in Negev bedouin society today, which well encapsulates the 
ambivalence of planned and unplanned changed, and of “modernity” as 
envisioned by the state confronting some of the vestiges of a wary bedouin 
society yet at odds with itself when it comes to the acceptance of some but 
not all cultural innovation, it is the changing role of the bedouin woman. 
During the 1990s and 2000s, the changes that have occurred in this arena 
are startling and profound, and are at the heart of social and economic 
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change in the bedouin community. And yet, this has come with a price; 
there are those who see the glass half full, recognizing that the fact that 
today one sees bedouin women Ph.D.s and medical doctors, as few as they 
are, is a major step in Negev bedouin development. But as these changes 
are occurring, so too do some see greater limitations being placed upon 
women, upon their rights, their privileges, and upon their freedom of 
movement, than even before.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 each discuss the extent to which social develop-
ment has taken hold in the Negev bedouin community. And yet, as I sug-
gest in Chapter 3, economic development remains extremely problematic 
through the Negev today, both within the planned and the unrecognized 
communities. If there is one area of economic development that can be 
highlighted as an example of a “success story,” however, it would be found 
in the area of tourism. Chapter 7: Bedouin Tourism Development: Planning 
in the New Economy seeks to address this very topic. Here, I note that in 
the 1980s–1990s, this sector began to develop in the Negev with bedouin 
themes and connections, but almost without exception, was dominated by 
Jewish interests and perpetuated a narrative that, it can be argued, did little 
to serve the present day needs and concerns of the resettled bedouin. As 
the chapter notes, however, by the 2000s, bedouin tourism had become 
an area of economic development for the bedouin themselves. Further, a 
narrative that is more closely aligned with the present-day experiences of 
the bedouin community was now being told, although some vendors have 
taken this idea still further, and were now perpetuating an image of the bed-
ouin-as-victim/oppressed as a selling feature of their tourism ventures.
Given the highly charged political nature of the subject at hand, I am 
compelled then in the fi nal chapter, Chapter 8: Segev Shalom—A City on 
the Edge of Forever?, to draw in an additional literature and genre, Science 
Fiction, in order to place what appears to many to be a political confl ict in 
an alternative light. Further, I do so in order to draw parallels between the 
themes found here—utopianism, alternative futures/realities—and similar 
ideals found in the planning literature. In so doing, I also wish to raise the 
question of whether the future of the bedouin community is already fi xed, 
based upon present realities and limitations, or whether planners can envi-
sion alternative futures, which can seek to overcome the present problems 
and diffi  culties enumerated throughout the body of this text. In this regard, 
I discuss future planning in the Negev bedouin community, including Se-
gev Shalom. While there is no doubt that some of what I put forward is 
utopian, what can also be said is that those of us who believe in planning 
believe that we can make the future; the future does not make us. It is in-
cumbent upon all interested parties to put forward ideas or dreams of the 
future—that, after all, is with what planning is truly concerned.
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Th is then is a study of what can—and perhaps cannot—be accomplished 
through planning for these former pastoral nomads. More, it is a recog-
nition that there is yet a great deal of work that needs to be done in the 
bedouin sector, and that well-intentioned outsiders can only do so much to 
move the initiative to the next level. Th e ultimate question I wish to raise, 
then, in concluding these two decades of study in Segev Shalom is whether 
we, as planners, concerned observers, Jews and Arabs alike, have the will, 
the ability, and above all, the desire, to actively alter the present status quo 
in order to overcome the past and help ensure a brighter future for a bed-
ouin community, which, here-to-date, has endured excessive hardship and 
rapid change, abandoning its previous lifestyle and traditions in response 
to the economic, political, and social forces of the state, while getting very 
little in return—in eff ect, settling for less. 
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[      NOTE ON ARABIC AND HEBREW       ] TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATIONS
Language is a crucial but nonetheless confounding element to any re-
searcher or writer who seeks to work in the Arab World. As those who are 
familiar with the Middle East well know, there are numerous ways to trans-
literate the Arabic and Hebrew languages into Roman letters. Diacritical 
marks often help, yet, at times, may hinder the ability to pronounce words, 
which, in truth, are best read in the original form. “Kh,” “Ch,” “Q,” and the 
like are often used in an attempt to compensate for letters that do not have 
easy equivalents in English. Th e result is usually less than ideal.
For the purposes of simplicity, I have attempted throughout this work 
to minimize such distractions. For the most part, whenever possible, Ara-
bic and Hebrew terms are used only when the English versions simply 
will not do (the names of towns or people, Israeli concepts, and so on). 
In these instances, I attempt to use a relatively “easy” transliteration sys-
tem, whereby what one reads is, more or less, what the word would sound 
like in the actual language. For example, ayins, alefs, kafs, and other chal-
lenging letters are Anglicized wherever possible to facilitate reading and 
comprehension.
Similarly, Arabic and Hebrew terms are used at a minimum and are 
translated into English whenever possible. My translations of quotes, in 
many instances aided by a fl uent speaker, are as honest and in keeping with 
the spirit of the informants as possible. But this is always a challenge; how 
to translate a term like “davka,” for example? Readers of English not famil-
iar with the term will not fully appreciate the “in your face” attitude that 
usually attends its usage. 
But then, that is the point, is it not? For just as there is often a commu-
nication gap between English readers and the subjects of this study, so too 
is there a gap between Israeli Jews, most of whom do not speak Arabic, and 
bedouin Israelis, most of whom do speak Hebrew (males above a certain 
age most especially), but who prefer Arabic, even if every other word seems 
to be the Hebrew word “b’seder” (OK?). And, of course, the gap between 
and among the subjects of the study is not merely linguistic, but is also one 
of ideas, beliefs, thoughts, and ideals as well.
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Th ere are, of course, scholarly books available concerning the Negev 
bedouin Arabic dialect, and its very unique history and qualities. Th is is 
not one of them. Th e goal here is to use transliterations and translations 
that make the work as readable as possible, yet also preserve the “fl avor” of 
the region, and of its peoples. I hope I have succeeded in this eff ort.
Note on Arabic and Hebrew Transliteration and Translations xxv
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
[ Chapter 1 ]
Planning in the Negev 
Bedouin Sector
Th e life of a Bedouin is a tent-pole on a camel. 
— Bailey, A Culture of Desert Survival: Bedouin Proverbs 
from Sinai and the Negev
A desert waste is preferable to a contentious neighbor. 
— Bailey, A Culture of Desert Survival: Bedouin Proverbs 
from Sinai and the Negev 
In an ideal world, new town planners operate in the realm of Utopianism. 
Th e true planner, the authentic planner, the planner on the cutting edge, is 
he or she who sits and dreams, who is willing to ask the most dangerous of 
questions, such as “What if?” Th e planner of the twenty-fi rst century does 
not even think of these as dreams, but rather as the blueprints of a new 
reality in the making; the planner is simply the mechanism and the catalyst 
that makes these dreams come true. 
Th e planned town then is the actualization of the dream, that which 
is brought to life by the will and whim of those willing to go outside of 
themselves, beyond the limitations of what is, and, if the planner is truly 
inspired, by what is even deemed possible. Th e planned new town is—or at 
least it can be—that which no one ever believed could come to pass. It is, in 
eff ect, Tomorrow’s city, Today.
And yet, one basic proviso must always apply: new towns only have the 
potential to be Utopian so long as they are planned with the interests of 
the potential residents as their guiding principle, and not in the interests 
of the planners. So long as the planners plan for their own self-interests, 
dystopian outcomes and unintended consequences can be assured. It is a 
clichéd truism that a town is only a refl ection of the people who reside 
there. Th is is all the more true when one considers the new town or com-
munity; until human inhabitants arrive, the town is not a town at all, it is 
merely an empty shell.
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And so it is with the state-forced resettlement of the bedouin Arabs 
of the Negev Desert in southern Israel into the planned new towns that 
have been created for them since the 1960s. Th e successful implementa-
tion of this planning initiative has been jeopardized since the outset, it 
was ill conceived, poorly designed, and is, to the present day, questionable 
in every facet of the ways in which the bedouin continue to be resettled. 
Planned with no bedouin input until very late in the process, the new bed-
ouin towns have long struggled to serve the community’s needs. Th is was 
not accidental, but was part of the state’s agenda to relocate the bedouin 
off  of the land and into concentrated areas as quickly as possible for its 
own political ends. Moreover, this failure to work with the community 
also played a key role in the towns’ inability to attract in-migrants. At the 
same time, those who did relocate found “towns” barely meeting the defi -
nition of the word, and that only recently are beginning to develop into 
viable, livable communities. 
In the following chapters, I will seek to show that there are numerous 
examples of ways in which the towns are succeeding in performing a role as 
nodes of social and economic development in the Negev bedouin commu-
nity. Israel’s state planners might be tempted to suggest (as many do) that 
in the areas of health, education, women’s status, and other social status 
indices, the bedouin are developing remarkably, following a “moderniza-
tion” curve well in line with most hopes and expectations. One can only 
conclude, then, of how tragic it is that despite these successes, many if not 
most in the bedouin community as a whole perceive the resettlement ini-
tiative as nothing short of a dismal failure. Rather than being viewed in 
this light, the Utopian “dream” remains elusive, as many Negev bedouin yet 
struggle to awaken from what they perceive to be nothing short of a living 
nightmare.
A History of the Bedouin New Town Planning Initiative*
Th e literature is replete with descriptions of the story of the Negev bed-
ouin community’s urbanization process into planned towns. Th e narrative 
has been repeated a number of times (see, for example, Meir 1997; Kressel 
2003), and need not be retold in full yet again on these pages. However, cer-
tain elements of how the bedouin community has, over time, been divided, 
concentrated, and resettled, and an explanation of how the initiative was 
planned and re-planned over time, is necessary in order to fully understand 
and appreciate the role that displacement has played historically in the new 
town initiative, and how, to an extent, these past events still impact the 
program’s successes and failures in the present temporal context. 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Planning in the Negev Bedouin Sector 3
According to the Israeli Land Authority, four million dunams (approxi-
mately one million acres) of land in the Negev Desert were under control 
of the bedouin prior to the creation of the State of Israel (Shapira, 24 No-
vember 1992), lands upon which, in many instances, many tribes lived in 
semi-permanent, “fi xed” residences (Marx 1967: 10). Between 60,000 and 
90,000 bedouin resided throughout the region prior to the 1948 War of 
Israeli Independence (Boneh, 1983: 47), comprising seven major “macro-
tribes” (Arabic: kabila): the Tarabeen, Tiyaha, Hanajira, Jibarat, Sa’idiyin, 
Ahyawat, and the Azazmeh. Th e Azazmeh—the tribe providing the focus 
of most of this monograph—had, since the late 1910s, lived within a ter-
ritory demarcated by the “arid mountains” of the Negev interior, as the 
stronger Tiyaha and Tarabeen tribes had moved into better quality grazing 
lands further north (Marx 1967: 9).
After the 1948 War, only 11,000 bedouin total remained in the Negev, 
the majority having fl ed or been expelled to the West and East banks of 
the Jordan River, the Gaza district, and the Sinai Peninsula. Of these, 90 
percent were Tiyaha; only a few hundred were Azazmeh, and “even fewer” 
were Tarabeen (Marx 1967: 12). While the Jibarat, Hanajira, Sa’idiyin, and 
most of Tarabeen fl ed altogether from the region, the Ahyawat moved 
southward into the Sinai. Th e majority of the Tiyaha did not fl ee during the 
War, but waited out the outcome of the War to determine the new political 
dynamics in the region (Boneh 1983: 53).
As for the Azazmeh, the tribe was split into sections, but experienced 
no wholesale fl ight during the War. Still, of the twelve major sub-tribes 
that originally comprised the Azazmeh, only the Mas’udiyin remained in 
tact. Some one thousand remnants of several other tribes were thus united 
under a few Azazmeh sheikhs by 1960 (Marx 1967: 13), using the same 
“Azazmeh” name as their tribal identifi cation. Disparate groups of bedouin, 
including some Tarabeen, Subhiyan, Sbeihat, Sarahin El-Ryati, and others, 
were now included within the tribe’s structure (Boneh 1983: 53).
Upon the establishment of Israel, the entire Southern District was placed 
under indefi nite Military Administration. Part of the Administration’s re-
sponsibilities was to remove all remaining bedouin groups from their various 
locations and relocate them within a siyag (Hebrew: translated as a “re-
stricted” or “fenced-in place”), a reservation-like region of some 1,000 square 
kilometers (see Map 1.1), that is, one-tenth the size of the original area of 
habitation in which the bedouin originally resided (Boneh 1983: 55–56). 
With few exceptions, the vast majority of Negev bedouin complied with 
the removal order. In addition, the Administration required that the bed-
ouin obtained permits in order to exit the siyag, which were given out on a 
limited basis and then only for purposes of travel, or to those who worked 
outside of the closed area in various occupations, including non-pastoral 
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activities. In reality, however, bedouin families living south of Be’er Sheva 
in the Mitzpe Ramon and Avdat areas were able to escape removal into 
the siyag because of their remote areas of residence. Th e Israelis did not 
in truth control the Negev and its borders fully until 1956—only then, two 
years after nearly all other Negev bedouin, did the bedouin in the more 
peripheral regions of the southern Negev take on Israeli citizenship. More-
over, the siyag was not totally closed. It was possible to leave, but only in 
one direction: Jordan (Hamamdi, 7 February 2007). 
Th e siyag’s purported purpose was to serve as a control and security 
mechanism, utilized both to protect the Jewish population of the new 
country from potential violence at the hands of the bedouin, as well as to 
concentrate the bedouin in one relatively small geographic area and remove 
them from “state lands.” From this point onward, state policy in the Negev 
served to encourage permanent bedouin settlement within a concentrated 
area, and eff ectively to eliminate nomadic activity as a whole (Marx 1967: 
53–54). Th ese eff orts were based in part upon assumptions, expressed 
throughout the literature, that the passing of nomadism is a “natural” phe-
nomenon (Meir 1997: 2), as peoples move from the pole of “traditional-
ism” to the pole of “modernity.” But in the Israeli case, this process may 
be further politicized and problemacized; with sedentarization and the ac-
tive ceasing of nomadism, the bedouin would, some contended, experience 
changing political contexts, and a “cultural orientation away from the Arab 
culture of the Middle East toward a more modern Western culture” (Meir 
1997: 5), most naturally embodied by the newly evolving Israeli State.
And yet, any measures to permanently settle, at the state’s behest, on 
lands that were not traditionally their own were met with resistance and 
vigilance on the part of the community. Rather, the bedouin sought to 
maintain a continuity with past land holdings, viewing resettlement in the 
siyag as but a temporary development (Marx 1967: 54).
Four major areas of settlement soon resulted from the relocation: the 
Huzaiyil (Rahat), Hura, Laqiya, and Tel Sheva areas. Th ese settlements ini-
tially had no government-directed plan, and no services other than schools. 
In the four settlements, some water provision was specially arranged. 
Settlement site location within the siyag was chosen based upon a variety 
of criteria, including proximity to highways in instances where residents 
sought easy transport access (Boneh 1983: 71).
Th e evacuation of the bedouin to the siyag led to restricted movement 
of the bedouin, whose free-ranging pastoral practices required large geo-
graphic areas in order to remain economically viable. Th erefore, while this 
concentration did not bring an end to the pastoral aspects of bedouin so-
ciety, it did signify the discontinuation of the active nomadic lifestyle by 
a majority of the bedouin population. Th e whole area was placed under 
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almost continuous cultivation, 
especially in barley and other 
cereals. Overuse of the soil was 
inevitable; erosion, though rec-
ognized as a danger, was simply 
accepted, as there seemed no 
way to conserve land in such a 
limited area (Marx 1967: 19). 
With the desire to control cer-
tain areas of the Negev for mili-
tary purposes, the government 
placed further limitations on 
where animals could graze. But 
the need for pasture outside of 
the siyag continued throughout 
the mid to late 1950s, as fl ocks 
were increased in order to maxi-
mize potential profi ts. Confl icts 
with Jewish newcomers to the 
Negev led to additional political 
stresses, and further reluctance 
by the Administration to open 
more lands to the bedouin for 
pasturage.
Th e combination of landless-
ness and the diffi  culties of rais-
ing fl ocks on limited grazing 
land led to alternative activity in 
the wage labor economy. By the 
mid-1960s, 45 percent of bed-
ouin male laborers worked in 
agriculture, 23 percent in con-
struction, transport, and ser-
vices, and 32 percent were “un-
employed” (that is, they lacked 
employment in the wage labor 
economy; Meir 1988: 261). Still, 
pastoral activity and traditional 
dry farming continued to provide a known alternative to the uncertainties 
of employment in the modern economy (Meir 1988: 263).
As Be’er Sheva was further developed as the regional center of the Negev 
during the early 1960s, its pull for bedouin labor increased. Th e founding 
Map 1.1. Location of the Recognized/
Legal Negev Bedouin Towns as of 2000.
Used by permission, courtesy of the Royal Scottish 
Geographical Society.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
This image is not available 
in this open access ebook 
due to rights restrictions. 
6 Settling for Less: Th e Planned Resettlement of Israel’s Negev Bedouin
in 1961 of the new Jewish development town of Arad created a variety of 
job opportunities for bedouin wage labor as well, with light construction 
proving particularly attractive (Boneh 1983: 60). 
As bedouin men increasingly turned to wage labor outside of their com-
munity, women, girls, elder community members, and others unable to 
work in these areas took over the responsibilities of tending fl ocks (though 
men remained responsible for camel herding; Marx 1967: 47). Like other 
Arab laborers in Israel, bedouin men were not allowed to remain in the 
cities or take their families there, thereby ensuring that they acquired only 
temporarily employment outside of the siyag (Marx 1967: 51).
Socially, the creation of the siyag led to severely crowded conditions, 
at least by bedouin standards. Th e population density in the area under 
Military Administration was 15 persons/square kilometer, as compared to 
2 in the Sinai and 220 in the rest of Israel (Marx 1967: 14). Nearly 3,300 
families were located there, intensively utilizing the available land as best 
as was possible for all agricultural, pastoral, and residential needs (Marx 
1967: 19). Th is lack of freedom of mobility, particularly amidst a population 
that had previously moved about relatively freely without limits or borders, 
produced a number of societal impacts. Th e close geographic proximity 
of various groups who historically had remained distant from one another 
due to social, cultural, or familial reasons, were now brought together in a 
new social dynamic.
To be sure, some degree of spontaneous settlement had occurred prior 
to the creation of the State of Israel in the late 1940s. Some bedouin settled 
during the Ottoman period in the latter part of the nineteenth century, re-
sponding to market forces and opportunities that presented themselves in 
the areas of agricultural production and animal husbandry (Kressel 2003: 
56). Moreover, as Abu-Rabia notes, the Ottomans strove to settle the bed-
ouin by the turn of the twentieth century, a process that continued through-
out the British Mandate period, as well as towns for some tribes that were 
developed in the western Negev (1994: 13). Th us, the imposition of the 
siyag served to disrupt the lives not only of those who were yet nomadic, 
but of those who had begun to settle as well. 
Beginning in 1959, only one group member was allowed to go outside 
of the siyag (in the beginning of May) with the fl ocks in search of summer 
grazing. Usually a youth, the shepherd would follow his fl ocks, while his 
family would stay behind. “Th e camp thus [became] a more permanent cen-
ter of the [Bedouin] group, while hitherto the members of the group had 
joined [the group] only at ploughing and harvest time” (Marx 1967: 85).
Th is led to perhaps the greatest social shift to take place in the bedouin 
community during this period, the transition from mobile to fi xed camp 
locations (Marx 1967: 87). Th e permanence of the spontaneous settlements 
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inside the siyag provided fi xed points of reference, and a sense of place 
previously foreign to the bedouin life experience. Th is development was to 
have profound repercussions later on, as the government sought to relocate 
the bedouin a second time, and to further concentrate the population into 
even fewer settlements.
Th e crux of the political confl ict over land ownership typical of pastoral 
nomad-resettlement projects and access had thus begun. From the outset 
of the creation of the Military Administration of the Negev, the Lands De-
partment of the Ministry of Agriculture sought to assert ownership over all 
of the land in the Negev, using the Ottoman Land Laws of 1858 and 1859 as 
the basis of its claims (Boneh 1983: 117). 
Although the bedouin themselves were able to choose their settlement 
locations within the siyag, the “spontaneity” of this settlement clearly had 
been initiated by the state’s removal program (see Map 1.2). Th erefore, the 
move from nomadism to semi-nomadism to permanent settlement was not 
spontaneous in nature. Rather, observers such as Boneh suggest that, “an 
alternative way of articulating the phenomenon of Bedouin settlement in 
the Negev [during the period of the siyag] is to view the Bedouin as reluc-
tant participants in the process of sedentarization” (Boneh 1983: 72; em-
phasis added).
In this relatively enclosed environment, the Administration practiced 
indirect rule over the bedouin tribes by acquiring the assistance of various 
tribal sheikhs, in eff ect co-opting them, by granting favors and utilizing 
their respected positions in the community in order to exercise eff ective 
communal control. Allocation of land, for example, was undertaken via dis-
tribution through local sheikhs. Th ey were thus empowered to decide who 
received which lands, and how much was received. 
Th e sheikhs’ power thereby increased to the point that, by the mid 1950s, 
even tractors could only be purchased by permit—and again, permits were 
distributed via the tribal sheikhs. According to Marx, “a chief [sheikh] who 
had access to the Military Administration could gain many advantages for 
his tribesmen and, therefore, greatly increase their dependence on him. 
Th is put him in a position eff ectively to carry out the Administration’s in-
structions in the tribe” (Marx 1967: 44–45). At the same time, the relation-
ship with the government allowed the sheikhs to infl uence where schools 
or other facilities might be placed in order to increase their prestige among 
their tribes (Meir 1990: 772); this in turn also implied that services were in 
eff ect “favors” rewarded for good behavior, rather than necessary facilities 
for all to utilize and to enjoy.
By conferring such powers and privilege upon the sheikhs, the state in-
troduced what Boneh has contrasted with “the egalitarian status of Sheikhs 
typical of nomadic Bedouin” (1983: 59). Th us, it may be contended that a 
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more top-down style of rule previously unknown in the community began 
to develop. To this point, bedouin society had been relatively decentralized, 
with each man having equal say and decisions being made largely based 
upon the Islamic principles of consensus (Arabic: ijma’a). But throughout 
the 1950s and early 1960s, the community was controlled in a manner of 
concentration, encapsulation, and co-optation, with the traditional leader-
ship increasingly playing a key role in helping the state carry out its agenda 
of what Boneh (1983: 59) calls “indirect rule.”
Th e bedouin were granted Israeli citizenship in 1954, soon after the siyag 
was created (Marx 1967: 54). A permanent leasing program was enforced 
beginning in the mid 1950s, despite hopes that citizenship would serve as 
a vehicle through which land might be returned to the community, as the 
bedouin had hoped. Citizenship also served to formalize the community’s 
severed ties with other Arab and bedouin groups in the region. It also put 
Map 1.2. Th e Location of the Recognized Towns in Relation to Nearby Jewish 
Communities and the Siyag.
Used by permission, courtesy of the Royal Scottish Geographical Society.
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an end to cross border movement, by further encouraging a vested eco-
nomic, if not political, interest in the Israeli State (Boneh 1983: 54). 
In addition, by conferring citizenship upon the community, the state also 
took on the responsibility of providing the group with adequate healthcare, 
schools, and other facilities (Shapira, 24 November 1992). Such provisions 
were both costly and diffi  cult, however, due to the geographic dispersion of 
the population, even within the siyag area itself. 
It was within this context that the bedouin new town planning initiative 
was developed. In the early 1960s, the state determined that the creation 
of a limited number of sites would best serve the state and the commu-
nity alike by permanently settling these nomads, which would act as an 
attractive tool to draw people together and to further concentrate them in 
urban areas. In addition, these services, which were not provided in the un-
planned camp setting due to various logistical and budgetary limitations, 
could serve to further the socioeconomic development and modernization 
of the community into a contributing element of the broader Israeli society 
and economy. As Dudu Cohen, Director of the Ministry of the Interior, 
Southern District (24 April 2007) explains:
One of the reasons that the government decided to open development 
towns for the bedouin is that the government is not able to distribute ser-
vices to such a widely distributed population … If the government wants 
to put up a school—where should it put it? It’s got to deliver educational 
services, social work services. A government can only deliver services in 
a central location. 
And so, it’s not just this government, all governments make the decision 
that they need to build settlements, [and that] within this framework the 
residents will be able to establish their life routines, to receive all the ser-
vices that a government is obligated to give to its citizens, and also to al-
low the residents to progress and develop…
But if you want Internet [a later addition, to be sure], university, a little 
higher education, academics, you can’t do it in the wilderness. You need 
the ‘stuff ’: media, electricity, educational services, healthcare, higher edu-
cation for the children. You need to create contact with and availability of 
all these services for the bedouin, or else their children will remain in the 
same situation that their parents are in. 
And yet, there are those who would contend that when the resettlement 
plan was born on 19 September 1965, the primary impetus of the program 
was nothing of the kind, but was in fact the removal of the bedouin from 
the land, with the ultimate purpose of putting an end to their claims of land 
ownership throughout the Negev region (Swirski & Hasson 2006: 17).
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Israel’s bedouin new town program began in earnest with the designa-
tion of Tel Sheva as the fi rst planned bedouin town, which followed the for-
mal removal of the siyag (Boneh 1983: 74). By 1968, forty-three buildings 
had been constructed in the town by the Israeli government. Th e central 
business district included a community center, space for shops, a restau-
rant, and a youth club. Each house was built with a separation between the 
guest room and the rest of the house, in an attempt to replicate the design 
of a traditional bedouin tent. 
According to outside observers, the town initially proved to be a failure 
(Boneh 1983; Horner 1982). Tel Sheva’s planners failed to fully understand 
the nature of bedouin society, or the needs and desires of the community 
for whom the town was designed. Tel Sheva’s houses, for example, were 
only 70 m2 in size (Gradus & Stern 1985: 53), too small to house the large 
bedouin families for whom they were built. Windows were similarly de-
signed too small for people who were accustomed to the wide-open ex-
panses and the freedom of the open desert. Land lots were also only 400 
m2, large by Jewish Israeli standards, but still unable to accommodate both 
houses and outbuildings for livestock. Many new residents simply used the 
houses to house their animals, while they lived in traditional tents in their 
backyards (Gradus & Stern 1985: 54). Moreover, the town’s center did not 
function well. Members of the community tended to shop once per week, 
generally at the Be’er Sheva Th ursday suq (Arabic: market); as a result, the 
center’s stores had little or no activity during much of the week.
By the mid 1970s, only 25 of the 46 houses built by the government were 
occupied (Boneh 1983: 74). Opposition to relocating to the town was based 
upon the mixed tribal living that Tel Sheva encouraged, and the inability 
adequately to maintain traditional modesty and privacy practices given the 
town’s physical layout and design. Planners’ attempts to quickly integrate 
disparate bedouin groups through physical planning failed to recognize 
the strength of ongoing tribal rivalries (Ben-David 1993: 44). Still, many 
bedouin groups did relocate to the area around the town, attracted by the 
services provided there, even if they did not want to live in the town. 
Th ose who did move into Tel Sheva itself were overwhelmingly fellahi 
bedouin in origin (see Chapter 5). Th ese bedouin had originally come to the 
Negev from Egypt via the Gaza district beginning at the turn of the twenti-
eth century (Kressel et al. 1991: 29), fl eeing diffi  cult living conditions in the 
Nile Valley that encouraged a signifi cant out-migration (Kressel 2003: 29). 
Following their movement eastward, they had found protection, assistance 
to earn their livelihoods, and, most importantly, land for agriculture, which 
they did not own but leased from the “True” Arab bedouin tribes in the 
area (see Marx 1967: 66). 
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Th ough these fellahi groups were accepted into the “True” bedouin com-
munity, they acted as landless tenants to these bedouin (particularly as 
agriculturalists), and held an inferior social position in relation to them 
(Kressel et al. 1991: 31). While Boneh suggests that “annexed” fellahi bed-
ouin groups were expected to pay patronage to their “True” bedouin advo-
cates by off ering them their daughters as wives (especially second wives), 
for example, to further seal the fellahi-“True” bedouin arrangement (1983: 
96), Marx (1967: 67) states that this behavior was not common when he 
conducted his fi eldwork. 
Despite their social inferiority, the fellahi bedouins’ role in the reset-
tlement of the Negev bedouin is a crucial factor. For the most part, the 
fellahin took on the material culture and lifestyle of the “True” bedouin 
when they came to the Negev, becoming virtually indistinguishable in ap-
pearance. But this acculturation process moved in two directions (Kressel 
et al. 1991: 45), with an inter-penetration between both cultures, sets of 
values, and lifestyles. Th e fellahin impacted the “True” bedouin, as they 
brought agricultural behaviors and practices to the Negev, while they took 
on the residential patterns of the local culture and lifestyle, living in tents 
and dressing and behaving as the local bedouin behaved. 
Unlike their “True” brethren, the landless fellahi bedouin, who had once 
lived in adobe huts in the Nile Valley, sought permanent settlement in the 
Negev, and relied upon settled agriculture more than livestock raising as 
their primary economic activity. Th e fellahi bedouin also helped introduce 
modern tools and machinery into bedouin society (Kressel et al. 1991: 43), 
particularly in the fi eld of agriculture. 
Although the processes of environmental adaptation to agriculture and 
sedentarization in the Negev appear to correlate with the existence or lack 
of fellahi bedouin in a given area in the Negev, researchers have been unable 
to confi rm this hypothesis (Kressel et al. 1991: 45–46). Still, what is clear is 
that by the beginning of the British Mandate period after World War I, only 
86 percent of the bedouin, “True” and fellahi combined, were nomadic tent 
dwellers (quoted in Meir 1988: 259). Th e rest, primarily the fellahi bedouin, 
had already begun to settle in more permanent settlements, the precursors 
to today’s spontaneous and planned settlements. 
Given the history and social environment of bedouin society, it is not 
surprising then that the fellahi bedouin led the way to settlement in the 
planned towns, beginning with Tel Sheva. Th ese bedouin were more cul-
turally receptive to the sedentary lifestyle of the planned town, given their 
backgrounds in sedentary agricultural villages and their desire to move up 
socially (which was impossible within the framework of the “True” bedouin 
tribal structure; Boneh 1983: 101). 
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As non-landowners and “lower class” bedouin, the fellahi bedouin 
therefore had little to lose in relocating and more to gain. Th e fellahin saw 
relocation to the town as a vehicle for upward mobility and land ownership. 
Resettlement also allowed them fi nally to separate themselves and become 
independent from the “True” bedouin tribes to whom they were indebted 
(Boneh 1983: 102). 
Th us, the outstanding political and social divisions in the planned town 
of Tel Sheva remained between groups of fellahi and “True” bedouin ori-
gins. While “True” bedouin mostly refused relocation for fear of settling 
upon lands previously belonging to other “True” bedouin, the fellahin felt 
little reluctance to enjoy the fruits of the state’s initiative. Th erefore, con-
cerns over land ownership questions, which tended to follow along fellahi/
“True” lines, continued to form the primary distinction between those 
groups choosing to relocate into Tel Sheva, and those who remained in 
non-planned settlements (Boneh 1983: 81). 
Lastly, it is important to point out that the role of the fellahin in the 
bedouin’s resettlement in Tel Sheva and elsewhere was not universal. Nei-
ther fellahi newcomers, the Ottoman government, nor even traders pen-
etrated the geographically harsh Azazmeh territory in the southern Negev 
Highlands to any degree throughout the aforementioned period of fellahi 
migration into the Negev. Th erefore, the Azazmeh experienced limited ex-
posure to outsiders, with the introduction of modern farm machinery, for 
example, occurring in the Highlands only well after the creation of Israel 
(Kressel et al. 1991: 46). Th e Azazmeh’s reliance upon their fl ocks, even 
when engaging in limited agriculture—using camels to pull plows for ex-
ample (Kressel et al. 1991: 47)—reveals the degree to which the traditional 
preference for livestock helped to perpetuate a nomadic lifestyle in the 
southern interior reaches of the Negev. It may therefore be argued that the 
limited exposure to the fellahin, and a continued preference for livestock 
rearing even as its status was in decline (Kressel et al. 1991: 47), would 
prove to be contributing factors in later resistance on the part of the Aza-
zmeh to settle in permanent locations.
Planning Since the 1960s
Overall, the outcome of the Tel Sheva relocation was at best mixed. A new 
approach to bedouin new town planning, which took the bedouin’s land use 
and social interests into greater account, began in the early 1970s with the 
construction of Rahat, twenty kilometers northwest of Be’er Sheva. Th ough 
the Rahat region was already home to a large spontaneous concentration of 
Huzaiyil bedouin, the town was planned and offi  cially recognized as a legal 
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new town settlement by the government in 1973 (Boneh 1983: 77), when 
residents began to receive electricity and running water.
Unlike Tel Sheva’s plan, traditional bedouin sociocultural functions were 
expressed spatially in the Rahat plan (Gradus & Stern 1985: 55). Th e town 
was broken down into neighborhoods comprised of self-built homes, and 
was designed exclusively for related “True,” fellahi, or Abid (former black 
slave; see Chapter 5) bedouin groups. Outsider groups or tribes could no 
longer move into just any area, but had specifi c neighborhoods designated 
and preserved solely for their use. Th ese large neighborhoods, which were 
connected by the town’s primary roads, served separate communities and 
helped to preserve tribal hierarchies. Circular roads, cul-de-sacs, and green 
spaces helped lend defi nition to the diff erent neighborhoods. 
As Fenster explains: “ethnic identity interests of the Bedouin can be iden-
tifi ed as those which retain their cultural or national identity. In planning 
terms, [those interests take on] spatial expression [which] relates to meet-
ing their landownership needs, respecting the privacy of the Bedouin clan, 
especially at the level of the nuclear and extended family, and the privacy of 
women” (Fenster 1991: 37). Th e physical layout of the towns also refl ected 
the social engineering interests of the state. “From a social standpoint, the 
planners saw a social advantage in the tribal integration that would take 
place in large scale settlements, when agricultural settlements had up till 
then been inhabited by only one tribe” (Fenster 1991: 146). Th e social dy-
namic envisioned is diagrammed in Figure 1.1.
Additionally, economic opportunity, such as light industry, was intro-
duced in the Rahat plan. Negev regional planners sought to centralize in-
dustry in specifi c areas and not to place industry in residential areas. In 
Jewish and Arab towns alike, the need for electricity, sewerage, and other 
major infrastructure are too expensive to provide to a variety of areas. Th e 
Figure 1.1 Bedouin Town Physical Layout Model.
Adapted from Fenster, 1991: cited, 150.
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creation of concentrated industry zones for the maximization of econo-
mies of scale is, then, considered to be far more cost-eff ective (Gur, 18 May 
1993).
Th e new policies and design features in Rahat helped to make the town a 
much greater success than Tel Sheva was in attracting residents. In the late 
1980s, Tel Sheva underwent a replanning program in order to rectify previ-
ous planning errors, and to learn from the successes of the Rahat program 
(Abu-Saad, 2 November 1992; Gradus & Stern, 1985: 56).
Th us, by 1982, some ten to twelve thousand people were living in Rahat 
(Boneh 1983: 77), though the majority still remained, like Tel Sheva’s in-
migrants, largely of fellahi origin. Th e population had nearly doubled by 
the early 1990s, and by 2007, the town had grown into a city, the largest 
bedouin community in the world, with a population of at least 42,000 resi-
dents (Dudu Cohen, 24 April 2007). 
Soon after the creation of Rahat, in 1975 a group known as the Albeck 
Committee was created to discuss and address the ongoing “bedouin prob-
lem” and to seek some resolution to it. Th e problem, simply stated, was 
(and is) the ongoing challenge for how to relocate the bedouin into the 
towns, that is, to concentrate them into ever-increasingly smaller geo-
graphic living environments. Th ere are three principles that developed out 
of this committee that are relevant to present-day concerns. First, it was 
restated that the state does not recognize that the bedouin own the land 
upon which they live (i.e., what is referred to throughout this volume as 
the “pezurah,” (Hebrew: dispersion); that is, the term used by the state as 
well as the literature when referring to the unrecognized, informal, “illegal” 
settlements built by the bedouin on lands they claim as historically under 
their ownership). Second, the bedouin can be compensated for these lands 
when they relocate (despite the fact that they do not have a legitimate land 
ownership claim from the state’s perspective). Lastly, this compensation to 
the bedouin would be premised upon the tacit agreement that they would 
only receive such monies so long as they then agreed to move to one of the 
planned towns (Swirski & Hasson 2006: 21).
Th us, following the construction of Tel Sheva and Rahat in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, construction of K’seifa and Aroer ushered in a new era of 
planning. Unlike the four aforementioned large areas of bedouin concen-
tration, the two towns were built as part of an eff ort to expropriate lands 
from the bedouin that were needed for a specifi c construction project. 
Moreover, bedouin town planning in the early 1980s shifted in emphasis, 
moving away from reliance upon a predominantly physical planning ap-
proach to one of greater concern for social and economic development. 
Increased awareness of tribal cleavages, an attempt to recognize and accept 
some agriculture activity in the urban areas, and a concern not only over 
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service provision but also service quality all contributed toward this trend 
(Ben-David 1993: 74–77). 
Th e history of the building of K’seifa and Aroer (later renamed Arara 
B’Negev) in 1982 as a result of the Tel Malhata project had been discussed 
at length in Fenster’s comprehensive dissertation (1991) and need not be 
detailed here. However, a brief review of some of the planning events of this 
period is relevant to understanding today’s planning activities. In particu-
lar, the evolution of the resettlement program was a major turning point, 
due to the time pressures associated with this particular area of bedouin 
spontaneous settlement. For the fi rst time, the government undertook a 
more inclusive, comprehensive, and intensifi ed planning approach, utiliz-
ing development anthropological methods as part of the bedouin resettle-
ment project.
Th e K’seifa and Aroer relocation project developed out of a 1976 plan for 
the northern Negev. Th e plan included construction of a military air base 
at Tel Malhata, which was eventually carried out in response to the with-
drawal from the Sinai as a part of the Camp David Accords (Fenster 1991: 
121). Th e base project required an area of 150,000 dunams (nearly 40,000 
acres), upon which some fi ve to seven thousand Negev bedouin resided 
(Fenster 1991: 161). At the time, 1,273 tents existed in the region; by 1979, 
nearly another 1,200 had been erected (2,464 in total, quoted in Fenster 
1991: 129), largely in an eff ort to combat the government’s removal plans. 
Families also expanded the building of tin, wood, and stone houses to cre-
ate more “facts on the ground” (a strategy repeated often throughout the 
Negev, see below). Nearly 5,000 of these structures were built in 1982 alone 
(Fenster 1991: 130). 
Th e need to quickly construct the base following the military pull-out 
from Sinai, and the realization that the bedouin would remain intransigent 
against the state’s land expropriation eff orts, demanded a reorientation of 
the resettlement process, which took into greater account the demands and 
land claims of the area’s population. Th e government fi rst had hoped that 
the bedouin would move from the land with little hesitance. When this 
failed to occur, however, the 1979 Land Law was passed with the intent to 
seize it. Th e resulting fears, anxieties, and rumors only further complicated 
state eff orts to pursue its relocation agenda (Marx 1990: 233). 
A “Bedouin Team” was created to help facilitate the removal order and 
to off er a comfortable alternative to the 1979 Land Law. Th e Team included 
anthropologists, planners, and others sympathetic to bedouin concerns 
(Fenster 1991: 163) and knowledgeable of their interests. Th rough the use 
of advocacy, mediation, and negotiation, the Team sought a pluralis tic ap-
proach to the recognition of the bedouin’s land rights, and to their essential 
participation in the planning and resettlement of K’seifa and Aroer (Fenster 
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1991: 171). Th e Team also sought to bring the state and the bedouin com-
munities together in order to reduce the tension and confl ict between the 
two, and to integrate the bedouin into Israeli society through improved 
services and a higher living standard. 
In 1980, the Implementation Authority of the Camp David Accords Land 
Acquisition Law of 1980 was created by the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Ministry of Justice to carry out the building of the base (Shoshani, 7 De-
cember 1992). Th e Bedouin Team was incorporated into the Authority as 
a think tank to assist in pursuing bedouin cooperation through relocation 
(Fenster 1991: 166). Th is organizational change from the Bedouin Team to 
the Authority, that is, “from a pressure advocate group to a bureaucratic ex-
ecutive” (Fenster 1991: 178), revealed a shift in the project’s need for timely 
implementation.
Th e Implementation Authority acted as an umbrella group with four sec-
tions: 1) the Negotiating Team, responsible for questions of compensation 
and resettlement; 2) a think tank, (essentially the Bedouin Team), which 
served as problem solvers; 3) the Planning Team, which planned the settle-
ments themselves, and included Ministry of Housing representatives; and, 
4) the Administrative Team, which held the fi nancial responsibilities of 
implementation. Other responsibilities included writing plans, town con-
struction, preparation of irrigated land, data gathering, bedouin planning 
preferences, compensation agreements, supervision of evacuation, logis-
tics, and accounting (Fenster 1991: 193).
Implementation occurred through a step-by-step process, in which 
there were a number of levels to accomplish the removal task. Th e prelimi-
nary level was to provide basic public services to the two towns, including 
schools, clinics, and neighborhood facilities, and then to wait and to see 
who would voluntarily relocate. Th e Authority then brought the plans to 
the bedouin to hear their opinions. Th e Authority found a number of limi-
tations in its eff orts, however. As one member explained, “[the bedouin] 
didn’t have a total understanding from maps, from descriptions on paper. 
So we went to the places themselves to show how development would ac-
tually appear, and where” (Shoshani, 7 December 1992). Th ese leaders in-
cluded sheikhs, heads of hamulas, teachers, and various people with some 
education or knowledge; that is, “not just simple people.” 
Despite the seemingly “obvious” improvements that the new town living 
had to off er, the bedouin still proved unwilling to accept the relocation plan, 
refusing to trust totally those in positions of authority. Th e initial approach 
of the Bedouin Team and the Implementation Authority had been to ap-
proach and to work through the sheikhs and other traditional leadership 
in order to gain the trust of the community in pursuit of the government’s 
goals (Fenster 1991: 176). When, after a short time, it became apparent that 
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the sheikhs were similarly reluctant to cooperate with the removal eff ort, 
the government shifted away from the traditional leadership to the younger 
bedouin leadership, which they expected would prove more amenable to 
relocation and resettlement (Fenster 1991: 177), rather than to admit that 
inherent problems might be found within the allocation initiative itself.
Still, bedouin negotiators in these meetings were part of the community 
elite. Th ey therefore were unable to speak for the whole of the community 
without fi rst seeking group consensus. Th is desire to gain broader approval 
stemmed from Islamic principles of shared, democratic leadership, which 
call for group member agreement in the context of the decision-making 
process (ijma’a; Arabic: consensus). And yet, predictably, as more people 
were brought into the planning process, implementation of the project 
became that much more complex and ineff ective (Fenster 1991: 178). Th e 
desire to get the relocation job done quickly led the Chief Negotiator to 
accept demands of various pressure groups, particularly the fellahi tribes 
in the area. Th ese agreements did not necessarily serve the Authority or 
the bedouin, for that matter, in the long term, but they did help facilitate 
relocation (Fenster 1991: 195).
Various promises to individuals, such as “securing nomination of lead-
ers of the clans as offi  cial sheikhs, licenses for weapons, licenses for driving 
taxis, and also promises relating to the development of services for each 
neighborhood such as schools and mosques” (Fenster 1991: 236), later 
backfi red when it was revealed that the Authority lacked the power to de-
liver on such promises. Such agreements also served to create a system of 
reward for those who held out the longest (Fenster 1991: 237). Th ose with 
the most land also gained more than those with little or no land (Shoshani, 
7 December 1992).
Th e building of K’seifa and Aroer well epitomizes the problems inherent 
in the bedouin resettlement project during this period. In particular, “the 
negative response of nomads to ‘top down’ sedentarization, even with posi-
tive incentive, stems from the simple fact that planning has not met their 
pluralist needs, either in cases when the physical layout of the settlement 
has not suited their ethnic needs, or where the very sedentarization pro-
cess itself failed to provide their citizen needs” (Fenster 1991: 119–120).
Overall, the removal of bedouin to Aroer and K’seifa was unique because 
of the use of development anthropological methods and the inclusion of 
public participation in the towns’ planning process. Experts and other ad-
vocates were engaged to facilitate a development anthropological approach 
previously lacking in Negev bedouin town planning. One could, therefore, 
conclude that the towns would better succeed in serving their residents 
because of the Implementation Authority’s greater eff orts to address the 
bedouin community’s demands. 
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In the fi nal analysis, the primary concern of the government was that of 
land appropriation for the military base, and it off ered little in terms of the 
development of the existing community there. “We just wanted to build 
the air strip, that was our job,” off ered one of the planners involved in the 
project. “Th at was the fi nal goal” (Shoshani, 7 December 1992). Th at said, 
the social and economic status of K’seifa and Arara B’Negev today diff er 
little from the other towns in the bedouin system. 
Th roughout the 1980s, Negev bedouin resettlement moved slowly for-
ward, oftentimes relying upon forced, rather than voluntary, relocation un-
dertaken by the Green Patrol, an aggressive quasi-military entity created by 
Ariel Sharon in 1978 and operating out of the Israel Land Administration 
with the sole purpose of relocating the bedouin off  of the land and into the 
towns, seemingly at any cost. As the fi rst town in the system, Tel Sheva 
received considerable attention during this period as it was redeveloped 
toward the end of the decade in response to the more positive results ex-
perienced in other towns. Rahat, as the second town in the system, both 
learned from and contributed to the Tel Sheva planning experience, and 
was rapidly becoming the most successful of all of the towns in terms of at-
tracting in-migrants. K’seifa and Aroer, as products of Camp David and the 
Sinai land agreement, off ered unique compensation and incentives to area 
tribes in return for their relatively quick relocation off  of the land needed 
by the state. By their very creation through the relocation of the population 
from the Tel Malhata region, they were automatically viewed as “success-
ful” in terms of meeting the state’s regional development needs; that is, the 
military base was built, so the relocation was a success.
In 1986, the Bedouin Authority, which developed out of the Tel Malhata 
initiative, was created. Although the Land Authority remains the overarch-
ing body overseeing bedouin concerns, this body to the present-day has 
direct jurisdiction over the daily interests and concerns of the bedouin 
community throughout the Negev. Since its creation, the Authority has a 
“monopoly” on planning and development in the community (Swirski & 
Hasson 2006: 39), playing a signifi cant role in virtually every aspect of the 
bedouin’s lives, both inside the planned towns and in the so-called “pe-
zurah” (the “dispersed,” unrecognized settlements). 
Th e Authority has been criticized by some for having such considerable 
concentrated power. No other population in Israel is similarly governed 
by such an agency, which has been compared to the United States Depart-
ment of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Aff airs (Swirski & Hasson 2006: 33), 
an agency similarly criticized for being too paternalistic and controlling of 
Native American concerns and, for all intents and purposes, a “state within 
a state.” Further, as Swirski & Hasson point out (2006: 44), all administra-
tive positions in the Bedouin Authority are headed by Jews. Th e Director 
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confi rms that this is the case and, he contends, it is for a good reason (Ye-
shuran, 10 May 2007):
Everyone who works here [in the Bedouin Authority] is Jewish. I had 
three bedouin working here when I fi rst took over [just last year], but they 
soon left. Th ey had diffi  culty doing the work. Bedouin don’t wish to speak 
with other bedouin, they don’t want them to know their business, to have 
them know their private aff airs. Everyone now admits that having bed-
ouin mayors was [also] a mistake. No one will get along or listen. In Arara 
[B’Negev] they now have two governments, as they have two competing 
groups and no one group will listen to the other. 
As for the fi nal two of the seven original bedouin towns, Hura (1989) and 
Laqiya (1985), (the development of Segev Shalom will be addressed in detail 
in Chapter 2), their creation was somewhat unique as well. As noted above, 
they, along with the Tel Sheva and Rahat regions, were home to substantial 
numbers of spontaneously settled bedouin since the time of the siyag in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Th eir recognition in the mid 1980s as legal “towns” 
(as opposed to the “unrecognized settlements”), to be formally developed 
and included within the planned town system, was a logical move on the 
part of a government anxious to provide for the most bedouin families at 
the least cost. Th roughout the implementation period, the Land Author-
ity continually sought to facilitate more voluntary resettlement whenever 
possible. Emphases were therefore placed upon greater provision of com-
forts and services, rather than upon removal by force or through monetary 
incentives. 
Still, implementation of the resettlement project became standardized 
by the Land Authority during this period as well. A series of physical plan-
ning steps, in which town design refl ected the potential demand for hous-
ing at the level of the sub-tribe, was developed and regularly utilized. Th e 
government approach to physical planning of neighborhoods, which devel-
oped in the late 1980s, was a byproduct of the design problems previously 
experienced. Th e planning steps were as follows (Shapira, 24 Nov 1992):
1.  Take aerial photos of a spontaneous settlement, and try to count/esti-
mate how many households exist there. Th en, designate an adequate 
number of neighborhood lots in an appropriate town; 
2.  Enter the community on foot and actually survey the number of resi-
dents. Reach a closer estimate;
3.  Plan a neighborhood based upon the tribal breakdown and population 
numbers involved. 
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Almost all of the lots in the towns were improved with basic infrastructure 
prior to their sale. Th ese up-front costs were diffi  cult for the government 
to absorb, particularly when the bedouin were resistant to relocation. On 
average, it cost the government 40,000 New Israeli Shekels [NIS] (about 
$15,000 in early 1990s NIS) to develop a single, one dunam lot. Purchasers 
were charged 8,000 NIS ($3,000) as part of the purchase price toward this 
infrastructure, and the government absorbed the diff erence. Services, such 
as sewers, were lacking in the bedouin towns when initially built because of 
the expense, as they were deemed too “rural and moshav-like, with houses 
too far apart to make sewers cost-effi  cient” (Shapira, 24 November 1992). 
Eligible land-buyers in the bedouin new towns were required to fi t into 
one of a number of specifi c categories. Th ose who could acquire lots in-
cluded families comprised of a man, his wife, and children (both the man 
and the wife own the house, contrary to Muslim law in this regard); a 
woman with children; and single men over the age of 21 years, who have 
served in the Israeli army (Shapira, 24 November 1992). Single women and 
widows, regardless of age, could not acquire lots in the towns. Th is policy 
was based on the belief that if a woman then married, the resulting family 
would own two dunams of land. Th ough clearly undemocratic, the Land 
Authority argued at the time that, “we can’t aff ord for a family to have more 
than one dunam. Even today, one dunam is too large, because there is not 
enough land planned and allotted to the municipalities to adequately ab-
sorb present population demand” (Shapira, 24 November 1992). 
A fourth and fi nal step in the planning process was actively to encour-
age family group/hamula relocation following the near completion of a 
sub-neighborhood. Th is step, however, often proved to be the most chal-
lenging of all. On average, though 90 percent of the lots in a given neigh-
borhood may be purchased, the Land Authority determined that only 40 
percent were actually improved and occupied by their landowners during 
this period in the early 1990s. Th e remaining purchasers tended to remain 
in spontaneous settlements in the area, but did not choose to relocate into 
the towns.
Th us, the planning, development, and selling of the lots in a bedouin 
town were only the fi rst stage in the relocation process. To measure prox-
imity to completion of its planning goals, the Israeli Land Authority also 
looked at the ratio of lots planned, developed, and improved to houses ac-
tually built and occupied—that is, the relationship between the fi rst steps 
of the government development of lots, and the fi nal goal of getting people 
into houses upon those lots—and, I would add, off  of the land claimed by 
the state. 
A policy that continues to be followed to the present-day to address this 
issue allows resettlers to move into town before a house is actually built. 
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Families then have nine months to provide the Bedouin Authority (previ-
ously, it was the Land Authority) with a house design for a structure to be 
built, and then have two to three years to actually build the structure. How-
ever, if the structure is not built on time, the Authority will take no recourse 
against the family in question (Shapira, 24 November 1992). In the mean-
time, families are allowed to build shacks or tents in which they may live 
while preparing to build a permanent stone home, and while accumulating 
the necessary funds to support its construction (see Images). 
Th e ease with which this process is implemented is, like most aspects of 
the resettlement initiative, a subject of widespread disagreement between 
the state and the bedouin community. Moreover, from the state’s perspec-
tive, the process has been streamlined over the past 15 years, so that today, 
few families should encounter any diffi  culties in relocating to a town (Ye-
shuran, 10 May 2007):
Someone in the pezurah can apply to purchase a migrash [Hebrew: town 
lot] and have the process completed in a month. Th ey need to know the 
number of the migrash they wish to buy, have photos, a town map, and 
put in an application. Th ere are people here [in the Bedouin Authority] to 
help them through the process, to “walk them through.” But anyone who 
wants to do it knows what to do. We have a lawyer here whose only job 
is to help them with this. If they need a ride to take them around we can 
help with that too.
Th e bedouin who must go through the process, however, off er a diff erent 
viewpoint. In 2007, a 28-year old bedouin man, who already lives in a bed-
ouin town, stated: 
Th ere’s a lot of bureaucracy [to obtain a migrash], and it’s not at all clear 
how to go through all the steps. But you have to go through the Bedouin 
Authority, and you have to show them a plan for at least a 100 meter2 
house [that you intend to build on the site]. Within 3 years it has to be 
built, and a house of this size will cost around 170,000 NIS (U.S.$42,500).
Over the years, the ability eff ectively to attract newcomers has largely hinged 
upon a policy of seeking fi rst to attract the new local bedouin leadership 
(not the local sheikhs, who often resist relocation for fear of lessened power 
or prestige in the new environment). If these leaders were not interested in 
resettling, the Land Authority would seek out people who were and would 
work with them to encourage tribal resettlement through its assistance. 
As Authority offi  cials explain, “we can’t do it alone because [the bedouin] 
don’t trust the Government. We fi nd out who is interested in moving, and 
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go from there” (Shapira, 24 November 1992). Although this dynamic can 
prove useful for the state, insofar as it can work with designated individuals 
who in turn exercise considerable infl uence over family members, over the 
years, the issue of working with hamula resettlement as opposed to nuclear 
family resettlement presents additional challenges to state planners:
Th ere’s an additional problem that from our perspective is making the 
normalization process in the bedouin population more diffi  cult, and that 
is that bedouin are only willing to come as families, as hamulas. And so 
there’s no situation in this population in which a contractor gets a piece of 
land from the government and develops it, and then sells the units, in all 
the settlements. A contractor, if you can get him interested at all in build-
ing 300 living units, builds them, develops them, markets and sells them. 
With the bedouin, it won’t work this way at all, because the people who 
will move there are only the people that the family will agree to live with. 
No one will go there with force. So you need to plan specifi cally for them. 
You can’t use a plan with a free market approach. You start to plan with 
relatives, the tribe, the hamula and you know that not everyone can live 
opposite the other. You know that there’s a large group that won’t live with 
a second group. 
It’s an obstacle to planning, because this is not a sophisticated free market 
that you can come and say, ‘I’ll plan, and the market forces will function. 
Th e contractor can raise the prices, lower the prices, everyone can live 
with everyone else.’ It’s not like this with the bedouin population. (Dudu 
Cohen, 24 April 2007)
In a “worst case” scenario, the Land Authority will take bedouin groups or 
sub-tribes to court in order to remove them from the land. By law, bedouin 
living outside of the town system in the pezurah are illegal squatters; there 
have been no successful attempts to fi ght the government relocation in the 
court system. After residents move out of an unrecognized settlement (and 
sometimes before), the government razes the settlement with bulldozers in 
an attempt to discourage residents from returning. Th e rationale for this 
policy, beyond the service provision discourse set out in September of 1965, 
has, forty years later, simply come down to a question of the rule of law. Th e 
Director of the Bedouin Authority states: “To be a modern, planned state, 
you have to have order. Look at this map! Look at all the unrecognized 
settlements all over the place. Th is isn’t order” (Yeshuran, 10 May 2007). 
As recently as the early 2000s, it was possible to say that “several thou-
sand” bedouin still resided in tents in the Negev (Kressel 2003: 89). By the 
end of the decade, however, this was no longer true, and very few tents 
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could be found anywhere in the region other than in the tourist areas (see 
Chapter 7). Rather, following a pattern that appears, to the Western ob-
server at least, to be modeled on the children’s story of the “Th ree Little 
Pigs,” those bedouin who do not wish to relocate to the towns, some 40 
percent of the population (Dudu Cohen, 24 April 2007; Yeshuran, 10 May 
2007), are instead increasingly replacing their tents with tin shacks, and 
their tin shacks with cinder block structures. Th ey are laying down cement 
pads for walkways and sitting areas as well. Th e rationale for these eff orts 
is clear; the more “permanent” such communities appear, the bedouin be-
lieve, the less likely they will be destroyed, uprooted, and forced out by the 
Green Patrol and its army of bulldozers. By using ever-stronger building 
materials, the bedouin are seeking to communicate a message to the state 
of: “we’re here to stay; we’re not going anywhere—your huffi  ng and puffi  ng 
notwithstanding.” 
Th us, planning for the urbanization and resettlement of the Negev bed-
ouin has evolved considerably since its inception in the 1960s, relying upon 
a top-down model typical of a centralized, state-centered planning ap-
proach. Only in recent years have the views of community members been 
incorporated into the planning agenda through the use of regional, and 
later local, councils (see Chapter 2). While these councils in theory exer-
cise direct control over the daily aff airs of the planned bedouin towns, the 
reality is that their role in the planning process is largely limited, serving 
as agents of “resistance” and “resilience” to the state’s eff orts (Meir 2007: 
205), while most if not all of the actual planning and governing of the towns 
remains divided, shared, and largely contested under the aegis and jurisdic-
tions of the Land Authority, the Bedouin Authority, and the Ministry of the 
Interior. As Meir sums up the issue,
Th e state used its hegemonic power in this regard to impose the scientifi c 
rationality of the planning process. Th ereby, planning was employed in its 
classical traditional mode, that is a rational and objective activity view-
ing all human agents in space as one type. By regarding the western style 
of urban life as the only viable option for the Bedouin, and by excluding 
them from participating in decision making, the state in fact considered 
its knowledge superior to that of the Bedouin. It acknowledged no “other-
ness” in this respect. (2007: 212) 
As a result, planning for healthcare services, education, infrastructure, and 
social welfare services in concentrated urban locations, the bulwark of the 
resettlement and modernization initiative and the main attraction to be 
off ered to potential resettlers, remains primarily in the hands of the Israeli 
State with limited local control. Moreover, over forty years later, the bed-
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ouin new towns are the subject of much criticism and controversy. Rather 
than serving as nodes of social and economic development and moderniza-
tion, many contend that they are nothing less than violent, impoverished, 
crime-infested slums.
Th e Outcome—Th e Socioeconomic Viability 
of the First Seven Planned Towns
While explanations for the causes will vary, few do not acknowledge in the 
early twenty-fi rst century that the fi rst seven bedouin new towns that were 
planned in the Negev are in crisis. Th e extent of the situation, the level of 
concern, and the answers for how to move forward vary, most especially 
between state and bedouin observers. One thing can be stated with cer-
tainty: poverty and the malaise found in the towns today can be traced 
directly to a lack of access to a variety of resources, beginning with the land 
itself. 
Several statistics bear out this contention. First, between 65 percent and 
75 percent of the Negev bedouin population as a whole lives below the na-
tional poverty line (Katz and De Schutter 2001: 24). Second, while 27 per-
cent of the Negev population is bedouin, the community today lives upon 
2 percent of the land. In Segev Shalom, for example, an area of 5,500 km2, 
the population was 6005 residents in 2005, providing a density of 915.8 
people/km2 (Bustan Report 2005: 3). And yet, according to Dudu Cohen 
of the Interior Ministry (24 April 2007), even this density is not adequate. 
“Land is a fi nite obstacle, it is not something you can produce, it is a given, 
a fact. You must use the land in the most correct way, the most intelligent 
way. You can’t waste land, because if you waste it, you can’t fi nd new land to 
replace it. So you must do good planning that looks at the future needs, not 
just in the next fi ve, ten years, but fi fty years into the future and ask, what 
will be? And so it will not be possible to continue to live as the bedouin do 
in the density that they live today.” 
A few places that a bedouin can go, at least to visit if not necessarily 
to live, are neighboring Jewish communities near and around Be’er Sheva. 
Meitar, population 6,400 in 2005, has a density of 381.5 residents/km2; 
Omer, population 5,900 in 2005, has a density of 293.8 residents/km2; and, 
Mitzpe-Ramon to the south, population 5,000, has a density of 78.1 Jewish 
Israeli residents/km2 (Bustan Report 2005: 4). 
But, of course, the dearth of land is only one resource that is notable in 
the bedouin towns. In truth, resources of all kinds are in fact lacking, and 
land is but one of many scarce commodities. Lithwick, for example, in his 
study of the fi rst seven towns, notes that the average family income in the 
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bedouin towns is less than half of that in Be’er Sheva (2002: 9). And yet, 
given the extremely high bedouin birthrate, three times the national average, 
the urban population is increasing at 5 percent per year based on natural 
increase alone; excluding migration numbers, the population in the towns 
was expected to double between 2002 and 2010 (Lithwick 2002: 11). 
As of 2002, the total population of the planned communities was 76,364, 
according to the Negev Regional Development Center (Swirski & Hasson 
2006: 66)—suggesting that some 150,000 bedouin live in the seven urban 
communities, not to mention the additional nine communities that have 
since been added to the bedouin planned settlement system within the 
Abu-Basma agreement (see below). Were one to measure the “success” of 
the resettlement initiative in these numbers alone, there is no doubt that 
the urbanized bedouin population, and more to the point, the percentage 
of the population living in one of the planned towns, is very clearly on a 
skyward trajectory. 
With a natural growth rate of 5.5 percent, the Negev bedouin popula-
tion doubles itself every fourteen to fi fteen years. Th is issue alone, the state 
contends, is enough to provide a barrier against eff ective, realistic service 
provision, as planners simply cannot keep up with the growth of the com-
munity (Dudu Cohen, 24 April 2007).
Lithwick also notes one of the most commonly held criticisms of all of 
the towns: they have no economic rationale to off set the community’s pop-
ulation “explosion” (2002: 10). Th e towns have been planned with limited 
commercial or industrial infrastructure, no transportation or communi-
cation links, and thus little ability to attract investment. “[Regarding] the 
seven Bedouin towns, it is diffi  cult to discover even … minimal systematic 
rationales for their creation. To most disinterested observers, the fi rst ini-
tiatives have been deemed to be serious failures. Later towns were based 
on minor modifi cations and improvements but in the large, they tended to 
follow the same if not always clearly stated formula that could hardly be ap-
propriate for such diverse entities” (Lithwick 2002: 12–13). 
As Swirski and Hasson note, low level budgeting and limited follow 
through in terms of using the allocated funding appropriately explains 
many of the fi nancial diffi  culties experienced by the bedouin towns (2006: 
58–59), which, since their creation, consistently have remained amongst 
the ten poorest communities in the State of Israel. Rahat, they note, has a 
library, but no books had been purchased for it over a year after it was built 
(Swirski & Hasson 2006: 57). 
In 2003, the Israeli Land Authority allocated 4.5 million NIS for the Bed-
ouin Authority. In the same budget, it allocated 25.8 million NIS for “Land 
protection” and 121 million NIS for “Planning and development in the 
minorities sector.” And yet, while three-quarters of the budget for “Land 
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protection” was actually used, only half of the funding set aside for “Plan-
ning and development” was used; half the funds simply were not taken up 
(Swirski & Hasson 2006: 81).
Th e economic diffi  culties of the towns are clearly evident when it also 
comes to the vicious cycle of limited tax bases upon which further to build 
and to extend infrastructure and growth. While the state is willing to pro-
vide its share, the assumption is that the bedouin town residents, living 
within a market-based economy, will provide theirs as well. “Th e govern-
ment undertook to fi nance the development costs, while residents of the 
new localities were asked to fi nance housing construction, with the help of 
a mortgage amounting to 70 percent of the basic cost of building a dwelling 
unit” (Swirski & Hasson 2006: 17).
While such expectations appear to be fair and equitable and are found 
across the country in the Arab and Jewish sectors alike, the situation in 
the Negev bedouin towns is a familiar Catch-22; without adequate job op-
portunities, incomes are low or nonexistent. Th e unemployment rate in 
the bedouin towns as a whole, for example, is approximately 35 percent, 
compared to 12 percent in nearby Be’er Sheva. Over 64 percent of those 
who are employed occupy “blue collar” positions (Swirski & Hasson 2006: 
95). Th e state planners are aware that such issues are a concern, but believe 
that over time things will change:
We need to bring employment that is appropriate in today’s contempo-
rary times that can include the bedouin. If we were to bring just any in-
dustry that requires high levels of knowledge or technology, they won’t be 
included in it. Th ey end up being janitors, landscapers, and service work-
ers … So we are talking about industries like carpentry, metalworking, 
vegetable [growing], greenhouses—things like they do in Gaza. Th at’s the 
fi rst phase. Of course, we’re also bringing high tech here mainly because 
of the university and the young people we want to keep here. 
In another fi fteen or twenty years, if the young bedouin also will change 
the character of his educational level and preparedness a bit and wants to 
integrate, there will be a place for him to go. But we are working on these 
two levels simultaneously because we need to bring employment that’s 
suitable to both the bedouin population and the Jewish population. But 
you always need the carpenter, the car mechanic and also the high tech 
guy in every society … that’s everywhere in the world. (Dudu Cohen, 24 
April 2007)
Moreover, cultural restraints limit female participation in the workforce, al-
though this is changing (see Chapter 6). According to an analysis conducted 
in the mid 2000s, 87 percent of bedouin women living in the planned towns 
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are not considered “in the labor force.” As for those who are considered a 
part of the force (i.e., the remaining 13 percent), 80 percent of these women 
are employed (Swirski & Hasson 2006: 96).
Nonetheless, whether male or female, monthly wages for urbanized Ne-
gev bedouin average about 3,000 NIS/month less (males) and 1,700 NIS/
month less (females) than their counterparts in Be’er Sheva. Th e gap is 
slightly less when compared to workers in the neighboring Negev town of 
Yeruham (1,750 NIS/900 NIS, respectively), one of the poorest Jewish com-
munities in the State of Israel (Swirski & Hasson 2006: 97). 
Regardless, the bedouin towns are poorly planned in terms of off ering 
any realistic way of being self-supporting or self-sustaining; lacking virtu-
ally any economic infrastructure, a reliance upon market forces to attract 
badly needed investment or employment opportunities is not very realistic, 
particularly when the Jewish sector in the Negev fi nds itself similarly ne-
glected much of the time by a state that limits its attention or investment 
anywhere south of Qiryat Gat. Th us, the creation of the planned towns may 
have solved some of the state’s concerns, but from the perspective of the 
bedouin community, they have done nothing of the kind:
From the viewpoint of the country’s leaders, concentrating the Bedouin 
in townships is a ‘solution’ with clear advantages, the chief among which 
is to reduce the visibility of ‘the [Bedouin] problem.’ Th e Bedouin will be 
neatly confi ned in their townships, and the concentration of camps and 
tin shacks will no longer constitute an eyesore for those traveling the Ne-
gev highways and byways. 
However, it is a moot point whether this will suffi  ce to solve ‘the problem,’ 
since all the problems that today trouble the residents of the ‘recognized’ 
[that is, planned] localities are likely to surface for those who have been 
resettled: the lack of infrastructure, the low quality of public services, the 
absence of economic development, and the dearth of economic opportu-
nities. (Swirski & Hasson 2006: 99)
Th e cyclical nature of the unemployed bedouin’s inability to support the 
tax bases of their own communities is exacerbated by the fact that those 
bedouin living informally in the pezurah are well aware of the lack of em-
ployment in the towns, the higher cost of living due to taxes and fees, and 
the increased tensions with other tribes. Rather than the towns serving as 
magnets and drawing more in-migrants in to help further support their 
struggling economies, the towns appear to off er disincentives for resettle-
ment. To coin the old adage, “good news travels fast,” among the bedouin 
of the Negev, “bad news travels faster.” Th us, many bedouin refuse to relo-
cate to town because of this growing recognition. “Th is awareness [of eco-
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nomic struggles and unemployment] became associated with their refusal 
to evacuate the lands they claimed until the issue of ownership is settled. 
Th ey believe that the drawbacks of life in towns outweigh the benefi ts” 
(Meir 1997: 199).
And yet, from the perspective of the government and the planners who 
are most directly responsible for the state of the bedouin towns, any fault 
for their slow development or progress seems to lie everywhere but in the 
towns’ planning. Th ere is some concession that perhaps the towns off er too 
few options, but this is an area that the state now hopes to rectify with the 
establishment of nine additional towns under the Abu Basma agreement 
(2000; Swirski & Hasson 2006: 50). As Cohen explains (24 April 2007): “we 
know that we failed in the fact that we planned only one model of settle-
ment for them … we didn’t create other models of settlement, for example, 
like moshavim, to enable them to carry out agricultural activities … and so, 
in the framework of the plans for the settlements of Abu Basma we’ve fi xed 
that, and all the new settlements are mixed …, and whoever wants to raise 
herds or agriculture will have a neighborhood that’s planned for it.” 
Cohen explains that, already, there are residents of Rahat who are now 
raising fl ocks, as in the past, but these fl ocks have now been removed out-
side of the city into an area comparable to an industrial zone, which is iso-
lated from the residential part of the community. A main road provides a 
water system, sewerage, and infrastructure in order that those who wish 
can maintain their animals, but in a manner that is healthy and more ac-
ceptable to the community as a whole. He explains: “Th at’s how we can 
take out all the herds that are now inside the city, and manage the livestock 
all under a cooperative management system, like a ‘mall’ for raising herds. 
Each one has his own area, but it’s cooperatively managed because it is a 
large number of animals, and there’s a large movement of trucks bringing 
in and taking out the feed, [and] providing water … but today, in the newer 
settlements, we’re doing this integrated design right at the start.” 
Such a concept clearly off ers promise and is reminiscent of Prof. Gideon 
Kressel’s idea of developing “Villages for Shepherds” (1988), which he fi rst 
publicized in his 2003 volume, though he had broached the idea with col-
leagues years earlier. Such a plan serves as a culturally appropriate response 
to past economic diffi  culties, when many bedouin tribesmen were forced 
to give up their income from pastoralism and farming, only to discover that 
there was no compensation to be found in wage labor opportunity in the 
towns (Meir 1997: 201). 
From Cohen’s perspective, the state has little to lose in making such com-
promises. Rather, he believes that the shift to modernity and “progress” is 
well under way, and there is little the bedouin (or anyone else for that mat-
ter) can do to stop it. And yet, despite his optimism, the Abu-Basma plan, 
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which seeks to integrate urban life with some aspects of agriculture pro-
duction and pastoralism, reveals that Israel’s planners have begun to accept 
the fact, perhaps begrudgingly, that not only do the bedouin resist planning 
that fails to consider their best interests, but they also refuse to conform to 
it. As the bedouin become more educated and as bedouin society becomes 
increasingly integrated with Jewish society, as Cohen describes, an unin-
tended outcome is that the bedouin are also that much more aware that 
the services and provisions in their towns are inferior to those in the Jewish 
sector. As a result, they are becoming increasingly more assertive and so-
phisticated, are embracing greater expectations, and are more demanding 
that their concerns be addressed than they ever have been before (Meir 
1997: 201–203).
Th e outcome is in stark contrast to the planning approach of the past. 
Still, in the fi nal analysis, it is clear that the planners in charge of imple-
menting Israel’s bedouin resettlement initiative are, above all, seeking ways 
in which to pacify the bedouin community, while simultaneously accom-
plishing the greater goal of getting the bedouin off  what is believed to be 
state land. As Moshe, planner for the Bedouin Authority, explains it:
When we give solutions to the immediate situation, we give them to the 
bedouin in such a way that it says in the future, in another ten of fi fteen 
years if the head of the family wants to change the nature of these [agri-
cultural/pastoral] lots to residential, there’ll be that option. We leave it 
open in the mechanism of the plan to change it. Th ey’ll have to pay a few 
agorot [Hebrew: pennies] in order to change it, but that’s okay. Th at’s a 
natural thing. 
But we leave in, and that’s the built-in idea of the plan—that’s the way it 
should be, what [the bedouin] wants. You see the goal? Th e goal is the us-
age of the lot. If for now it’s agricultural, he can change it to residential in 
a very short process, a localized, short process. Th is is the biggest change 
in the planning, and in my opinion, the greatest change that we have made 
in the past few years. (15 February 2007)
Conclusions—Th e Unclear Benefi ts of Urban Living
Th is account of the bedouin resettlement initiative over the past fi ve de-
cades allows for a number of inter-related conclusions at this juncture. First, 
many state planners argue that the issue of bedouin concern over their los-
ing ownership over the land when they resettle is a red herring. Th ey con-
tend that the resettlement initiative is, fi rst and foremost, recognition of the 
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changes that are happening naturally within bedouin society. Resistance to 
relocation, they contend, is simply strategic; why relocate without gaining 
fi nancially from the state? Th e longer one waits and “squats” on the land, 
the more this will force the government’s hand; or better still, the more 
likely that one will not have to move at all. Or so the argument goes.
It is my contention, conversely, that it is the potential loss of their land to 
the state that forestalls most bedouin resettlement, but for many today it is 
more than this. Ultimately, the reason so many bedouin, 40 percent of the 
approximate population of 175,000 who currently do not move, is directly 
due to the failure of the planned towns to serve as the Utopian magnets 
they might have been, which were supposed to be designed to draw in re-
settlers. Th is, despite the fact that living in the so-called pezurah is illegal 
and that the approximately 40 settlements located in the pezurah are sub-
ject to demolition at any time. In essence, I have argued with the various 
government offi  cials with whom I have spoken that if the bedouin do not 
feel that living in the towns is an improvement over living in the pezurah 
(or further, if they believe that such a move is for the worse), they will have 
no incentive, other than the rule of law, to relocate. 
Interestingly, in time, I found that these offi  cials and I shared a meeting 
of the minds. Ilan Sagie, for example, an Interior Ministry offi  cial, stated his 
view this way (24 March 2007):
All the Azazmeh are supposed to go into Segev Shalom. But they are saying 
that they don’t want to. Why? You know exactly why. Today the bedouin 
are ‘playing on the eyes’ of the Government. And in my opinion it’s a good 
game. If I was on their side, I would behave exactly the same way. First 
there were seven bedouin cities, now there are sixteen since the Govern-
ment approved another nine [under Abu-Basma]. And they’re saying, ‘If 
we sit and wait, they’ll approve more’ … [Among] the bedouin, everybody 
wants to live exactly where they’re living right now [in the pezurah]. 
Th ey just want the Government to approve a settlement and bring them 
roads, water, and electricity, and a clinic, and a kindergarten … and then 
they can stay there, each one on top of his own hill. Th at’s what they want. 
Th e State cannot allow such a thing for many reasons. So they’re playing a 
waiting game. ‘If we hold out longer, we’ll get more of what we want.’ 
And yet, no sooner did he complete his thought that he then conceded:
But you’re right, that’s exactly the reason that people aren’t moving to 
Segev Shalom. Th ey think diff erently than we do. Th ey think they’re losing 
[when they come to town] because for them, living alone with your wife 
and children is preferable. It’s not important under what conditions, it’s 
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preferable alone [to] them, because they live with their extended family, 
their sub-tribe. 
To live with others invites troubles. Th at’s their thinking. So if they think 
they are inviting trouble, they will come up with all kinds of reasons why 
it’s better to sit there and not move. Look, if you were to ask me if I would 
be willing to live under the conditions the way they’re living today in the 
pezurah, I’d say, ‘What, have you fallen on your head?’ I’d be willing to go 
and live in Segev Shalom. Under no circumstances would I be willing to 
live in the pezurah … But it’s a diff erent mentality, the bedouin mentality, 
and you can’t erase it in a few or ten or even twenty years. 
Given this logic, one could argue that even the best-planned towns would 
not attract in-migrants, as the bedouin have motivations that simply defy 
the interests of the state. But when one adds to this the further realization 
that, in truth, the towns are not in any way the “best planned,” it should be a 
surprise to no one that bedouin attitudes toward the resettlement initiative 
remain at best skeptical. 
In truth, it is well recognized that the towns have been victims of benign 
neglect (or worse) since their creation. As such, the diff erences between the 
town and the informal settlements (see Chapter 3) are less blatant that Sagie 
implies. On the one hand, housing cannot be compared; most houses in the 
towns are far larger and of a higher quality that the temporary dwellings of 
the pezurah. On the other hand, being able to aff ord to initiate and complete 
a permanent stone home is an ongoing challenge that many simply cannot 
accomplish and thus, they live inside the town but in temporary homes, 
including some tents, which are no diff erent from those in the pezurah. 
Like Sagie, however, Cohen does not see things in this light. From his 
perspective, the planned town is clearly an improvement over the un-
planned one, although he grudgingly off ers that some improvements to the 
towns may be appropriate (24 April 2007):
One of the most important things today is to raise the attractiveness of the 
permanent settlements. We know that today, perhaps, it’s not so attrac-
tive, but it’s more attractive than living in some tent somewhere, without 
a road, with sewage running in the street, without water so you have to 
bring it in drums. But that’s what we in the Bedouin Authority do, raise 
the attractiveness of the permanent settlements.
Again, it should be noted here that all unrecognized settlements have ac-
cess to running water (though not at each individual dwelling or house-
hold) and residents no longer are reliant upon wells or cisterns. None have 
sewage in the streets; the bedouin are incredibly clean, and their culture 
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demands that they take great care in how they handle human waste. Th e 
unrecognized towns do in truth have roads, which are not necessarily 
paved, of course.
But then, many of the streets of the planned towns are not paved. Not 
all planned town residents have access to electricity or telephone service. 
For years, Israel’s bedouin in the pezurah and towns alike have used cell 
phones, not relying upon the landline option. While some informal settle-
ments have Internet access via satellite dish, many parts of the planned 
towns lacking phone lines do not. And yet, Cohen continues:
If a bedouin in the pezurah prefers to live in the wilderness without water 
and without electricity, relying on a generator, the sewage fl owing by him, 
and afterwards he becomes ill and comes and complains to the State say-
ing ‘why is he sick,’ I have no answer for this. Th is is a confl ict that always 
exists. His son is studying in Segev Shalom, that’s true, but he meets in 
the school, let’s suppose, the son of someone else who lives in Segev. But 
the son of the one who lives in Segev, when he comes home to his house 
there, he has electricity, he can connect to the Internet, he can study and 
do things, and he tells the son who lives in the pezurah what he did the 
night before. And the one from the pezurah can’t do it, because he hasn’t 
got these things. 
So through that connection, you create a stimulus in the children of the 
pezurah who put pressure on the parents, ‘why don’t I have electricity? 
Why can’t I connect to the Internet?’ Th is is a situation that we call non-
formal education. 
It can be argued that the model the state is embracing is one of develop-
ment, which relies upon the bedouin residents’ innate jealous and com-
petitive nature and desire to “keep up with the Hamamdis” by relocating 
to these “Levittowns,” as Americans sought to “keep up with the Joneses” 
during the height of rapid suburbanization in the 1950s and 1960s. But 
more to the point, it is a development strategy that will only work so long 
as the “boy” in the town can actually connect to the Internet (in Segev Sha-
lom, half of the neighborhoods do not have phone lines and therefore no 
Internet access), can frequent the Community Center (Segev Shalom does 
not have a Matnas community center), can participate in after-school clubs 
or activities, or for that matter, can participate in aff ordable camps (as very 
little of this exists in the planned towns, see Chapter 3).
Moreover, the state believes that it must continue to provide services 
in the pezurah, if not simply because the bedouin are citizens who have 
a right to these provisions, then because “you believe that education and 
enlightenment will help the bedouin society to progress, and not the op-
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posite.” In theory, in other words, the state could withhold these services 
in an attempt to place further pressure upon the bedouin to resettle, “but 
then the state would’ve shot itself in the foot, because the instant there is 
no education, then you start with problems like violence, and problems 
like [bearing large] numbers of children and polygamy. When someone has 
education and enlightenment, automatically, these numbers are reduced. 
We have surveys that show that the instant that people moved to an urban 
settlement, they tend to marry fewer wives and have fewer children” (Dudu 
Cohen, 24 April 2007).
Th e idea then is not to make the settlements of the pezurah unlivable, 
but to make the towns attractive. But, it is argued, this is not solely the 
job of the state, nor is it a budgeting matter alone. Th e desire to make the 
towns attractive to in-migrants, and to respond to the criticisms often lev-
eled concerning inadequate jobs, infrastructure, and the like often raises 
other diffi  culties that many planners may not consider.
Th ere’s always someone who thinks that whatever you try to do, someone 
from your hamula needs to profi t from it. It’s hard to manage things this 
way. Th e bedouin were never in a situation when they had to come to 
an agreement between themselves. When you’re in the wilderness, you 
don’t have to reach agreements with anyone. Th is is your territory, this 
is his territory, you don’t trespass on him, he doesn’t trespass on you. But 
it isn’t the same when you have to live together and you have to reach 
agreements. 
Th ere are places where we haven’t succeeded in putting in a sewage line 
300 meters, because it passes through the territory of ‘Hamula A’ and 
they will not agree to have a sewage line in their territory. And what’s a 
sewage line for goodness sakes, you don’t disturb anything! You dig, put in 
the pipe line, and cover it up, and there’s no problem. Lord Above! … It’s 
diffi  cult. Also for the people who work here it gives the feeling that “Well, 
if they don’t want it why on earth should we help them?” 
Ultimately, what comes out of the discussions with Cohen and the other 
state planners can be enumerated as follows:
1.  Plans for the bedouin towns were poorly designed from the outset, fail-
ing to take bedouin participation, cultural interests or other concerns 
into account;
2.  Budgeting for true development in a variety of areas has, since the cre-
ation of the program, been off ered at a level that suggests that the ini-
tiative was halfhearted at best;
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3.  Th e state planners appear, despite a lack of funding and foresight, to 
be seeking to implement the initiative as well as they are able, although 
their directive is, ultimately, to get the bedouin community off  of the 
land and into the towns;
Lastly, it is quite apparent that:
4.  Th e bedouin community is skeptical of state planning eff orts, distrust-
ful of government motives, and reluctant to conform to its demands, 
even when, at times, the state’s actions have the potential to benefi t the 
community.
In conclusion, then, I began this chapter speaking about Utopianism. Need-
less to say, the bedouin towns of the Negev desert are dystopian at best. State 
planners and residents alike fi nd themselves in a situation today in which 
there is much criticism and blame to go around, yet few easy answers exist 
to resolve the crisis plaguing these communities. In the fi nal analysis, more 
than forty years after the resettlement initiative was implemented, the state 
and the bedouin, the planners and the residents, still appear to be miss-
ing one another, literally and fi guratively, by speaking a diff erent language, 
holding diff ering expectations, goals, dreams, and desires. 
Ultimately, it appears that in many ways, the major distinction between 
the planned towns and the informal settlements is, for the bedouin at least, 
the fact that the state has deemed these densely concentrated areas that 
have enjoyed a certain level of planning as “legal,” while those lands upon 
which the bedouin sit today, lands the state lays claim to as it continues to 
consolidate its hold on what was once Arab Palestine, are deemed illegal. 
Indeed, not only do many in the bedouin community perceive that there is 
little diff erence in this regard, but even those involved with administering 
the resettlement initiative similarly note that this distinction can to a cer-
tain extent be put into question (Yeshuran, 10 May 2007):
Moving to town because living in an unrecognized settlement is against 
the law is no small thing. But there are other reasons: electricity is more 
expensive in the pezurah than in town, especially when they are using 
generators. Water in town is easy to get, you just turn on the faucet. Th e 
towns are orderly, unlike the pezurah.
But yes, if the State brings the services [education, healthcare] to the bed-
ouin in the pezurah, then you’re right, what’s the point of moving? Th ere 
is a confl ict right here in this state. Th is is a governmental problem, not 
a bedouin problem. Th e courts say that the bedouin in the pezurah must 
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have these services, and so they get them [even though they live in the 
pezurah] and even though the State also says they are living illegally. It’s a 
real controversy, and there’s no agreement. 
Until there is an agreement, one can appreciate the ambivalence that many 
bedouin, some 75,000 or so, feel about relocating to one of the towns. 
And yet, in the meantime, despite all of the negative concerns expressed 
above, the irony is that living in the towns does have its benefi ts. In the 
chapters that follow, I will analyze data gathered in one of the recognized 
towns, Segev Shalom, between late 1992 through to early 2007, that will 
reveal that overall, residents who have resettled there are in many ways 
better off  socially and economically than their family and friends in the 
neighboring pezurah. At the same time, however, I will reveal as well that 
despite these improvements in virtually every possible area of growth, the 
residents of Segev Shalom are less satisfi ed with their conditions and cir-
cumstances than one might anticipate. Not only are many of the bedouin 
today less content with their lot than in the past when they lived in more 
diffi  cult and challenging circumstances, but the community as a whole has 
become more politicized, agitated, and resentful—all unanticipated conse-
quences of the bedouin planned town initiative.
N
*Some of the historical information in this chapter comes from Dinero, Steven C. 
1995. “Human Settlement in Post-Nomadic Bedouin Society: An Assessment of 
Social and Economic Transformation in Segev Shalom, Israel.” Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Graduate Program in Urban Planning and Policy Development. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers, Th e State University of New Jersey, Chapter 4.
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Segev Shalom—Background 
and Community Profi le
A person educated in the ways of the desert can make it in the 
city, but not vice versa. 
— Muhammad (Abu-Tarek) Hamamdi, Segev Shalom, Israel, 
24 April 1993
Th e founding of the Negev bedouin town of Segev Shalom/Shqeb as-Salaam 
(Hebrew/Arabic) was offi  cially inaugurated in 1979 as the result of a unique 
agreement struck between Azazmeh Sheikh Ouda and the state, and was 
designed to allow the tribe to settle on its own traditional lands rather than 
to be relocated on others’ land as had been the case with the other tribes 
that had resettled years earlier. Together with Aroer and K’seifa, the two 
towns that had been created in 1982 (Swirski & Hasson 2006: 14) within 
the context of the Tel Malhata project, these three localities comprised the 
Moatzah Masos (Hebrew: Masos Regional Council) from 1988 until 1996, 
when the three were split into separate municipalities. 
Th e Segev Shalom Local Council was then created as its eff ective replace-
ment to govern the town and was comprised of nine members. And yet, it 
was not until four years later, in 2000, that Segev Shalom fi nally held its own 
local elections for the fi rst time to elect a local bedouin Rosh Ha’Moatzah 
(“Mayor”), allowing the residents of Segev Shalom to direct and run their 
own aff airs in an independent fashion (see Chapter 3). Th is system has 
been in place ever since.
Early Town Development and Demography
Segev Shalom was created by the state primarily for members of the Azaz-
meh tribe, who, to the present day, dominate positions of signifi cance and 
power in local political and social institutions. Encouraging the Azazmeh 
to resettle has been a challenge from the outset, perhaps in some ways more 
challenging than the resettlement of any other tribe. By the early 1980s, it 
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was already recognized that, in general, those bedouin who persisted in 
living in tent environments in the pezurah, which by this point was already 
exceptional, were by and large members of the Azazmeh tribe (Boneh 1983: 
67). As Kressel notes (2003: 56), the Azazmeh have long been known to re-
sist surrendering what might be called “traditional” pastoral nomadism in 
the classical sense of the words, as they also were the last of the tribes to 
adopt agriculture as a supplement to herding, primarily engaging in live-
stock husbandry and rearing until the turn of the twentieth century. 
What is also known, however, is that as “True” landed bedouin, the Azaz-
meh, unlike the fellahin or the landless Abid bedouin, have a great deal to 
lose by abandoning their lands for the towns. Th erefore, while in part the 
rationale behind this resistance may be attributed to the Azazmeh’s “tra-
ditional” worldview, the issue also has a pragmatic side that must be taken 
into account.
Th e development of Segev Shalom, and the fact that it is the smallest of 
the fi rst seven towns planned in the Negev, is a refl ection of this history. 
Initially designated over 4,000 dunams (1,000 acres) and designed for a to-
tal of 10,000 people (Ministry of Housing 1990: 30), the town only became 
an active resettlement site as late as 1986. When, in 1979, the town was fi rst 
inaugurated, the implementation Authorities “only had preliminary ideas 
about the town … [there was] a picture of how it would appear, where it 
would be located, but that’s all” (Shoshani, 7 December 1992). Moreover, 
the Land Authority acknowledges that the 1982–1986 period was one of 
stagnation throughout the bedouin town system, which included little de-
velopment in any of the seven towns that were recognized at the time. Only 
three permanent stone houses existed in the area that was designated for 
legal house construction in Segev Shalom in 1979. 
Kressel contends that, in truth, the founding date of the town is 1984 
(2003: 72). As of 1985, there were still only 40 families living in the town 
(Hamamdi, 11 November 1992). By 1986, the town had 14 permanent build-
ings in Shekhuna Alef, and 4 buildings in Shekhuna Bet (Hebrew: neighbor-
hood; Arabic: hara; however, the language used in the planning and devel-
opment of the towns is Hebrew, not Arabic [see Map 2.1]). 
By 1987, only 60 lots had been sold in the town, but a major infusion 
of residents began to relocate to Shekhuna Bet that year from the area of 
Emek Sarah, near the junction of the Dimona and Eilat highways. Th e Masri 
hamula, comprised of 120 Abid households, took three years to move com-
pletely in. Th is family, whose members are former black slaves and the de-
cedents of slaves to the Azazmeh (see Chapter 5), was a small, weak, and 
landless group with little status in bedouin society. Th eir young leader, Mu-
hammad Masri, viewed the move as a major step up socially for himself and 
the family as a whole (Masri, 24 November 1992). 
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At this time as well, Shekhuna Alef began to attract more residents, 
primarily from the Abu-Jarabiya and Hamamdi hamulas, both of which 
were Azazmeh bedouin. Shekhuna Gimmel only slowly attracted residents, 
primarily from the Gidefi , Abu-Sualim, Abu-Sleiyech, Hamamdi, and 
Map 2.1. Segev Shalom Physical Plan. Drawn in 2003 by Blustein Maps, Haifa 
for the Segev Shalom Local Council.
Used by permission, courtesy of the Council.
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Mas’udiyin hamulas. Still, roughly 10,000 to 12,000 Azazmeh bedouin con-
tinued to reside in the vast region south of Be’er Sheva and north of Mitzpe 
Ramon during this time (as cited in Dinero 1999: 27), and were resistant to 
relocation into the town. 
Th us, as of late 1992 when this study was initiated, it can be said that the 
town was still in its infancy (Illustrations 2.1, 2.2). In Shekhuna Alef, only 77 
percent of existing lots had been sold at that time. According to the Land 
Authority, an additional 4 percent were in the process of being sold. Hous-
ing starts had occurred on only 52 of the lots purchased—that is, 60 percent 
of the neighborhood lots were unimproved. In Shekhuna Bet, conditions 
were no better. Of the 247 lots that were planned, 77 percent were sold and 
7 percent were in the process of being sold. In that neighborhood, 72 hous-
ing starts had occurred, leaving 71 percent of the lots unimproved.
As new neighborhoods, Shekhunot (Hebrew: neighborhoods) Gimmel 
and Dalet were, of course, even less developed than Alef and Bet. In Shek-
huna Gimmel, 226 lots were planned, of which 24 percent had been sold 
by late 1992, and an additional 1 percent were in the process of being sold. 
Th ough offi  cially, no housing starts had occurred at the time in Gimmel, 
some building had already begun during the period in question and a few 
houses already did exist in the neighborhood. By early 1994, a number of 
new housing starts could be seen throughout the town; in Shekhuna Gim-
Illustration 2.1. Shekhuna Alef—1993.
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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mel, streets had been paved in anticipation of the new housing develop-
ments there. 
In Shekhuna Dalet, 260 lots were in the planning stage only at the time, 
while in neighborhood Hey, 312 lots were also in the planning stage. Plan-
ning for Shekhuna Dalet began in December 1989, and planning for Shek-
huna Hey began in January 1990 (Ministry of Housing 1990: 10). It was 
estimated at the time that it would take between six and seven million NIS 
($2–3 million) to open Hey and Dalet to resettlers (Shapira, 1 December 
1992). Th ese costs included building a 900-meter long road to the entrance 
of Hey at 40 NIS ($17)/meter, 12 meters across, and 3 meters of shoulder. 
In addition, two bridges were needed to connect the neighborhood to the 
rest of the town. 
Th e Land Authority developed only 150 lots at fi rst (almost half of the 
312 planned), to see how well the neighborhood was able to begin attracting 
new in-migrants. At the time, just this half of the units was projected to cost 
1.5 million NIS ($530,000), when water lines and electricity were brought 
in and the road was built to connect Hey with the rest of the town. 
Th us, when this study began in late 1992, 60 percent of the developed 
lots in Segev Shalom had been sold (excluding the new neighborhoods not 
yet opened for residents, Dalet and Hey). Of those sold, 40 percent had 
houses built upon them, or at least construction had begun. Overall, some 
Illustration 2.2. Shekhuna Bet—1993.
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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50 percent of lots planned were developed, and the other half remained 
undeveloped (Ministry of Housing 1992: 19).
Segev Shalom’s housing start percentage on lots sold in 1992 was slightly 
lower than the overall fi gure for all lots developed in the bedouin town 
system, in which 70 percent had been sold. Of these, for all 7 towns, 43 
percent of those lots developed and sold had been improved with houses 
or housing starts (Ministry of Housing 1992: 17–22). In addition to hous-
ing, some town improvements were also initiated during the early 1990s. 
For example, a new white stone central mosque was completed in 1994 (see 
Chapter 5, Illustration 5.2). Previously, town residents prayed in a building 
not unlike some of the temporary corrugated tin dwellings that surrounded 
it. Curbing on the main road into town was introduced in late 1993, as were 
lights around the town soccer fi eld to allow for night play. Th e increased 
numbers of residents, with the anticipation of more to come, led to the 
need to relocate the high school in order to provide additional classrooms 
(Hamamdi, 6 January 1994). 
A town center 70 dunams (17 acres) in size was also planned for Segev 
Shalom during this period. Th e center was to be comprised of 120 housing 
units, plus all of the facilities expected in an Arab village of its projected 
size. Th ese included the existing central mosque, plus a post offi  ce, schools, 
banks, a supermarket, and a sports center. But it was stated at the time by 
the town’s Jewish Rosh Ha’Moatzah that until the town’s Regional Council 
Illustration 2.3. Shekhuna Bet—2007. 
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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had suffi  cient funds to build such a center, it would remain only in the plan-
ning stages (Sagie, 27 May 1993).
By 1995, there were 420 offi  cially recognized households in Segev Sha-
lom. Th e town’s population had reached 2,354 (see Figure 2.1). Th e average 
household was home to approximately 6 people, the same as most of the 
bedouin towns at this time (Statistical Yearbook 1999: 123–124). While the 
Azazmeh have always been the numeric majority in the town, they have 
never surpassed more than about two-thirds of the number of respondents 
in any of the random samples collected for this study. Methodological ef-
forts to represent all of the demographic sectors in the town off er part of 
explanation for this (see below); in addition, the Abid population in the 
town is growing rapidly. Statistical evidence from 2007, for example, shows 
that of those who are married to one spouse, Abid bedouin couples in town 
are more likely to have small children than similarly monogamous Azaz-
meh residents (p=.02). A related test found that monogamous Azazmeh 
residents, conversely, are more likely to have more high school-aged chil-
dren in the town (p=.04). Th is was found to be true regardless of the par-
ents’ ages.
Th us, since 2000, the black bedouin community of Segev Shalom has 
begun to expand out of Shekhuna Bet, most especially into Shekhuna Gim-
mel. Th ese Abid bedouin, who often refer to themselves in the town as 
“Tarabeen” (though members of the Tarabeen tribe in other areas of the 
Illustration 2.4. Shekhuna 6—2007. 
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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Negev are in fact “True” bedouin), diff er from the “True” bedouin in nu-
merous ways (see Chapters 3, 5), which are largely recognized by state and 
local offi  cials (Sagie, 24 March 2007; El-Harumi, 28 May 2007). Similarly, 
the Azazmeh town residents view them as a separate and distinct group; 
Shekhuna Bet is “their neighborhood,” for example, and the mosque located 
there is “their mosque.” 
In the meantime, there is no doubt that there is a growing number of 
other tribes in addition to the Azazmeh, including fellahi bedouin and 
“others” now residing in the town who were not there during the early years 
of the town’s evolution and development. In fact, until very recently, there 
were no fellahi bedouin in Segev Shalom at all; early on in the town’s exis-
tence, a group of fellahin attempted to move into Shekhuna Gimmel (with 
permission from one sector of the Azazmeh leadership), but they “didn’t 
last a day.” Some of the other members of the Azazmeh leadership came to 
the settlement site soon after the fellahin began to move in and forced them 
immediately to leave (Shapira, 24 November 1992). 
As for the “others” now residing in the town, these include Palestinian 
“collaborators” from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, also known by the He-
brew epithet “shtinkerim.” In a controversial move, they were resettled in 
the town from the Palestinian Territories in the 1990s, presumably in com-
pensation for cooperating with the Israeli Government against Palestinian 
interests. It is estimated by the town leadership that as of 2007, there were 
“no more than 15 or 20” such families in the town (El-Harumi, 28 May 2007), 
although “word on the street” perceives this number to be far higher. 
Such families are highly stigmatized, and very few bedouin residents 
have anything positive to say about their existence in the town. Th ose liv-
ing in the pezurah, similarly, cite their existence in town as one of many 
reasons against relocating to Segev Shalom. Such attitudes, suggest state 
government offi  cials, may simply serve as an excuse for bedouin resistance 
to ongoing eff orts to relocate (Sagie, 24 March 2007).
Politics and Town Development
Th e Moatzah Masos (Hebrew: Masos Council) was created in 1988, and 
governed the three towns until 1996. Ilan Sagie, a Jewish Israeli who lives 
on a moshav north of Qiryat Gat, was appointed Rosh Ha’Moatzah at that 
time, and remained in the position until the Moatzah was dissolved. Al-
though a technocrat at heart, Sagie played a crucial role in developing the 
town during the key period of its formulative years of existence. While the 
state, operating primarily through the Land Authority during this period, 
saw its primary role as getting the bedouin off  the land out of the pezurah 
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and into the towns, once there, the role of actualizing their resettlement 
and of fulfi lling their demands and expectations with little money to work 
with was “his problem” (Sagie, 27 May 1993), and continues to be the pri-
mary role of subsequent town leaders. 
Th us, when I fi rst interviewed him in late 1992, he was sanguine about 
his intermediary role, as he served as both state functionary and presumed 
bedouin advocate in what amounted to a no-win environment. At the same 
time, however, his outlook on bedouin life, and on the challenges and dif-
fi culties experienced by the bedouin residents of Segev Shalom and the 
other Masos towns, refl ected an understanding and appreciation of their 
struggle, which informs the ideologies and policymaking strategies of very 
few Jewish State offi  cials working in the Negev bedouin sector. Again, I 
quote him at length (16 November 1992):
Th e bedouin don’t care about infrastructure. Th ey just want to sit on 
their own individual mountains. But when pastoralism fails, then infra-
structure becomes relevant. Why? Because they need good roads to go to 
work, phones to call in late, electricity to see at night like what exists in 
their places of work, education for their kids so they can access good jobs 
when they’re older. When he ceases being a shepherd, the bedouin’s need 
for the spontaneous settlement ceases …
No, we shouldn’t force people into the towns. Old people, for example, 
can’t make it in town. It’s like forcing Indians to live in New York. At fi rst, 
it didn’t happen. But today, there are Indians living there … Still, if some-
one wants infrastructure, they must come to the town. But it’s the eco-
nomic problems that prohibit him. A bedouin wants to build a house, to 
be comfortable, but he doesn’t have enough money to build. Th is is why 
they wait to come to Segev Shalom. Economic problems are worse in the 
town [than the pezurah]. Electricity, water, local taxes all cost money. And 
their children want to dress like the others, to get new clothes, to have 
candy, gum, and soda. So the family budget must be higher in town.
Years after the conclusion of his period in offi  ce, some town residents—
even those too young to remember him well—expressed the belief that his 
leadership compared well with the present-day bedouin leadership. As one 
young male respondent to the 2007 survey put it, “I am not satisfi ed at all 
with this government today. Th ey talk about improvement in the town but 
after a while it becomes clear that it’s all a lie. Five years ago, [we fi nally real-
ized] it was all an illusion. Ten years ago, it was all disappointments. Fifteen 
years ago, we still had hope. At least then, when we had the Jewish mayor 
[Sagie], if there wasn’t improvement it was obvious and if he didn’t succeed 
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then he would do more and put his whole soul into it to try to make things 
improve.”
Such views stand in sharp contrast to those of Sagie’s immediate succes-
sor, whose role in the town’s development, beginning with the dissolution 
of Masos and its replacement with the Segev Shalom Local Council on 1 
August 1996, was far less distinguished. Ironically, the disbanding of the 
Masos Regional Council had long been sought by town residents. Many 
bedouin residing in Segev Shalom, Aroer, and K’seifa felt that their indi-
vidual interests were paramount, and not shared or appreciated by those of 
other tribes, let alone the other towns that together comprised the govern-
ing body. In 1994, a number of the tribes in the three towns had appealed 
to the Supreme Court asking that Masos be dismantled and, in 1995, it was 
fi nally agreed that the Council would be broken up in order that each town 
would govern its own aff airs (Meir 1997: 217).
And yet, when the Segev Shalom Local Council was created, it was placed 
under the direction of the Israel Ministry of the Interior—recognition of 
the fact that much of the actual town planning was taking place at the top, 
and that the role of the Council was to serve as an implementing agent and 
less as an actual governing organ. Th is Ministry was controlled by Shas, the 
orthodox Sephardic party supported primarily by Jews of North African 
descent and headed by Knesset Member Eli Suissa, as part of a coalition 
agreement with the government of Benyamin Netanyahu (Dinero 2000: 
187–188). Th erefore, a party appointee, Knesset Member Eliezer Mizrachi, 
became the town’s Rosh Ha’Moatzah (Hebrew: Council Head; i.e., “mayor”) 
for the next four years. An orthodox Jew in his early 50s, Mizrachi was a 
diamond polisher by profession, with a yeshiva education. He lived in Jeru-
salem throughout his tenure as Negev bedouin town mayor.
Although governance of Segev Shalom took a turn for the worst during 
this period, in which representative government appeared to many to re-
main as distant and inaccessible as the governance structures that guided 
the town’s development, eff orts under the Netanyahu government to en-
courage resettlement out of the pezurah and into the town continued un-
abated (see Figure 2.1). Th ese eff orts included a new strategy inaugurated 
in 1997, which sought to “contain the spread of the scattered Arab popula-
tion, prevent further invasion into state land, and tighten the enforcement 
of the state’s planning and construction laws” (Yiftachel 2003: 39). Th is 
would be carried out, according to the Israeli newspaper Ha’Aretz, through 
increased reliance upon the Green Patrol’s often excessive eff orts to con-
tain “illegal” bedouin settlement activity, to restrict bedouin grazing rights, 
and to declare large tracts of land “restricted military training areas” (as 
cited in “Israel off ensive…,” 3 September 1997).
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Th e September 2000 elections provided a turning point in the town’s 
political history. Residents of Segev Shalom, as well as three other bedouin 
towns, were able to elect local bedouin leadership, including a bedouin 
Rosh Ha’Moatzah, for the fi rst time in their short histories (“Four Negev 
Bedouin Towns…,” 19 September 2000). In Segev Shalom, the winning can-
didate was Amir Abu-Mu’amar, 40 years old at the time and the eldest son 
of town founder Sheikh Ouda Abu-Mu’amar. Amir benefi ted from the fact 
that the Sheikh played a key role in the development of the town from its 
inception. He was well regarded in Jewish Israeli society, having been one 
of very few Negev bedouin to have fought in a battle unit during the Yom 
Kippur War (see Chapter 7), and was highly respected for his intellect and 
his negotiating abilities with state offi  cials. He had over fi fty children, who 
were the off spring of 6 wives.
Born in a tent in December of 1959, Amir fi nished high school and three 
years of college in order to obtain a teaching certifi cate. He taught school 
for six years, four in Segev Shalom and two in Tel Sheva. For two years, he 
served as the Secretary of the Moatzah Shoket (the Regional Council of 
Hura and Laqia), before stepping down in November 1992. Amir moved to 
Segev Shalom in 1984 when he was 25 years old.
His goals as Rosh Ha’Moatzah were a refl ection of years of frustration 
and ambivalence about the planning and development of Segev Shalom. 
On the one hand, his beliefs centered upon the idea that “the bedouin loves 
nature; all this infrastructure in town just isn’t appropriate to our lifestyles. 
Th e bedouin is a man who loves the desert, who loves the large open areas. 
He wants to wake up in the morning, open his eyes and not see a wall, 
but be able to see far off  into the distance. He looks ahead into the future” 
(Mu’amar, 10 December 1992). 
On the other hand, his true conviction appeared to lie not in how the 
towns were inappropriate to the bedouin lifestyle, but rather, that it was 
Figure 2.1. Segev Shalom Population Increase Averaging 387 Resettlers/Year, 
1995–2005.
Source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995–2005.
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Illustration 2.5. Main Intersection—2007.
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
Illustration 2.6. Dentist’s Offi  ce—2007. 
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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Illustration 2.7. Halal Butcher—2007. 
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
Illustration 2.8. Shwarma Restaurant—2007. 
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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the planning and governance of the towns that was serving to render them 
weak, ineffi  cient, and unsuccessful. It is this sentiment that drove him, ulti-
mately, to pursue political offi  ce. Nonetheless, his sentiments well represent 
a people at odds with itself, and with those who act on their behalf with little 
regard or understanding for their concerns. As it is bedouin leaders such as 
Amir Abu-Mu’amar who are best able to verbalize the Negev bedouin con-
dition, both within Segev Shalom and, in fact, throughout the towns of the 
Negev today, I quote him at length (Mu’amar, 10 December 1992):
Segev Shalom wasn’t planned well at all. Th ere are two reasons, both eco-
nomic. Th e bedouin economy is based upon agriculture in the fi elds, and 
the raising of animals. Th ese two things supported them. Th ey didn’t need 
to go out of their community—everything they needed was right there. 
Today, they have to go and buy and sell things. In town, the two economic 
foundations don’t exist. You can’t work the land here, there’s no land. 
Th ere is no agriculture here. Th erefore, people don’t want to come here. 
Th e people who come here are those who work in industry, they work in 
education. Th ose without these jobs stay out. Most of my family is outside 
[in the pezurah]. 
Th ere is another reason why they stay out. It’s political. Th e State comes 
and says that the land is theirs. But the bedouin say “no, it’s ours, you’ll 
Illustration 2.9. Bakery—2007.
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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have to pay us for it or we won’t go.” Th ere are others who want to come 
here. But if I’m living fi ne outside, and I have fl ocks, where will I put them 
in the town? Where is the land for them? We need economic opportunity 
here. We have to pay for the phone, electricity, water. How will people pay 
for these things? Most important, they have to fi nd work to pay for all of 
this. But there isn’t any.
Th is town is our grave. We came here looking future-ward, but our path 
has many thorns. Every way that you go, it hurts. Th is is a pressure situa-
tion. You either try to fi nd a solution to all of this, or you get angry, ner-
vous and frustrated. Let me just give an example: we have no sewer system 
here. Where we used to live, it wasn’t modern, but we lived in a clean 
environment. When we had to go to the bathroom, we would go into the 
wadi, far from the place where we lived. We had no facilities, it was very 
simple. It was very natural, the water, the sun, everything breaks down, it’s 
good for the earth. Here we have a septic tank. It isn’t healthy. Th e sewage 
should go into a system and be taken far away, but instead it is right here 
where we live. So even these small things aff ect people psychologically. 
In many ways, Amir’s perspective well represents the challenges of the 
bedouin today, recognizing that previous political and social structures no 
longer work in a dynamic globalizing Israeli context, yet also realizing that 
the bedouin need to fi nd their own way through the newly developing en-
vironment that the resettlement initiative has produced. In the early 1990s, 
he told me that, “I don’t want to be sheikh. We live in a democratic society 
now. I’m no better than anyone else. Th e position of sheikh is from the past. 
It isn’t appropriate today. In the past, we saw the sheikh as democratic. But 
now we live here in town, so the sheikh isn’t appropriate, we live in a mu-
nicipality. Th e next ‘sheikh’ should be the mayor of Segev Shalom.”
His conclusion then provides the prologue for his four years as Rosh 
Ha’Moatzah:
Ilan Sagie means well. But you can’t know where I have an itch to scratch. 
Th ere are many possibilities—only I know where to scratch. ‘If I am not for 
myself, who will be? If not now, when?’ [paraphrasing the famous Rabbi 
Hillel]. People are stupid, they’re not smart. It’s a pity. We have everything, 
but what we need is good will. Most of us did the army. I served—this is 
my country. My father worked with the British government even before 
the State of Israel existed. We were here during the Ottoman period, dur-
ing the Mandate. [At this point he pulled a pistol out from underneath 
the pillow by his side]. See this? Th is was [David] Ben-Gurion’s. He gave 
it to my father in friendship. And yet, look at us today. We still don’t have 
equal rights.
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After four years of governing the town with a philosophy centered upon 
the pursuit of equality and justice for the residents of Segev Shalom, most 
especially the need for local job opportunities inside the town, Amir Abu-
Mu’amar was unseated by Saeed El-Harumi by a narrow margin in elec-
tions held in September 2004, who ran on a platform supported by Israel’s 
Islamic parties. During the brief period that El-Harumi has ruled the town, 
his primary area of emphasis has been on physical improvements to town 
infrastructure, roads, and the building of schools. In addition to govern-
mental funding for these projects, the town also enjoys a partnership with 
the Jacobs International Teen Leadership Institute (JITLI, see below), 
spearheaded by San Diego entrepreneur and investor Gary Jacobs and his 
wife Jerri-Ann. Th e Jacobs family contributed over $80,000 toward de-
velopment projects in the town, the most well-known of which is a high-
profi le playground located adjacent to the Municipality complex.
Th e philosophy of the El-Harumi administration, especially with regard 
to the ongoing goal of growing the town and drawing in new in-migrants 
from the pezurah, is straightforward. “We need to make Segev Shalom at-
tractive, a magnet for young people to come from the periphery. I think we 
are succeeding” (El-Harumi, 8 February 2007). 
As the town has grown, however, the demographic concerns that Ilan 
Sagie encountered throughout his tenure remain critical, if not greater 
than was manifest in the past. While tribal and family confl icts that are 
well-known throughout the other bedouin towns are far less apparent in 
Segev Shalom, the recent nature of the resettlement initiative, and the fact 
that social dynamics are not erased once one moves into the town but are 
often magnifi ed, is a constant concern in bedouin local politics. As El-
Harumi notes (28 May 2007), “We are mostly one big tribe here. When I 
won in the elections, I told my supporters ‘no fi reworks, no big celebration.’ 
My opponent, the previous Rosh Ha’Moatzah [i.e., Amir Abu Mu’amar], is 
my cousin, my relative. We are family here. We had no reason to make it 
uncomfortable for him. In other towns there is confl ict between groups, be-
tween tribes, over budgets and other issues, and nothing gets done. Th at’s 
not how it is [in Segev Shalom].” 
Confl icts between families in town, sometimes leading to violence, is an 
ongoing problem in all of the bedouin towns, but of far less consequence in 
Segev Shalom. Clashes exist, but they are largely limited to power struggles 
between various hamulas (such as the Abu-Mu’amar and the Hamamdi 
families) and do not extend beyond the political dynamic (Sagie, 24 March 
2007). And yet, the bifurcated nature of the town between the black Abid 
bedouin and the Arab “True” Azazmeh bedouin is unmistakable and, as 
will be seen below, is manifested in virtually every aspect of the residents’ 
social and economic status.
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Th e Tarabeen, the blacks, are poorer here than the Azazmeh. We know 
about the poverty. Th ey are wonderful people but they have some diffi  cul-
ties. Our job in the Moatzah is to bridge the gap between the Tarabeen 
and the Azazmeh. We are trying diff erent things to do this. Th e Council 
has developed a program to send students to Shekhuna Bet, to help work 
with the people there on various projects. Th ey are helping people as 
there is need. We are also sending social workers to work especially with 
this population. We know they need to help them to overcome some of 
their problems. (El-Harumi, 28 May 2007)
As for growing the population of Segev Shalom, this concern also har-
kens back to the period when Ilan Sagie was forced to plan for an ever 
increasing population of resettled bedouin, with high expectations built 
upon the promises of a state fi xated upon the goal of relocating the bedouin 
out of the tent settlements, off  of the land, and into the planned towns at 
any cost—but lacking when it comes time to allocate adequate budgetary 
allowances required to pay for the demands made by these resettlers in the 
new environment. 
Th e state strives to make it as easy as possible for residents of the “un-
recognized” settlements to relocate to the towns through what it believes 
are strong, heavily subsidized, “carrot-like” incentives to induce relocation. 
A migrash, that is, a dunam (1000 m2, approximately a one-quarter acre) 
sized plot of land in Segev Shalom is free for a new buyer relocating out of 
the pezurah. As noted, the system is designed to limit expansion beyond 
one migrash per family once resettlement is accomplished. “If you already 
live in town, or if your family already has a migrash and then you want to 
get another, well, we know who is who, we know you already got one with-
out cost. So no, you have to pay for another.” In Segev Shalom, a dunam 
migrash cost 74,000 NIS in 2007, approximately $18,500 (Yeshuran, 10 May 
2007).
Moreover, in a twist of irony that further reveals the tensions between 
the local community and the state, Rosh Ha’Moatzah El-Harumi believes 
that if many bedouin relocate but the fl ow occurs too quickly, the town will 
only suff er, not gain, from their arrival. He therefore has worked with the 
Council to develop a plan that is accommodating to in-migrants, but that 
also recognizes the limitations that the town must face in serving the needs 
of all of its existing residents.
We simply cannot accommodate all the Azazmeh here now. Maybe we 
can take those in the immediate area around Segev Shalom, maybe up to 
a town size of 13,000–14,000. But we don’t have the budget, the resources 
from the Government, for any more than that. [As it is] people come from 
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the pezurah, they use our schools and resources—the kids go on fi eld trips 
with our students, use or facilities—but all this is supported by our bud-
get. Th ey don’t live here, they don’t pay any taxes. 
So Abu-Basma [i.e., the Council created to represent the newly recognized 
municipalities which are only slowly being developed and built] gets the 
money for their budget, and yet we are the ones providing the infrastruc-
ture … I recently wrote a letter to the Wadi Na’am [a major pezurah settle-
ment] leadership. I told them they were better off  living in another town 
of their own [as is their present goal]. We cannot support all of them here 
at this time, not with our present budget. So I said “good luck, I hope they 
will give you your own town as you wish.” (El-Harumi, 28 May 2007)
Despite such struggles with scarce resources, Segev Shalom is recognized 
as one of the few towns able to manage eff ectively and effi  ciently its fi nances. 
Sagie, who in 2007 was working in the Ministry of Interior’s Southern Dis-
trict as Coordinator of Building and Development, noted that the Segev 
Shalom municipality is unique in its ability economically to function well.
Segev Shalom is always the one town that’s got what’s called sound fi scal 
practices; it’s the way it should be, the budget has always been in order. 
And it’s that way to this day. It’s never happened there that a salary went 
unpaid. Under both Mu’amar’s and El-Harumi’s tenures, things have been 
managed the way they need to be … Th is gives this particular settlement 
an advantage. Because the settlement is more compact, it is also easier 
to undertake projects. If you have a certain need and you have the bud-
get, say a million shekels to make sidewalks and roads and that kind of 
thing, you’re able to do it in such a compact place. It’s far easier than in 
a settlement in which you’ve got a house here and a kilometer away an-
other house, and a neighborhood over here and another neighborhood 
way over there. (Sagie, 24 March 2007) 
Dudu Cohen concurs (24 April 2007). From his perspective, Segev Sha-
lom is “more developed and successful in its level of management” than 
the other towns. He notes that the Moatzah is run professionally and in 
a manner that is helping the town to stand out as one of the Negev’s true 
success stories:
Th e treasurer is excellent and the professionals are good, and that’s im-
portant too. Ten years ago you couldn’t fi nd in the bedouin sector such 
great professionals in the fi elds we’re speaking about—accountants, trea-
surers, those that deal in fi nancials. It’s the only municipality that last year 
wrote a fi nal report on the year’s work. Th at is to say, they did what seems 
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natural, that you want to start planning for the next year, so you complete 
the previous year’s report to check what you did and didn’t do and build 
the following year’s plan on that. 
Segev Shalom last year concluded 2005’s work, invited all the residents, 
and said to them, “Look what we’ve done in the last year, look what we 
want to do in the coming year.” Th at’s a diff erent type of management that 
you don’t often see in the bedouin sector. And so I say that in all these 
steps, the way they came to their residents to present to them a “din and 
heshbon” [Hebrew: judgment and accounting]—of what they’ve done and 
what they’re planning on doing—this is a change in behavior and values 
in public service …
So in this respect, Segev Shalom is fairly advanced and trying hard to 
improve its situation, to position itself better among all the other bedouin 
towns. See how its grown? Th ey’ve done a lot of work in the town. It’s 
almost doubled in area [since it was fi rst developed]. Th ere are 8,000 new 
housing lots. 
While such praise is rare and is a positive sign of just how far Segev Shalom 
has come since the false starts of the early years of its development, a Lo-
cal Council perspective, which seeks to discourage rather than encourage 
resettlement into the town, is somewhat dissonant with the state’s resettle-
ment agenda. An attitude that appears to be concerned more with spend-
ing limited resources on those residents already in the town, rather than 
constantly striving to bring in more resettlers, can be seen as far back as 
1997. Although the town rated third of the seven at the time in terms of 
“current budget allocation,” its expenditure per capita placed Segev Shalom 
fi rst out of the seven towns in terms of seeking to develop the town and 
improve residents’ quality of life (Statistical Yearbook 1999: 134).
Development in Segev Shalom’s 
Non-Residential/Commercial Sectors
By the end of the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century, Segev Shalom was 
no longer the small, dormitory town that it had been during most of its 
early years of existence. Th e town had fi ve public schools, two health clin-
ics, and a small number of private doctors off ering their services out of their 
private residences (see Chapter 4). Th e town also off ered three mosques, 
the central mosque in Shekhuna Alef and two smaller, informal buildings in 
Shekhunot Bet and Hey, as compared to the early 1990s when there was but 
one—a simple shack where the central mosque stands today. Th ere is also a 
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small post offi  ce in town where banking transactions, such as paying bills, 
purchasing money orders, and the like, may be carried out as well.
Further, since the year 2000, two major changes have taken place in Se-
gev Shalom that have contributed to its growth and development. Th e fi rst 
has been the state’s recognition that by using the “stick” that seeks to force 
the bedouin out of the pezurah and into the town, they have accomplished 
little other than to create resentment, mistrust, and anger within the com-
munity. Th us, a strategy that instead relies increasingly upon the “carrot” 
of seeking to draw resettlers in by making the town a more attractive living 
space has become the greater emphasis of state planners in recent years. 
Moshe Moshe, a Bedouin Authority planner who has worked in Segev 
Shalom, as well as some of the other towns, for several years and who holds 
the primary responsibility of growing and developing the town (15 Febru-
ary 2007), suggests, “in the last six, seven, eight years people have identifi ed 
the economic potential of Segev Shalom. Th at is to say that today, when a 
family comes into the settlement of Segev Shalom, it doesn’t come because 
the state says, ‘you can’t live here [in the pezurah] anymore, we’re posting 
an eviction notice, we’re clearing the area.’ No, it has other reasons to move 
in.” He notes that by early 2007, there were almost no empty properties 
in Shekhunot Gimmel, Dalet or Hay, a direct result, he contends, of these 
changing attitudes.
Such reasons are not only economic per se, but are in many ways a re-
fl ection of the changes the state has long sought, that is, the “moderniza-
tion” of the community, its goals, desires, and so on. For, he contends, “the 
traditional style of life that was there in the past is changing. It’s chang-
ing all the time. In the past, you needed 2,000–3,000 dunams in order to 
live with the fl ock—but now there’s no fl ock. So you say to yourself, ‘What 
am I doing out here in the fi eld anyway? Why am I out here alone with 
the mud and the rain and in discomfort with no electricity and no water? 
And if, God forbid, Mother and Father are sick, and it rains and the wadi 
overfl ows, I won’t be able to cross over, or maybe they’ll die in the car.’” As 
a result, Moshe argues, the bedouin are relocating to Segev Shalom in in-
creasingly large numbers. 
In part, he attributes this to a change in planning strategy within the 
town environment.
Th e revolution that we started began in 1995 … [We decided then that] 
we needed to stop dictating to them how it will look; we needed to include 
them in the planning. We need to hear from them what they want in the 
plan, what looks right to the bedouin. We won’t always give them what 
they ask for, not always. If they ask for thirty dunams per family, that’s not 
something we’re able to give. If they ask for fi ve dunams per family, that’s 
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something that we can weigh or consider … we’re going to plan together 
with the people. And we’re going to try to reach the maximum possible 
that will bring about the most comfortable life that we possibly can off er. 
(15 February 2007)
In addition, Moshe highlights the fact that, increasingly, the bedouin 
have begun to pursue a limited level of entrepreneurial activity within the 
town. Although such risk-taking is relatively new to some sectors of the 
bedouin community (see Meir & Baskind 2006), there is no doubt that this 
is happening; businesses that simply did not exist in 2000 have seemingly 
been created overnight, both within the central suq (market) area, as well 
as throughout the town’s shekhunot. Th is, it must be noted, stands in sharp 
contrast to only a few years ago, when the town had virtually no economic 
activity or opportunity and was comprised almost solely of residential 
housing (see Dinero 2000). 
It is notable that the Moatzah is incapable—although some charge, un-
willing—to maintain a full rendering of the economic activity taking place 
in the town. Th e bedouin are loathe to comply with the Council by offi  -
cially registering their places of business, offi  ces, and other activities, as this 
would subject them to various regulatory constraints, not to mention re-
quiring them to pay various local and national taxes. Th us, many if not most 
non-residential economic activity in the town is unoffi  cial, unregistered, un-
documented, and unregulated (Segev Shalom Local Council, 2 May 2007).
According to an internal document dated fall 2006 (which in truth was 
developed for public health policy and livestock management purposes, 
and notes such concerns as rabies vaccinations, animal bites, and the like, 
but also includes a list of offi  cially registered food selling/marketing estab-
lishments; see “Plan and Work Management for Veterinarians,” Fall 2006), 
there were only eleven businesses offi  cially registered at the time:
• 5 full groceries
• 3 small groceries
• 2 restaurants
• 1 produce market
A quick drive through the town past a number of groceries, repair shops, 
butchers, and other small, cottage-scale commercial operations, many of 
which are run inside or next to the proprietor’s residence, reveals that this 
list is far from complete, however. Th us, at my request, an assessment was 
conducted and a list of commercial/non-residential enterprises was com-
piled by the Moatzah (no such list existed up until this time), which was 
to include both registered and unregistered non-residential activity in Se-
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gev Shalom. Th is “offi  cial” list, which includes the above-mentioned food-




• 1 produce market
• 1 sports equipment shop
• 1 lottery station (TOTO)
• 1 cell phone store 
• 1 dentist
• 1 travel agent
• 1 car parts store
• 1 car wash
• 1 building materials store
And yet, no sooner was this list submitted to me that it became clear that 
it is still incomplete. For example, it does not include at least three bridal 
salons in town (one in the town suq, two in Shekhuna Alef ), a pizza shop lo-
cated across from the high school (“Pizza Star”), three butcher shops (two 
on the main road, one adjacent to Shekhuna Bet, and one adjacent to Shek-
huna Alef, and one in the suq), a number of car repair garages, a doctor’s 
offi  ce in Shekhuna Gimmel, a bakery (on the entrance road by Shekhuna 
Alef ), and a variety of other small enterprises now found throughout the 
town.
By and large, entrepreneurial activity in the bedouin community as a 
whole has been dominated by fellahin, rather than “True,” bedouin (Meir & 
Baskind 2006: 86). In Segev Shalom, many are neither, but are of Palestin-
ian origin. In addition, Muhammad Masri, titular head of the Abid hamula 
in town, is responsible for developing a large mixed residential/commercial 
site on the main road as it passes through Shekhuna Bet, which includes 
restaurants, shops, a butcher, an apartment for his second wife and family, 
and other commercial activities. 
As Moshe, Bedouin Authority planner, notes with more than a hint of 
self-congratulatory pride, this commercial growth is all quite recent, and is 
occurring in a variety of sectors (15 February 2007). Moreover, he suggests, 
there is much more economic growth to be expected in Segev Shalom in 
the years ahead as a result of the present economic planning activity now 
taking place in the town:
Now, if you notice, as you come into Segev Shalom from the direction 
of the mosque, on the left before you reach the square there’s a strange 
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structure, just in front of the empty area, a structure with glass. Th at’s a 
dentist’s offi  ce. Th e son of the Sheikh, Ashaf, completed his dental degree 
and opened a clinic. Now pay attention, in the last seven years there’s 
merchandising, along the street, on the left and the right, there are all 
kinds of stores. Th at wasn’t there before—there was nothing … 
Another example of what is happening in Segev Shalom is in the new 
industrial area. We’ve already established a few businesses there … [But 
presently] nearly all these properties are empty. But all of them are sold … 
Now, why? Th is road [pointing to a map], it’s true it ends here in the park-
ing lot right now, but Be’er Sheva is here and here’s the cut off  road. From 
Emek Sara there’s going to be a road that’s going to cross the cut-off  road 
and is going to go up to Route 25. So people see the potential. Th e man 
who just sat here, it took me ten minutes to convince him to take owner-
ship of this property here, property Number 25. Why? Because I told him 
tomorrow, this is all going to open up. Now tomorrow may turn into one, 
two or three years. But this will be. Th e same tomorrow, even if it happens 
in two or three years, he’ll already be here. “I’m already here, [he’ll say to 
himself ] I’m already a fact.” Okay?
While Moshe’s optimism and desire to take credit for the economic growth 
and development of Segev Shalom appears at fi rst blush to be reasoned and 
well-earned, other voices in the Israeli government provide an alternative 
perspective to this eff usiveness. As of mid 2007, the 258-dunam Industrial 
Zone in Segev Shalom included the following businesses:
• Car repair garage
• Flour production company
• Building materials company
• Food preparation company
• Baking goods company
• Masonry materials company 
• Carpentry materials company
• Truck repair garage
According to the Israeli Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor, these busi-
nesses, all totaled, employed no more than 30 men (El-Amour, 14 June 
2007). Two of the companies were owned and operated by outsiders; one, a 
bedouin from Hura and the other a bedouin from Arara B’Negev. Th e rest 
were owned and operated by men from Segev Shalom. 
A chicken processing plant was also planned for the area, which would 
employ 400–500 employees. Th e company, which was based in the north-
ern Israeli city of Hadera, was planning to move and, “all things going well,” 
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would begin business sometime in late 2009. El-Amour noted that the Is-
raeli government was subsidizing this project, off ering incentives to try to 
attract this and other businesses to come to Segev Shalom. “Th ey are giving 
them a 24 percent tax break for the fi rst year to relocate here, with further 
incentives for the fi rst 5 years that they are here.” But, he charges, the gov-
ernment invests in projects in neighboring Jewish areas to a far greater 
degree. “If nothing is built in the Dimona Industrial area, the state will step 
in and try to help. Here the same thing is happening in Segev Shalom and 
the government is hardly doing a thing. We are trying to make it attractive, 
to work cooperatively with Emek Sarah, for example, to make the natural 
connection there. So if we can just join up with them, create something 
cooperative with the Jewish industrial areas, there is a lot of potential.” 
El-Amour, a bedouin who lives in K’seifa, sees the very issues that Moshe 
sees, and yet unlike Moshe, his reaction to what is happening in Segev Sha-
lom concerning economic activity and development is far more sanguine. 
People buy a migrash [Hebrew: lot] [in the Industrial Zone] but don’t build 
anything on it. We don’t really know why—there are many reasons. Some 
buy but don’t have enough money to build a business. Some buy but just 
don’t know what to do—what kind of business to create, what to do. 
Th ere’s also so much bureaucracy here, it takes so long to get a business 
going. You pay 100,000 NIS ($25,000) more or less for a lot. But then it 
takes a few years to get through the bureaucracy to actually have a busi-
ness up and running. So people just start something in a shack by their 
houses. Th ere’s nothing here [in the Industrial Zone] that’s attractive, 
nothing new to draw people in, no new technology, nothing that allows 
people to dream. So there’s not much activity there, and actually, we can’t 
really say that there even is an Industrial Zone in Segev Shalom at all.
In their study, Meir & Baskind (2006) make very similar charges. Th ey note 
that much of what holds back the bedouin entrepreneur or investor today 
from successfully creating and succeeding in a business enterprise is not 
“culture” or the fear of risk-taking, as some might hypothesize, but rather, 
the inability to fi nd banks willing adequately to fi nance their start-ups; the 
inability to access business consultancies willing and able to advise them 
on eff ective courses of action in how to succeed in the competitive business 
climate of the Israeli capitalist economy; and the inability to overcome the 
“tyranny of bureaucracy,” wherein the state, the bedouin believe, pre sents 
disproportionately diffi  cult obstacles before any bedouin businessman wish-
ing to open a commercial enterprise (Meir & Baskind 2006: 88–90). 
Moreover, El-Amour suggests that: “the Moatzah doesn’t know how 
much [commercial] activity there is outside the Zone, and doesn’t want to 
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know. Th is is the informal economy, a ‘black economy.’ Now they are build-
ing all along the main road into the town. It will be like a ‘Central Park,’ 
with new buildings that are connected, orderly, and that line the street. 
Some will have grass. Th ese won’t be separated from one another standing 
individually; they will not be haphazard.”
In essence, private investment is now driving the planning process, 
rather than planning driving development. Th e commercial area along the 
main road that Masri and other businessmen have invested in already ex-
ists, and now the planners are attempting to bring some order to it—largely 
behind the guise of a little grass and some landscaping. What is being seen 
increasingly in Segev Shalom is that private enterprise, initiated by some of 
the town’s more daring individuals willing to undertake capitalist ventures 
and who, to varying degrees, are willing to conform with the system, is suc-
ceeding in the town. 
What is also quite apparent is that on the one hand, the Industrial Zone 
in Segev Shalom—that is, the site where the government is seeking to im-
pose economic development—is, as of 2007 at least, largely unsuccessful 
and for all intents and purposes, empty. On the other hand, commercial 
activity thrives inside the community itself, but it goes unchecked, unregu-
lated, and uncontrolled—and yet ironically, the state wishes to take credit 
for its existence. As is the case with much of the planning and development 
in the bedouin sector, the residents of Segev Shalom are not fully conform-
ing to the rules and regulations or demands of the government. As a result, 
development is happening internally, indigenously, naturally, not because 
of government intervention per se, but rather, in spite of it. 
Th is development is not surprising. In their work on bedouin entrepre-
neurship (2006), Meir and Baskind made the initial assumption that in the 
planned Negev bedouin towns, commercial enterprise would develop as 
the bedouin modernized, and this would be a direct result of the planned 
change initiative. Further, they hypothesized that, unlike the pezurah, com-
mercial activity and behavior would be more pronounced in the planned 
town environment than in the pezurah, given “that degrees of develop-
ment and well-being, exposure to development and a modern business 
environment, and friendliness and comfort of the operational business 
environment, are all more favorable in towns than in the underdeveloped 
unrecognized settlements in the ‘dispersion’” (Meir & Baskind 2006: 84). 
And yet, they found no statistically measurable diff erences between the 
towns and the pezurah in terms of entrepreneurial activity, and the rise of 
businesses in the two environments. Th eir conclusion is incredibly telling:
Th is might imply further that there are no diff erences between town-
dwellers and “dispersion” [i.e., pezurah] dwellers in their degrees of devel-
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opment, exposure to development and to a modern business environment, 
and the consequences of these in terms of business entrepreneurship. Th e 
explanation for this may be found in the issue of the infrastructure and 
economic bases of the planned towns. Th e government promised public 
investment in these towns in the 1970s and 1980s in order to attract the 
bedouin from the “dispersion” to relocate there. Th is could have generated 
a signifi cant diff erence in degrees of economic growth and development 
between these spaces, making the towns more attractive. In fact, however, 
these investments have been negligible. (Meir & Baskind 2006: 84)
Conclusions
As the above statistics reveal, during the 1990s and 2000s, the social and 
economic growth and development of Segev Shalom has been consider-
able. Th e questions that this chapter raises, however, and that will be raised 
repeatedly in the chapters that follow, will be: 1) to what extent have im-
provements been experienced in the Negev bedouin community, specifi -
cally Segev Shalom, that make it an attractive place to live, and to attract 
additional resettlers; 2) to what extent do the bedouin town residents per-
ceive/enjoy these changes and improvements, and how might this be mea-
sured; and last but not least, 3) to what extent are these improvements and 
changes attributed to the state’s planning eff orts, and to what extent do 
bedouin residents believe that improvements in their lives today are occur-
ring not because of government intervention/planning eff orts, but in spite 
of them.
In general, it may be said that bedouin perceptions are largely in con-
tradiction with the state’s perception of reality. While all indices suggest 
what should be perceived as an improvement in bedouin resident quality of 
life, that sentiment is not sensed by many, if any, Segev Shalom residents. 
At the same time, from the state’s perspective, the issue of a failure to see 
advances in social and economic development in Segev Shalom and the 
neighboring towns does not come down to planning, but is almost entirely 
cultural. A resistance on the part of the bedouin to register their businesses 
or to conform with the offi  cial system by holding camels after relocating 
to town, for example, is not contextualized in order to understand that, in 
fact, there is a rationale and logic to the decisions the bedouin make based 
upon their being members of an impoverished, disenfranchised, minority 
group having limited choices, limited resources, and limited power. Rather, 
state planners see theirs as a job of seeking to change the culture of the 
bedouin, to “modernize” their ways of thinking, rather than to understand, 
respect or appreciate bedouin society for who and what it is. Th is paternal-
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istic mentality is at the heart of what makes planning in the bedouin sector 
such a problematic enterprise.
Th us, the issues which will be addressed in subsequent chapters (3–7) 
will include the labor limitations presently found in Segev Shalom, chang-
ing educational opportunities, changing bedouin roles and identities in Is-
raeli society, and the role of women in this change. I conclude this chapter 
by quoting at length one of the key architects of Israel’s bedouin planning 
and resettlement agenda, Ministry of Interior (Southern District) Director 
Dudu Cohen, as he eff ectively lays out the state’s perspective on the social 
and economic development of the Negev bedouin in reference to these is-
sues as it stands in 2007 (24 April 2007):
If you look among the bedouin women they’re either childcare workers or 
teachers, [since] any other occupation that would allow them to meet with 
men is a problem. And so that aff ects the nature of the work, the nature of 
their education, it aff ects everything. Th e drop-out rate in high school is 
very high because their parents aren’t willing to let them leave their village 
and study in a school outside the village. So they learn in the elementary 
schools where they live, but very few go on to high school, so very few go 
on to university. So you get to a situation in which the level of education 
for a bedouin woman is very low; she [doesn’t] bring in any money. 
So from an economic standpoint the man is the sole breadwinner, and 
his knowledge isn’t in high tech, but low tech, and the level of his income 
is low too. Now, usually he doesn’t have one wife but more than one wife 
and so he has a lot of children and for each one there isn’t much to go 
around. We also need to deal with this topic but to deal with it as a social 
problem. It’s also a cultural problem. You can’t change it in one day. Th e 
State can’t force it on them, if they want to progress, they can’t progress in 
the structure of their lives today, with one head of household among two, 
three, four wives with tens of children and one breadwinner. Because the 
result is less for each child; it’s math. 
As much as the State gives for children, through the national insurance, 
it’s not enough. Th e ability of the father to give attention to so many chil-
dren is problematic. At least we are identifying a little change, but not 
much. It comes from the fact that they are living in a Jewish society, they 
see that in Jewish society there is one wife, and to live with many wives is 
not easy; with many children it’s not easy; and it’s a process that is revolu-
tionizing bedouin society. It’s a process that they’re undergoing. 
Cohen’s perspective reveals virtually every aspect of the foundation of the 
state’s Negev bedouin planning agenda. By connecting formal education, 
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the role of women, polygyny, and economic development, he makes it clear 
that the onus for development lies squarely on the shoulders of the com-
munity itself and not on the government, or its role in implementing and 
carrying out the new town planning initiative. It is to be determined then 
how planning and development in the bedouin sector are to be evaluated. 
As Chapter 3 will reveal, the bedouin community is quite open to the type 
of development and “progress” that Cohen describes. But the question, of 
course, is whether the state’s planners are able to deliver. And when they 
are not, who, really, is to blame?
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Planning, Service Provision, and 
Development in Segev Shalom 
We [bedouin who live in town] like to think we are the same as our 
relatives out there [pointing toward the spontaneous settlements off  
in the distance]. But we’re not the same. Look at this shiq [Arabic: 
traditional guest area of the tent centered around the fi re pit, but in 
this case, a small room constructed of cinder blocks]. Th is is nostal-
gia, trying to hold onto the past. How do you measure the strength 
of a bedouin character? By the height of the pile of ashes in his shiq. 
We have this shiq, but it isn’t like what we had out there. I remem-
ber what we had, and so I try to recreate it here. My children who 
are growing up in the town—they don’t even have this to remember.
Th e shiq should be open to the outside, so that people can come one 
after another. Th e tent is open; when the dogs bark, you can look 
out and see what’s going on around you. Here, we go home from this 
shiq, we close our doors to our villas, and we are cut off  from the 
world and the people around us. So we like to think that we are the 
same as they are [out there], but we’re not. 
We have lost something by coming here. But of course, you can see 
what we’ve gained. 
— Muhammad (Abu-Tarek) Hamamdi, Segev Shalom, Israel, 
11 November 1992
As suggested in Chapter 2, population growth in Segev Shalom has been 
steady, taking off  roughly at the point when this study was initiated in the 
early 1990s. It is apparent as well that a great deal of growth, both in popu-
lation as well as in the early beginnings of economic activity, also has begun 
to occur in the town, most especially since the year 2000.
While state planners are quick to point out this growth (and to take credit 
for it), I noted in the previous chapter that bedouin residents often perceive 
that much of what has occurred has not necessarily happened because of 
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the government’s planning eff orts, but perhaps, in spite of them. Moreover, 
what is also quite clear is that resident attitudes toward the provisions of-
fered by the local governing agencies, in particular, the Moatzah, remain 
mixed. While on the one hand, several indices suggest an improving quality 
of life for Segev Shalom residents, overall satisfaction in the town does not 
appear to correlate directly in every instance with this change.
Measuring Growth and Development in Segev Shalom
Th e state and the local bedouin community, including the Local Councils, 
often appear to be at odds when it comes to their views of the growth, de-
velopment, and ultimate success of the planned Negev bedouin communi-
ties. Th is is, in fact, a common dynamic in planning, often referred to as 
a choice between “planning for people, or planning for place.” While this 
binary is itself suspect, as one would reasonably posit that both are required 
planning goals and need not be viewed in opposition to one another, what 
is certain is that measuring in a quantitative or qualitative manner the 
success of Segev Shalom must go beyond an analysis of the trajectory of 
population growth, successive political leadership or competent fi nancial 
management style. 
As a planned new town for an ethnic and religious minority community, 
which, prior to resettlement, had never previously lived in an agglomerated 
environment concentrated upon a small area of land, Segev Shalom and the 
other bedouin towns was (and is) an experiment not only for its bedouin 
residents, but for its planners as well. While the academic and popular lit-
erature, blogs, and news media are rife with condemnations of the towns 
for being utter failures, a scientifi c examination and evaluation of the town, 
addressing where and how it is succeeding, where and how it is failing, and 
why, will shed further light on the issue.
As noted, the growth and development of Segev Shalom since the early 
1990s has been considerable, and is based almost solely upon resettle-
ment from the pezurah. In order to quantify this growth and quality of 
life improvements that the various planning and governing agencies have 
implemented during this period, I undertook four independent, scientifi c 
household surveys over a fi fteen-year period (1993, 1996, 2000, and 2007), 
with the intent of tracing this change in a systematic, organized fashion. 
In undertaking this analysis, I held certain methodological ideals and 
provisos in mind concerning measuring the successes and failures of the 
resettlement initiative in general, and the success of Segev Shalom, in par-
ticular, in serving the interests of its resettled residents. First, I turned to 
the World Bank Department of Social Policy’s resettlement policies and 
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evaluation techniques made popular throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Cer-
nea 1988; 1990; 1993), as I believed that these off ered an objective standard 
for resettlement project analysis. Th ey were particularly ideal methods and 
procedures for quanti tatively and qualitative ly monitoring post-reloca-
tion planning projects, and for measuring the socioe conomic eff ects and 
transfor ma tions resulting from resettlement of minorities, including indig-
enous peoples. 
 Th e contention of these models was, in eff ect, that through an emphasis 
upon adaptive technologies, specializa tion, appropriate methods, and the 
anticipated displacement and social alteration resulting from the introduc-
tion of planned change, a less-developed community can be transformed 
from underdeveloped to developing given adequate time, cultural sensitiv-
ity, and appropriate planning techniques (see also Rondinelli 1985; 1990). 
Th e approach I sought to adopt in order to measure and analyze this change 
centered upon the premise that “concentrating investments in services and 
infrastructure in settlements that serve, or could serve, a large population 
from surrounding rural areas [is] more effi  cient and eff ective than scatter-
ing services and facilities widely over the landscape” (Rondinelli 1990: 242). 
Th is, of course, is the state’s bedouin resettlement argument in a nutshell, 
and was planned on the assumption that there would be particular func-
tions, linkages, and accessibility of spatially concentrated services to neigh-
boring urban populations. 
Th e resettlement/development literature also argues that the functional 
integration of place-specifi c services can contribute to the development of 
an urban hierarchy, network or system to overcome urban-rural polariza-
tion (Belsky & Karaska 1990: 227). It is this dispersion of services through-
out an urbanizing rural network that, it is contended, will help to further 
modernization and development.
Such an integration of economic and social services is viewed as a means 
of moving out of the low productivity cycle typifying rural societies, and as 
an agent for countering the cultural resistance for change. Th e provision of 
services that are required to complete a settlement system hierarchy acts as 
a further catalyst to economic development. 
Overall, the supply and placement of urban functions in order to pro-
mote a balanced central place hierarchy is the primary component of this 
approach (Belsky & Karaska 1990: 227). Th is goal is seen as more pro-active 
than a demand-oriented, market-driven approach (Rondinelli 1990: 244). 
It is the contention of the resettlement planner that “instead of maximiz-
ing access to specifi c facilities based on questionable interpretations of 
demand, the urban functions method helps planners make locational deci-
sions that can con tribute to creating conditions in rural regions that allow 
market trade to develop” (Rondinelli 1990: 244).
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It is signifi cant here to note that Israel’s Jewish new town development 
program, initiated in the early 1950s, was also designed using an urban 
hierarchy pattern based upon Christaller’s Th eory of Central Places, which 
parallels the bedouin new town agenda. Th e program sought to create an 
integrated system of large urban areas, medium sized towns, small towns, 
and hamlets, which would together comprise Israel’s emerging urban sys-
tem. Th e new development towns were to serve as intermediate settle-
ments between large towns and hamlets (kibbutzim/moshavim). Rural 
centers were planned to support regional needs, such as primary schools, 
infant clinics, health centers, post offi  ces, service stations, stores, and gen-
eral goods. Regional towns were designed to serve as centers of production, 
storage, and export of the agricultural products (Efrat 1984), and to serve 
as the “super-ordinate” center of a few of these rural centers, providing ad-
ministrative and supply capacity.
 Israel’s state planners hoped that regions around the central new towns 
would develop simultaneously with urban growth. Ultimately, however, 
this approach proved not very suitable to Israel’s existing geographic and 
social conditions. Planning was rarely done within the regional context, 
and the physical planning for the new towns was not developed in coordi-
nation with social and economic planning (Efrat 1984). Th us, it is both pos-
sible to say that these planners were quite familiar with the concepts they 
sought to apply to the bedouin new towns as they and their predecessors 
had used them previously in the Jewish sector. It is also possible to say that 
the results of that initiative were, and remain in the twenty-fi rst century, at 
best, mixed.
Second, in seeking mechanisms through which adequately to address the 
success of Segev Shalom and the neighboring bedouin towns, I also sought 
to use a Social Impact Analysis (SIA) model (see Freeman et al. 1979), as 
I believe it off ers further guidance in measuring the social impact of de-
velopment projects, including resettlement projects, upon less-developed 
communities. SIA introduces the contention that social costs and benefi ts 
are as important to project success as are economic costs and benefi ts, and 
that both must be weighed in determining successful modernization and 
development planning. In addition to the World Bank’s notions of what 
is needed and desirable in a successful resettlement/development project, 
SIAs help to determine seemingly counterintuitive or previously unantici-
pated development project results. SIAs reveal that “common sense” mea-
sures do not always live up to their name (Freeman et al. 1979: 47), and that 
projects may fail socially or economically to transform a population in the 
manner initially intended. 
In undertaking an SIA-style approach, I assumed in the 1992–1993 study 
and the analyses thereafter that resettlement and development in Segev 
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Shalom must, like similar programs, have measurable objectives, a plausible 
way of achieving them, and personnel able to pursue them (Freeman et al. 
1979: 49). By clearly defi ning specifi c project goals and by limiting project 
objectives that can otherwise become contradictory, planners may ensure 
that project successes or failures can be predetermined and later measured. 
Setting time limits or schedules delineating specifi c, realistic objectives 
(say, increasing school attendance for girls by a certain percentage by a cer-
tain date) also helps to direct a project, and to further its progress.
In the fi nal analysis, one of the most important goals I sought to quantify 
were the impacts (desired and not desired) of the resettlement initiative, 
particularly though not solely as they have manifested in this bedouin town. 
Th e implied impact of state-provided urban services to post-nomads is so-
cial and economic development and communal modernization—that is, an 
improved “quality of life” for those who relocate from their original place 
of residence to an area designated by the state. But such an improvement 
is not easily measured, nor is its defi nition even fully agreed upon (Cutter 
1985: 7). It is for this reason that I use a combination of indicators—spatial, 
functional, and social—in discussing the success of Segev Shalom. What 
residents think and what the state perceives are, as one might imagine, of-
ten two entirely diff erent things.
As Cutter notes, it is the perceptual aspect of one’s comfort level in a 
given geographic location that, though diffi  cult to measure quantitatively, 
is a key indicator of individual (and ultimately, communal) satisfaction with 
one’s place of residence. Psychological well being, satisfaction with one’s lot, 
and how fully one’s aspirations are being met, is the essence of quality of life 
attitudes (Cutter 1985: 16). While not always easily summarized, the basic 
question, “Is life better in town than in the pezurah?,” provides the essence 
of quality of life measures in this post-nomadic community.
One fi nal consideration also is necessary in this analysis. In communi-
ties such as that of the Negev bedouin, communal quality of life factors 
and individual quality of life factors must be distinguished. Th ere is some 
argument, for example, over whether individual quality of life benefi ts may 
confl ict with communal quality of life benefi ts, and that as individualism 
rises, these improvements may come at a cost to the community as a whole 
(Cutter 1985: 66).1 For, while certain changes in the bedouin community 
may be perceived as improvements over the previous individual lifestyle, 
they may at the same time be perceived as harmful to the community as a 
whole (Ben-David 1993: 113).
I kept these various ideas and concepts in mind when I began the pro-
cess of attempting to measure the growth and success of Segev Shalom 
from a multifaceted perspective that took quality of life and similar issues 
into account. I initiated the data gathering for the study by fi rst designing 
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a survey instrument in the summer of 1992, to be used in the fi rst of four 
household surveys that was to be conducted in the town in the early spring 
of 1993. Implementation of the fi rst survey was supported in part by the 
Masos Regional Council (Moatzah Masos). I was paid a small stipend, and 
in return committed myself to writing an analysis for the Moatzah about 
my fi ndings in the town. In addition to the fi nancial assistance, I received 
offi  ce/secretarial support (which I received for all four surveys from the 
Moatzah), as well as the commitment of bedouin students located by the 
Moatzah, who agreed to undertake the actual door-to-door survey process 
in the town. In this and subsequent surveys, I personally carried out the 
completion of several of the questionnaires as well, which numbered ap-
proximately 10 percent of all questionnaires administered. 
Th e number of surveyors, the number of households visited, and the 
number of questionnaires successfully completed by necessity increased 
with each iteration of the survey, a refl ection of the growing population of 
the town, as well as the growth in its geographic size. While, for example, 
I received assistance from four students in the surveying process in 1993, I 
required twelve in 2007. In every instance, I divided up the town by neigh-
borhood (Shekhuna) and, using maps provided by the Council designating 
where families actually lived (as opposed to lots sold or housing starts initi-
ated), randomly selected households by lot number (there are no addresses 
in town) for inclusion in the survey. 
As for the sampling frame for the surveys, this was defi ned as the num-
ber of occupied lots in the town, regardless of the whether the dwelling(s) 
utilized were permanent stone homes, shacks, tents, or other types of resi-
dences. In each survey, every eff ort was made to access a representative 
sample from each individual neighborhood based upon population (i.e., a 
clustered sampling approach was used), especially due to the fact that the 
Abid bedouin do not live throughout the town, but only in certain geo-
graphic areas. Shekhunot Alef and Bet are the most densely populated neigh-
borhoods, with the most families residing there, and thus are especially 
represented in all four sets of the survey fi ndings (as is Shekhuna Hey in the 
2007 fi ndings, which, since 2000, has become home to a number of diverse 
groups, including fellahi bedouin and Palestinian “collaborators”). 
Th e number of households included in the surveys increased each sur-
vey, although the representative nature of the sample remained consistent. 
Th e Council assisted in the early iterations of the survey in publicizing that 
the survey would take place, though word of mouth between residents 
proved a far more eff ective “marketing tool” in gaining access to residents’ 
homes than were the eff orts of the government. As a result, in the 1993 and 
subsequent surveys, the “refusal/no one home” rate was quite low, averag-
ing about 20 percent and declining with each subsequent survey; as town 
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residents became increasingly familiar with the research project, aware-
ness of its purposes and intentions rose and suspicions dwindled. 
Th is rate is well in line with other household research conducted in 
developing world environments (see, for example, Th omas et al. 2001: 5; 
“Household Sample Surveys…,” 2005). A greater problem than refusal to 
cooperate or to answer the door to the surveyor was the number of resi-
dents who, as time went on and word spread that a survey was under way, 
sought out surveyors, seeking to voice their views to anyone who, they be-
lieved, was willing to listen to their concerns. Other researchers working 
in poor, less developed environments have had similar experiences, not-
ing that “once the fi eld worker cuts through the initial fear and suspicion, 
the favorable attitudes come to the fore and result in greater cooperation 
than might be expected in less stratifi ed societies” (Stycos 1993: 56). Still, 
achieving trust in the Negev bedouin community is an ongoing challenge, 
largely though not wholly overcome through the use of a team of bedouin 
student surveyors.
In March 1993, 81 household questionnaires were completed, refl ecting 
more than a third (38 percent) of the occupied households that existed in 
the town at the time. In July 1996, 102 questionnaires were completed, re-
fl ecting approximately the same percentage (36 percent) of all households 
in the town. In July 2000, the bedouin student surveyors employed for the 
project were able to gather 150 completed questionnaires. Although the 
town had doubled in size since 1993 (480 households in 2000 compared 
to 215 in 1993), this still amounted to 31 percent of the households in the 
town.
Th e 1993 survey took a little over a week to complete. Th e 2007 survey 
took nearly a month, beginning 4th of March and concluding on the 30th of 
March. Two hundred thirty-six questionnaires were completed during this 
period, which amounted to 21 percent of all existing, offi  cially recognized 
households. Th e process had by this point become more complex and 
cumbersome than ever before. In cooperation with JITLI coordinator and 
elementary school headmaster Abdullah Jirjawi, students were recruited 
from the Segev Shalom High School to participate in the project. All of the 
students had facility in Arabic, Hebrew, and even a little English. Having 
participated in JITLI for some years, all were senior honor students who 
had made brief visits to the US, Mexico, and Europe. Th us, they came to 
the study with a level of maturity, sophistication, and understanding that 
fostered the collection of an incredibly deep and rich data set from what 
had by 2007 become a town of 6,248 residents living in 1,124 households. 
It is to this data, and the wealth of information that can be mined from it, 
that I now turn.
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Planning and Development in Segev Shalom—2007: 
Quantifying Resident Socioeconomic Status and Satisfaction
A detailed accounting of the descriptive statistics that comprise the data 
sets for the 1993, 1996, and 2000 studies has already been undertaken (see 
Dinero 1996; 2000; 2004), and need not be repeated here. What follows, 
then, is a compilation and compression of material from these studies as 
it meshes with and compares to data from the fourth and fi nal survey, un-
dertaken in Segev Shalom in 2007. It is this data that, by being the most 
recent and comprehensive, provides an inclusive rendering of the state of 
planning and its outcomes in the town in the early part of the twenty-fi rst 
century.
Th e data set gathered in 2007 (see Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3) is quite compa-
rable to those gathered in previous years. A better gender balance was 
achieved than ever before, but statistics concerning marriage and age are 
comparable, if not identical, with similar studies. As in previous studies, 
Chi-square analysis was used (p < or = .05) due to the small N, the nature 
of the population, and the data set gathered. 
Also as in previous studies, age correlated with a variety of signifi cant 
social and economic indicators in Segev Shalom. For example, younger 
bedouin residents were found to be more educated than older residents 
(p=.00), more literate (p=.00), and less likely to live in a polygynous house-
hold (p=.00; see Chapter 6).
Economically, the young were more likely to be employed (p=.04), and 
less likely to carry out a “traditional” behavior, such as growing fruits, 
olives, or vegetables (p=.05). Th ey were more likely to own material goods, 
however, such as phones (p=.00), VCR/DVD players, (p=.00), cars (p=.02), 
and personal computers (p=.03). Signifi cantly too, those aged 40 years and 
under were more likely to use the social welfare services off ered in the town 
(p=.05; see Chapter 4); they were, conversely, less likely to have voted in the 
last election than older bedouin town residents (p=.01).
In general and quite logically, younger residents also tended to have 
lived less time in Segev Shalom than the “old timers” (p=.02). One of the 
major diff erences between the 2007 data set and previous data sets is, of 
course, the length of time living in the town. In the 1993 survey, for exam-
ple, 58 percent of respondents lived in the town fi ve years or less, most of 
these having relocated fewer than 3 years prior to survey implementation 
(Dinero 1995). In 2007, approximately this same percentage, 60 percent, 
had lived in the town at least 11 years; nearly half the respondents had lived 
in the town for 16 or more years. Quite clearly, the town could no longer be 
viewed as “new” or recently established. 
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And yet, there are notable diff erences between those who could be 
deemed the “old timers”—that is, the founders of the town who have lived 
there now for over a decade—and those newcomers who are yet fi nding 
settled life in the new town environment a novel experience. Several statis-
tically signifi cant correlations were found between the length of time one 
lived in the town of Segev Shalom and other economic and social develop-
ment indices. While this is, of course, logical, there are a number of other 
correlations that further reveal the diff erences between these “newcomers” 
and the town’s “old timers.” 
For example, more recent arrivals were found to be more educated than 
the old timers (p=.00), most especially members of the Azazmeh tribe 
(p=.00), those under the age of 40 (p=.02), and those in the town who for 
the most part have lower household incomes (i.e., under 10,000 NIS/month; 
p=.00). Further, newer arrivals were found to be more literate than the oth-
ers (p=.01); again, this was especially found to be true among the Azazmeh, 
(p=.01), men (p=.01), and those with low household incomes (p=.01). 
As a result, newer arrivals had a slightly better chance of accessing em-
ployment than the old timers (p=.05). Th is was especially true of women 
laborers (p=.01) and those coming from lower income families (p=.00). 
Indeed, overall, these new arrivals remain more likely to reside in lower 
income households than those bedouin residents who had lived in the town 
for a decade or more (p=.00). Th is was especially true of the young resettlers 
Table 3.1. 2007 Segev Shalom Survey Respondents—Descriptive Statistics
Gender: M 49% F 51% 
Age: 40 or under 77% Over 40 23%
Marital: Married 68% Single 23%
 Divorced 6% Widowed 3%
 Polygynous family 32%
Tribe: Azazmeh 58% Tarabeen 32%
 Other 10%
Years Living in Segev Shalom:
 1–3 11% 4–6 9%
 7–10 20% 11–15 20%
 16+ 40%
Source: Segev Shalom Survey, 2007.
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(p=.00), particularly members of the Azazmeh tribe (p=.01). Previously 
(see, for example, Dinero 1995), I noted that continued pastoral and agri-
cultural activities in the town have economic, as well as social functions. 
Although this dynamic still distinguishes the tribes in town (see below), 
it does not appear to be impacted by the time spent living there. Newer 
arrivals to Segev Shalom are less likely than old timers to raise fl ocks or 
other animals (p=.01), particularly the young (p=.02) and those with low 
household incomes (p=.00). Similarly, newcomers are signifi cantly less 
likely to raise olives, vegetables, or other crops (p=.00). Once again, this 
is particularly true of Azazmeh members (p=.00) and those families with 
lower household incomes (p=.00).
Th e length of time living in the town similarly plays a role in other eco-
nomic aspects of the bedouin resettlers’ lives. On the one hand, recent re-
settlers are less likely to own a TV (p=.03), especially Azazmeh families 
(p=.03) and those with low incomes (p=.03). And yet, newcomers are more 
likely to own a VCR/DVD than town veterans (p=.04), even if they are 
low income (p=.00); they are also more likely to own a personal computer 
(p=.00), especially if they are young families (p=.00), or members of the 
Azazmeh tribe (p=.01). Young newcomer families were also more likely to 
own a Nintendo/Playstation gaming system (p=.04)—an item with which 
many veteran bedouin respondents were entirely unfamiliar. 
As for the extent or degree to which town living serves as an agent for 
modernization and political moderation, the correlations found in 2007 
Table 3.2. 2007 Social and Economic Indicators: Education and Employment
Education None 15% Some elementary 10% 
(M/F) Post elementary 26% HS grad 54%
 Post HS 5%
 Literate  88%
 (Arabic/Hebrew/both)
Employment Employed 53%
(M/F) Household Income under 10,000 NIS/month 78%
 (approx. U.S.$2,500)
Job location Bedouin area 7% Jewish area/town 45%
 Moshav/kibbutz 8% Segev Shalom 40%
Agrarian Raise Animals 37% Raise Crops  45%
Source: Segev Shalom Survey, 2007.
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that suggested any signifi cant relationships off er mixed results. What can 
be said is that those living in town longer have a more favorable view of 
the national government (p=.03). Th is was found to be true especially of 
women (p=.01), low income residents (p=.04), and respondents under 40 
years of age (p=.05; see Chapter 5).
Further, employed Azazmeh residents living in the town longer had a 
greater likelihood of working in the non-bedouin, Jewish sector (p=.01), as 
what could be viewed as a sign of further integration into the mainstream 
of Israeli society. Related to this issue, the Azazmeh living in town longer 
had higher incomes (p=.01). Similarly, Abid Tarabeen living in town longer 
were found to be more likely than other Abid Tarabeen newcomers to own 
a stone house, rather than just a temporary dwelling (p=.04). 
Other diff erences between the two tribes are also notable. Th e Azazmeh 
continue to come to the town in more recent years relative to the Tara-
been. A correlation is found between tribe and time of arrival, where the 
Azazmeh are more likely to have come more recently to town, while the 
Tarabeen ceased relocating for the most part over a decade ago (p=.02); 
this is especially so of young households (p=.00). In many ways, however, 
this is only a small diff erence between these two groups. As noted in previ-
ous study outcomes stemming from research conducted in Segev Shalom 
(see, for example, Dinero 2006; Groode & Dreiher 2007), there are numer-
ous distinctions between those residents in the town who are of “True” 
bedouin Arab origins (that is, the Azazmeh tribe), and those who are of 
African origin. Th ese diff erences may appear minor, but when viewed on 
the aggregate, they reveal a vast social and economic disparity between the 
Table 3.3. 2007 Housing, Utilities, and Reasons for Relocation
Housing Permanent house 80% Temporary 44%
   Dwelling(s)* 
Electricity source Public Utility 80% Wire/neighbor 17%
Water source  Utility 96% 
Why did you locate to Segev Shalom? 
 Family reasons 47% Government force 27%
 Services in town/  Born here/other  6%
 quality of life 20%
Note: * More than one dwelling—permanent, temporary, or both—are typically built on a single lot.
Source: Segev Shalom Survey, 2007.
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two groups that has long defi ed any planning eff orts to achieve uniformity 
across the town’s thin socioeconomic veneer.
Th e Azazmeh, for example, are less likely than the Abid bedouin to raise 
any sort of animals in Segev Shalom (p=.01). Th is is especially prevalent 
among the town’s poorer residents (p=.05), a clear sign that holding fl ocks 
and other animal resources is not for “nostalgic” purposes, but rather 
serves as an economic supplement to household income. Th e same can be 
said for agricultural activity in the town: the Azazmeh are less likely than 
the Tarabeen to raise any sort of crop (p=.00), most especially the lower 
income households (p=.01). 
Not only does this fact say a great deal about the economic status of 
many of the black bedouin of Segev Shalom, but more than this, it impacts 
the town environment as well. Shekhuna Bet is physically diff erent from 
the rest of the town, fi lled with animal corrals, gardens, small orchards, 
noises, and smells of all kinds—a bit of chaos and cacophony amidst what 
is slowly evolving into an otherwise “modern” town. Although such are 
found throughout the town, the degree of diff erence between this neigh-
borhood and the others is not lost on the town residents, who bear various 
resentments against either the Moatzah, the Abid themselves, or both, for 
this questionable state of aff airs. Survey respondents representing lower 
income households were generally more critical of the town’s cleanliness 
than were more wealthy respondents (p=.00), in particular the members of 
the Azazmeh tribe (p=.00). Th at is, overall, the Azazmeh were more criti-
cal of the town’s cleanliness than were the Tarabeen (p=.03).
Wealth disparity between the two communities is also expressed in 
terms of material goods ownership. For example, the Azazmeh are more 
likely to own a Nintendo/Playstation gaming system (p=.03). Signifi cantly, 
even the lower income Azazmeh are more likely than the Tarabeen to own 
a Nintendo/Playstation (p=.03). Other luxury/high end items that the Azaz-
meh are more likely to own include the personal computer (p=.00), and 
most especially those households with higher incomes (p=.03). Th e Aza-
zmeh are also more likely to own VCR/DVD players (p=.02). Th e higher 
incomes Azazmeh are also more likely to have a satellite dish for their tele-
vision service (p=.01).
As for the Tarabeen households, they too are more likely to own cer-
tain consumer products, but these statistics only further the contention 
that Segev Shalom is highly socially stratifi ed. Tarabeen households, for 
example, are more likely to own a clothes washing machine than the Azaz-
meh (p=.04). Moreover, this was found to be especially true among the 
lower income Tarabeen families (p=.02). Th e lower income Tarabeen were 
also found to be more likely to own a TV than lower income Azazmeh 
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households (p=.01), who were also more likely to own a refrigerator than 
Azazmeh families (p=.02).
In general, of course, consumption by these lower income households is 
not an indicator of family prosperity as it is for the wealthy Azazmeh, but 
rather, it suggests that these items (the TV, washing machine, and refrigera-
tor), unlike the high end items consumed by the more well-off  town resi-
dents, are viewed by these Tarabeen consumers as essential components 
of post-nomadic life. Th ese are viewed as items for survival, not items of 
leisure (the TV included). 
On the whole, however, the bedouin families of Segev Shalom are slowly 
but surely showing an increasing ability and desire to purchase consumer 
goods as wage labor engagement and overall household incomes rise (Fig-
ures 3.1a, 3.1b). In comparing Segev Shalom residents’ levels of consump-
tion with the Israeli national averages for consumer product ownership 
(Figure 3.2) one fi nds the following: refrigerator, 99.9 percent; washing ma-
chine, 94.7 percent; TV, 91.7 percent; telephone, 86.8 percent; Cable/Dish 
TV, 70.1 percent; VCR, 64.9 percent; personal computer, 59.2 percent; and, 
car, 57.3 percent (CBS 2004). While the bedouin ownership rates fall below 
these rates in most instances, on average, Segev Shalom residents have a 
higher rate of ownership of TVs and automobiles than the Israeli national 
average.
Predictably, it is found that income correlates strongly with the educa-
tional levels of the survey respondents in the town, though this was found 
Figure 3.1b. Percent Employed Outside the Home, Segev Shalom Survey 
Respondents (Male/Female).
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
Figure 3.1a. Percentage of 
Employed Segev Shalom Residents 
Who Are Working in the Town 
Itself, Men & Women, 1993–2007.
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
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to be true for the Tarabeen households and was not necessarily the case 
with the Azazmeh households (p=.01). What was also found, however, was 
that the Azazmeh who were employed in wage labor were more likely to 
work in Jewish areas, making higher salaries than Tarabeen respondents 
(p=.05). Respondents over 40 years of age who lived in households with 
higher incomes also were more likely to work in the Jewish sector (p=.05).
Th ose households in Segev Shalom with higher incomes were also more 
likely to own a permanent stone home rather than just a temporary dwell-
ing (p=.03), a telephone (p=.03), a VCR/DVD player (p=.01), and a car 
(p=.01). Higher income households were more likely to be connected to 
the public utility in order to access their electricity (p=.01), particularly 
among young (p=.01) and Azazmeh (p=.03) households.
It should be noted here that, as discussed at length in Chapter 2, there 
is limited employment opportunity in Segev Shalom. And yet the employ-
ment rate within the town itself has risen sharply during the 15-year study 
period (Figure 3.1a). Th is rising job rate is somewhat misleading, as it in-
cludes the increasing employment of women in the town (see Chapter 6). 
According to the 2007 statistics, only 22 percent of the employed male 
population work in the town of Segev Shalom, compared to 76 percent of 
the employed women. 
Employment opportunity inside the town is but one way of measuring 
the level and degree to which Segev Shalom can be considered a “town” in 
the fullest extent of the word, and not merely a bedroom community de-
signed to service the local Jewish cities, towns, kibbutzim, and moshavim. 
Th is is the perception and fear of many Negev bedouin, who increasingly 
view the bedouin towns as what amount to economically empty peripheral 
proletarian spaces lacking employment opportunities, and designed to ser-
vice the bourgeoisie needs of Israel’s Jewish urban cores.
Figure 3.2. Segev Shalom Ownership of Material Goods (%, Listed Most to 
Least), 1993–2007.
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
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Th is lack of economic opportunity, it is believed, only serves to fester in-
ternal problems (violence, petty crime, delinquency, and the like). Th e per-
petuation of agrarian activity in the town, both the raising of crops as well 
as livestock (Figure 3.3), clearly suggests that the economic situation in the 
town requires these ongoing supplements, however impractical undertak-
ing agricultural activity or animal husbandry may be within a small, densely 
designed urban environment. Moreover, in Segev Shalom, it appears clear 
that both forms of activity are on the gradual rise.
Th e percentage of those bedouin who state that they relocated to the 
town due to the force of the state as compared to those who have relocated 
seeking development and opportunity have changed considerably over the 
years as well (Figure 3.4). While early on in the study, government force ap-
pears to have played a signifi cant role in one’s decision making, over time 
it can be seen that this factor became less signifi cant as the attraction of 
accessing a higher living standard and quality of life began to draw reset-
tlers into the town. What is also increasingly evident is that by 2007, this 
attraction had begun to fade; newcomers, it appears, had lowered their ex-
pectations somewhat, with the recognition that the promises of the 1980s 
and 1990s had not been delivered.
And yet, many appear to believe that town living will off er them some-
thing better—the category “family decision” implies that the bedouins’ de-
cision to resettle is increasingly being based upon a constellation of factors, 
some developmental, some political—than remaining in the pezurah (see 
below), and so they move. Access and use of the town’s utilities and pub-
licly planned services (see Figures 3.5, 3.6) further suggest that resettlers 
are using these provisions in increasing numbers, and view them relatively 
favorably.
Figure 3.3. Segev Shalom Residents Raising Livestock, Fruits and Vegetables 
(%), 1993–2007.
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
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In order to try to isolate the motivations of resettlers, I removed the 
“Family decision” responses from the data, and tested just two categories, 
namely, “Moved by Government Force” and “Moved for an Improved Qual-
ity of Life/Access to Town Services.” Some signifi cant correlations can be 
found that distinguish these two groups. Th ose stating that they relocated 
seeking development or a better quality of life (QOL) were found to be 
more likely to own one material item, the refrigerator (p=.03). While this 
might appear on the surface to be a curious distinction, it is less so when 
one considers that in the pezurah, where electrical service is not provided 
as a public utility, privately-owned generators are used and then, only dur-
ing evening hours. It is common to sit in the dark as the daylight hours 
wane, waiting for a timer to turn the generator on; it is common too for 
leftover food to be thrown out or off ered to the local dogs, given that refrig-
eration is impractical and non-existent in environments where electricity is 
only on four or fi ve hours per day. It is perhaps understandable as well that 
the correlation between refrigerator ownership and motivation for relocat-
ing to the town for QOL purposes was especially strong among women 
respondents (p=.02).
Other material goods and services provide some draw into the town 
as well. Older residents who stated that they relocated seeking a higher 
QOL, for example, were found to be more likely to have satellite dish TV 
than those who stated that they relocated due to government force (p=.01). 
Th ose seeking a higher QOL also stated a higher likelihood of utilizing the 
town’s social welfare services (p=.01), most especially the young (p=.01), 
men (p=.03), and Tarabeen respondents (p=.01). Azazmeh and women re-
spondents, stating that they were seeking a higher QOL, also tended to rate 
the town’s medical services higher than those who moved by force (p=.05, 
Figure 3.4. Primary Reasons for Resettling Cited by Segev Shalom Residents 
(%), 1993–2007.
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
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.05 respectively). Th e women’s response is particularly telling; as most bed-
ouin women still do not drive and yet are responsible for healthcare con-
cerns for their children (see Chapter 4), the convenience of Segev Shalom’s 
clinics, like owning a regularly functioning refrigerator, are clear QOL im-
provements for Negev bedouin women when compared to their lives in the 
pezurah (see Chapter 6).
Th at said, not all women are more satisfi ed with the new town environ-
ment, or moved there of their own accord. More educated women were 
more likely than those without high school educations to state that they 
relocated by force (p=.01). Further, those respondents, both male and fe-
male, stating that they relocated to Segev Shalom primarily due to govern-
ment force were signifi cantly more likely to live in polygynous Azazmeh 
households (p=.05). 
Th ose stating that they moved by force also stated that they do not feel 
equal with other Israelis (see Figure 3.7). While, in general, this was not 
found to be statistically signifi cant for the general sample (p=.06), the cor-
relation was statistically signifi cant for young respondents (p=.05), and 
members of the Azazmeh tribe in particular (p=.01). In addition, the Aza-
zmeh who stated that they came by force were more likely to say that they 
did not feel that the present Israeli government was able/willing to serve 
the socioeconomic needs of the bedouin community (p=.04). 
Th e planning and services off ered in the new town environment are, of 
course, what distinguish Segev Shalom and the other offi  cially recognized 
towns from the communities of the pezurah. If the goal and purpose of 
resettlement is to off er these resettlers a modern, clean, developed living 
environment and standard that is deemed unachievable in the pezurah en-
vironment, one may reasonably seek to assess the extent to which the state 
Figure 3.5. Percentage of Households Connected to the Local Utilities, 
1993–2007.
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
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is succeeding in this endeavor. Th e answer, as these statistics suggest, is 
mixed, and, once again, is infl uenced by a constellation of factors, including 
income, gender, tribe, and age.
Younger, lower incomes residents, for example, were more critical of 
the town’s cleanliness than older residents in the same income category 
(p=.02). Th ese older, lower income residents, however, were more critical 
of the electrical service in town than the younger low income respondents 
(p=.05). And yet overall, those from higher income households rated the 
electrical service higher than those with lower incomes (p=.01), especially 
members of the Azazmeh tribe (p=.01). Put simply, those who can aff ord 
these services tend over all to be more satisfi ed; many feel they are paying a 
great deal for these services, and are getting very little for their money.
Much of the data seems to refl ect what can best be described as “un-
met expectations” among some, while others are clearly pleased to accept 
what little they now have relative to what they once had when living in 
the pezurah. Th is is clearly seen when comparing the Azazmeh with the 
Tarabeen. As noted above, the Tarabeen rate the overall cleanliness of the 
town higher than the Azazmeh. Th ey also rate the water service higher 
than the Azazme (p=.02), particularly those coming from lower income 
households (p=.01). But further, the Tarabeen women rate electricity ser-
vice higher (p=.01), water service higher (p=.02), and town healthcare ser-
vices higher (p=.02) than Azazmeh women. In general, it can be said that 
among the lower income households of Segev Shalom, the Tarabeen are 
generally more satisfi ed with the new town environment, as they rate the 
overall town services and planning higher as compared to the past than do 
the Azazmeh (p=.03).
Figure 3.6. Segev Shalom Residents Rating the Town Services Highly (%), 
1993–2007.
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
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Qualitative Data: Th e Voice of the People
From these quantitative data, a picture of general satisfaction begins to 
form, but it is incomplete, as it does not fully refl ect what many bedouin 
residents say about their lives and their feelings of living in the new town 
environment. In 2000, a new question was introduced into the survey: “Is 
life in Segev Shalom better than it was 10–15 years ago, worse, or about 
the same?” In 2000, 66 percent said better, only 4 percent said worse, while 
25 percent said things were about the same. In 2007, while the fi gure for 
people believing things were better had risen to 74 percent, those believ-
ing things were worse rose to 25 percent. Still, this question also does not 
fully allow the bedouin residents of Segev Shalom to voice their views or 
concerns about the resettlement initiative, or about urban living.
In part, this is due to the culture and language of the bedouin of the Ne-
gev. When asked to “rate” a given service or situation, the fi rst reaction is to 
request further explanation. “Rating” is a malleable concept, and somewhat 
novel to the culture in question. So, while here I may wish to distinguish 
between those who are “more satisfi ed” from those who are “less satisfi ed,” 
such distinctions may mean little amongst the bedouin themselves. Rarely 
does one receive an initial answer beyond “kweis” or “b’seder,” the Arabic 
and Hebrew equivalents, respectively, of “OK,” when asked to judge or rate 
a particular service, government offi  ce, and the like. Often, it is only upon 
further discussion that some bedouin respondents will feel comfortable 
enough fully to elaborate upon their true attitudes and feelings (which may 
indeed be negative), despite an initial response to the contrary.
In order to address this concern, a series of open-ended questions at 
the conclusion of each questionnaire allowed the Segev Shalom residents 
to speak about those issues that most concerned them. In addition to sev-
eral concerns expressed regarding healthcare services in town (see Chapter 
4), for example, several respondents to the 2007 survey called for “cleaner 
streets, public gardens, and promenades to walk on” in the town. In fact, 
nearly every respondent made note of how dirty the town was, and how 
much this concerned them. 
In addition, several respondents, mostly women in their 20s and 30s, 
called for the opening of a matnas (Hebrew: town activity center/club found 
in virtually every community in Israel), and courses including “music, com-
puters, [and] Hebrew classes.” Said one: “We want trips for the children, 
day camps, projects for children, a course for kids to learn to swim. Th ey 
need summer programs for when the kids aren’t doing anything.” Many 
others repeated several items from this list, and the concern that the town 
youth tend to wander around after school with nothing to do and “nowhere 
to play.” 
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For many in town, especially those under 40 years of age, Segev Shalom 
provides the services and provisions that they need. States one 32-year-old 
male: “Th e changes over the past 10–15 years are for the better. We didn’t 
have streets, schools, or houses like these in the past. Th ings are better. We 
have everything here now, the Kupat Holim (Hebrew: public clinic), things 
we never had before. Everything is for the better now.” Added another 19-
year-old male: “We have progressed, it’s better. We have electricity. It used 
to be that we only had it at night. Now we have a local Kupat Holim instead 
of having to go to Be’er Sheva. We have a school nearby. We have a post of-
fi ce. It’s like a bank, you can cash checks, you can get money there.” 
Such sentiment, however, is typically tempered by a list of frustrations and 
perceived injustices that impact Segev Shalom residents’ daily lives. Th ese 
attitudes are expressed amongst nearly all of the qualitative information 
provided on the 236 questionnaires completed that year. Th e same 19-year-
old continues, “we need a bus from here to Be’er Sheva. We need medicine 
from the pharmacy in Be’er Sheva and we can’t even get there. [When we get 
there], security checks us more than the Jews as we enter the supermarket 
or the bank. And they give the Jews more money for their kids for school. 
Th ey help them more than us. Th ey give the kids in the Jewish gans (Hebrew: 
kindergartens) food assistance, but not ours. You could fi ll your page.”
Many off ered responses that suggest fears of prejudice, racism, and 
worse. One 35-year-old female respondent said: “Th e State should care 
about the Arab citizens and help us with money and the construction of a 
house. Th is is very diffi  cult. Th ey should do it the way they help the Jews 
that want to live in this country. Th ere should be equality. We are citizens 
in this country and it should help us because it belongs to us too. We live 
here.” Off ered a male respondent: “Th is State is racist when it comes to 
the bedouin. I don’t recommend to anyone to move to Segev Shalom.” A 
42-year-old male put it diff erently: “We go to the hospital in pain and they 
tell us ‘you’re fi ne.’ I was upset and they kept saying I was OK when I had 
a problem. If you are a Jew, they’ll look at you even when you’re fi ne but a 
bedouin, no. A bedouin woman gets kicked out [of the hospital] right after 
having a baby but a Jew can stay as long as she wants.”
Th is theme of inequality, as it is perceived to exist both within Segev 
Shalom and throughout life in Israel in general, was found repeatedly in 
the open-ended responses to the 2007 survey. Many of the responses are 
also similar insofar as they refer to service in the Israel Defense Forces. A 
51-year-old male Segev Shalom resident who owns fi ve houses in the town, 
is married to four wives, and is father to 22 children, states: “Th e Jews get 
far more than we do. We have no money in the towns to do anything. Th ey 
are all the same. Nothing changes for us. I was in the Army. I remember, 
a Jew will do the same as you, but he gets more … Economically, things 
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were better 15 years ago. Everything is more expensive now. You have to 
pay for water, electricity, taxes. Fifteen years ago I got value for my money 
but today no. Everything’s gone up in price.” When asked why he opted to 
relocate to the town, his answer, without further elaboration, was that he 
moved “by mistake.” 
Many respondents also conclude that, given the opportunity, they would 
leave the town at once and go back to the pezurah. While making such 
statements may simply be out of frustration, nostalgia or sheer hyperbole, 
what it does seem to suggest is that for many, town living is not and has 
not met their expectations. And so I provide Table 3.4, in order that the 
respondents2 may, in their own lightly edited words, off er the essence of the 
concerns and issues of what it means to them to live in the planned bedouin 
town of Segev Shalom in 2007:
Table 3.4. Segev Shalom Residents’ Perspectives, 2007
Resident 1. 41, Male—Th ere are no bedouin—the real bedouin are not here. In the past the 
women cared for the babies. Today, look at me! [He holds up his infant son, his wife has gone 
out for the evening].
 My brother is in the Army. If you do the same thing you should get the same thing. Arab 
blood and Jewish blood is both red.
 But things have gotten worse here. I didn’t come [to Segev Shalom] for me, I came for 
my kids. Our lives are concentrated here, we need all these services. But in another 20 years, 
there just won’t be any bedouin left at all. Here we are modern people. But outside town, they 
are still bedouin … We can teach our kids that “your father is a bedouin, but you can be an 
engineer or a lawyer!”
 I came here for my kids’ education, for them to learn Arabic, Arab culture. My brother in 
the Army is getting an education. But there they teach you the Jewish language and how to 
be a Jew. Here [in Segev] they can learn how to be Arabs.
Resident 2. 36, Male—We have problems here with high blood pressure and diabetes and 
obesity. We need exercise especially for our women. Segev especially has this problem. We 
have to pay for water, electricity, taxes, TV, the house. We have to pay to live. My wife and I 
both work, that’s all we do, so we can pay for all of this.
 I miss the camel, the tent, the food … now we have no time, all we do is work to pay the 
bills. When I was a kid I didn’t learn how to ride a bike until I was in 12th grade, but today 
my kid in fi rst grade wants one. He doesn’t know the history, the culture. If that happens, the 
bedouin are fi nished, we’re gone. When the bedouin has to make a zoo and put a camel in it 
to teach his kid what a camel is, that’s the end. Th e bedouin ate only natural foods. Now they 
are eating hot dogs, salami, these things aren’t nature. Th is isn’t ‘bedouin.’
 I get money for my kids, but I have the Moatzah. I have to pay arnonah [Hebrew: Municipal 
tax], water, and electric bills … We can study in the university so we have equality.
 Th ere’s a lot of development in the town. Also the society has developed. If bedouin 
women are educated, her children will be. And if the children are, the society will progress.
Resident 3. 26, Male—Th e town is dirty. Th ere is trash here. Th ere are no police here. Th e 
place is a mess. Work is available [in Israel], but it is just for the Jews. I worked at Ramat 
Hovav. I worked there longer, I was a better worker, but some Jews came along and they were 
given promotions ahead of me and in my place.
 Th e town is better [than in the past] for studying and learning. But I think things for our 
society are getting worse all the time, because I think the Jews hate us more every day. When 
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I go to Be’er Sheva, I’m stopped 15 times between here and there. Am I not a citizen? But this 
is how it is. 
 I have 3 sisters. Th ey married guys from Gaza. Th ey got no teudot zehut [Hebrew: Israeli 
I.D.s]. Anywhere in the world when you marry you get citizenship, but here, my sisters’ 
husbands were taken by the Government and sent back to Gaza.
Resident 4. 28, Male—I pay arnonah—for what? I am in my own house, and I have to pay 
rent! We initially moved here because the Government forced us. Over time, we have seen 
that Segev is a good place. But there are those who just wish to leave. You can use solar 
[energy] in the pezurah so you don’t need a generator. Outside, there’s water too.
 So most are just saying “So what was the reason, why did I come here?” Here is an example, 
this guy here [sitting to his left], his family, they left their 2-story house and just went back. 
If it weren’t so diffi  cult, there are many others like him who would follow. Out there [in the 
pezurah], there are no walls—just freedom!
 Fifteen years ago, we were freer. Yes, today, due to political changes, we have El-Jazeera, 
El-Arabiyya, the Internet. [But] it’s like we were “primitive” and the government had to come 
and help us “progress.” In my opinion this is not true.
Resident 5. 31, Male—Going to the Kupat Holim is a waste of time. It’s like sitting at the 
airport just waiting. Th e doctors don’t speak Arabic. Th ey treat you like children, like we are 
foreign or strange. Th ey don’t really care. Th ey built this new building, but is it for us, or is it 
from somewhere else built for someone else?
 Regarding education, the Jews get far more than we do. Th e kids here are studying in 
caravans. It costs 1,400 NIS [approx. U.S.$350] each day per bus to transport the kids. If 
they would take all this money they could build a new school from one month’s worth of this 
expense for these busses. Ten elementary schools feed into one high school. Th en the girls 
drop out because of the far distances they have to travel.
 Given the chance, I think 90% of the people living here in Segev Shalom would just leave. 
We’d give up electricity and TV—who needs it, it just gives you a headache. We’d go back 
if we could. Th e town is just getting worse—it’s a trash bin. Th ey are bringing [Palestinian 
collaborators] here. Th ey are not opening up new areas for development. We have lots of 
children, so the town is getting more dense, there’s lots of pressure. Further, there is no work, 
no industry, and no opportunity …
Resident 6. 32, Male—Everything here [in Segev Shalom] is done half way. Th ey waste 
money, do things a little at a time. It makes no sense. A lot of it is the Moatzah, but this 
also comes from the [National] Government. Th ey build schools that are too small from the 
beginning. Th ey want a longer school day. Who is this good for? Not for the bedouin. Th ere 
is no equality here. You want me to be here but you won’t give me equality. Th ey force us to 
be here but then we can’t manage to even build a house!
 If I could I would just have stayed outside [in the pezurah]. I would have more money 
now, I would be better off  with just a generator. I wouldn’t have to pay arnonah. I don’t need 
a villa. If I have to live here, I need the money to do it. To live here, to study, it costs a lot of 
money. If you don’t work [as I do], you haven’t got a chance.
 Ten years ago I was able to earn less but my money paid for more. I make more money 
now but get less for it. So my life has worsened. Everything you see around you is from 
ten years ago. I can’t fi nish building my house, or I take food out of the mouths of my kids. 
Everything has gone up in price, taxes, arnonah. Th e economic situation is really bad. And I 
think 10 years from now it will be worse. Anyone who is living in a shack now [i.e., does not 
yet have a permanent stone house built] is in trouble. Th ey’ll never live in a house.
 Arnonah is 3,000 NIS [approx. U.S.$750] per year. Th ere are a lot of people who aren’t 
paying and it adds up. So [the Government] will start repossessing their belongings, leading 
to thefts and chaos. Th ey’ll feel like they have nothing to lose.
Source: Segev Shalom Survey, 2007.
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To reiterate, these views should not be considered as in any way excep-
tional. One hears these kinds of attitudes expressed repeatedly, not only in 
Segev Shalom, but in other planned bedouin towns as well. Still, it must also 
be emphasized that they provide only a part of the picture, for, of course, 
the quantitative data above suggests some positive developmental trajec-
tory in the town as well. Perhaps the best way to summarize these am-
bivalent fi ndings comes from a 50-year-old bedouin woman 2007 survey 
respondent, who suggested, “We have progressed a little, but then we’ve 
moved backwards and things are worse today than in the past. We didn’t 
have a good Moatzah in the past, but now we do. But people have changed. 
Everyone thinks only about himself now, and about what is for his own 
good. Not about anyone else.” 
Th is sort of nostalgia is common among many of the bedouin respon-
dents, whose memories of living in the pezurah and whose claims about 
their experiences there at times are reminiscent of the Israelites’ memories of 
living in Egypt under Pharaoh when they are wandering in the Sinai after the 
Exodus. Th at is to say, the Promised Land of Segev Shalom has hardly met 
their expectations—expectations that were designed and built up by a gov-
ernment that sought to relocate them at any cost, but that has provided little 
since their arrival. But was life in the pezurah as good as they remember it? 
In an attempt to answer this question, I initiated a small comparative 
survey in the neighboring communities of the pezurah not far from Segev 
Shalom from 3–13 May 2007. Eight surveyors, teaching staff  from one of 
the Segev Shalom elementary schools and JITLI students from the Segev 
Shalom High School, randomly sampled 45 households in order to make 
some comparisons with residents in the planned town. Given that there are 
several thousand households in the pezurah, this survey was considered a 
small, non-representative sample, too small really to be considered as any-
thing other than a snapshot that might allow some comparisons with those 
bedouin living in the planned town. When combined with the 236 house-
holds in the town, they comprise 16 percent of the total 281 households in 
the entire study. Still, despite the small N, some relevant material can be 
culled from the data, which off ers a further understanding of the relation-
ship today between the planned town and the pezurah.
Some Perspective: A Comparison with the “Pezurah”
Several statistical diff erences can be noted between the respondents of the 
2007 Segev Shalom survey and the pezurah survey. Most, though certainly 
not all, of these statistics bear out the contention by the state that living in 
the new town environment off ers development opportunities that are far 
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less available in the pezurah. What one might reasonably ask, however, is 
whether, like any migration, those living in the town were more open and 
amenable to certain developmental behaviors and attitudes to begin with 
than are those who resist resettlement in the urban environment. 
For example, a substantially higher rate of polygyny, 48 percent, was 
found among the pezurah households, as compared to those in town, 32 
percent (p=.04). Th is statistic bears out Kressel’s contention that polyg-
yny rates are higher in the pezurah than in the planned towns (2003: 96). 
Moreover, respondents in the pezurah were also more likely to identify as 
bedouin (p=.01; see Chapter 5), 47 percent compared to 19 percent in the 
pezurah. Under the age of 40, the diff erence was even greater. A trade-off  
between bedouinness and Muslim identity clearly can be identifi ed; in the 
town, 50 percent identifi ed as Muslims and 16 percent as bedouin; in the 
pezurah, 30 percent identifi ed as Muslims and 48 percent identifi ed as bed-
ouin (p=.01). In both environments, however, an expression of Palestinian 
and Arab identities was virtually identical.
Still, pezurah residents were more likely to raise animals (p=.00), raise 
crops (p=.02), and live in temporary housing (p=.00). Th ese distinctions, of 
course, provide the very defi nitions of what it means to live in the pezurah 
in 2007. In addition, those in the pezurah households were less likely to own 
a VCR/DVD player (p=.02), a refrigerator (p=.00), a Nintendo/Playstation 
(p=.00), or a personal computer (p=.00). None of this was unexpected, but 
what must be noted here is that no diff erence was found between the two 
environments in terms of the ownership of satellite dishes, TVs, washing 
machines, or telephones. Car ownership and access was no diff erent be-
tween the men in the two environments; women in town, however, had 
more access to cars than women in the pezurah (p=.03).
Pezurah residents do not have electric service (p=.00) or water service 
(p=.00). Th ey predictably rated their electricity lower than town residents 
Figure 3.7. Political Indices, Segev Shalom 1996–2007 and the Pezurah 2007.
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
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(p=.00), as well as their water service (p=.00). Pezurah residents also ac-
cess a private doctor less than town residents (p=.00), most especially men 
(p=.01) and those under the age of 40 (p=.01). Residents of both areas use 
Soroka Hospital with similar regularity, however.
Educational levels also varied between the two environments, although 
all respondents in both environments were similarly literate. However, men 
(p=.05) and those under 40 (p=.00) in Segev Shalom were more educated 
than their counterparts in the pezurah. Such a distinction is yet another 
reinforcement of the strength of the resettlement initiative’s social devel-
opment accomplishments (see Chapter 4). Although children from the 
pezurah attend school in the towns, these statistics suggest that living in 
the town itself simply makes education that much more accessible. While 
no correlation was found on the basis of gender as might be anticipated, 
what was found was that there was a statistical diff erence between a survey 
respondent’s mother’s highest grade achieved between the town and the 
pezurah; the mothers of those living in the town were in general more edu-
cated than those living in the pezurah (p=.03).
Th e bedouin who are employed in wage labor work in similar job lo-
cations, regardless of where they reside. Household income is not signifi -
cantly diff erent between the two environments. Further, the male level of 
employment is not statistically any diff erent for town residents than for 
pezurah residents. Th e women of Segev Shalom, conversely, are consider-
ably more likely to be employed in wage labor than women in the pezurah 
(p=.02). Nonetheless, the male statistic is extremely signifi cant, insofar as 
it furthers the contention noted above that the towns off er little economic 
opportunity (certainly no more than the pezurah), and yet provide less in 
terms of allowing the bedouin to sustain themselves through their “tradi-
tional” agrarian activities of crop production and pastoral nomadism/ani-
mal husbandry. Th ose living in the pezurah, on the other hand, are able to 
carry out any economic activity that those in town are employed in and, in 
addition, engage in agrarian activity if they wish—that is, if they are willing 
to continually combat the constraining mechanisms imposed by the state 
against these interests (see Chapter 1).
Resettling or refusing to move is, in part, a political act. Several diff er-
ences can also be discerned between the respondents in terms of their po-
litical attitudes and behaviors. For example, men voted at similar levels in 
both environments, though women in Segev Shalom were more likely to 
have voted than women in the pezurah (p=.05). Th ose living in the pezurah 
were more likely to state more positive attitudes toward the Israeli govern-
ment than those living in the town (p=.01), though these tended to be older 
(p=.03) male (p=.01) respondents.
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Residents of the pezurah (p=.00), especially the young (p=.00) and male 
(p=.01) respondents, were more likely to agree, on the other hand, with 
the statement that the Islamic parties are their preferred replacement for 
the present government. Th ose living in the pezurah were also more likely 
to off er either the Islamic or the Arab parties (Bilad, etc.) as better options 
than the present Kadima party, as opposed to respondents from Segev Sha-
lom who off ered these, as well as Jewish/Zionist parties (or, in most case, 
stated than no party could help the bedouin at this point in furthering their 
social and economic development needs, see Chapter 5; p=.00). Th is senti-
ment was not necessarily solely based upon the “religiosity” of the respon-
dents per se. While those living in the town do state overall more frequent 
mosque attendance than those in the pezurah (p=.05), a behavior espe-
cially stated by the men for obvious cultural reasons (p=.02), no statistical 
diff erence could be found between the two environments in terms of the 
degree to which respondents stated that they attend the mosque on a gen-
eral basis (see Chapter 5).
Perhaps the greatest diff erence noted between the two environments 
comes down to feelings of being treated equally with Jewish Israelis. While 
the percentage of Segev Shalom respondents in 2007 who stated that they 
feel that they are not treated equally is quite high, 77 percent, this fi gure 
has dropped steadily throughout the study period (Figure 3.7). As for the 
pezurah, 97 percent stated that they do not feel they are treated equally with 
Jewish Israelis (p=.00).
Conclusions
Th e social and economic development results of planning in Segev Shalom 
manifested over the fi fteen years of this study noted in this chapter suggest 
that a number of observations and conclusions may be put forward. First, 
it would be disingenuous not to note the overall positive change that has 
generally occurred in the town, as measured in such areas as access to wage 
labor employment (including employment within the town itself ), material 
wealth (including the most diffi  cult item for many to access in the past, the 
permanent stone house), connectivity to the public utilities, and attitudes 
toward these service provisions. In these and other areas, the bedouin of 
Segev Shalom have shown slow but steady improvement during the period 
in question as measured by these socioeconomic indices that can be used 
to measure the Quality of Life (QOL) of these resettlers.
Second, when compared with those bedouin who remain in the pezurah, 
the diff erences in the life experiences of the resettled bedouin of Segev Sha-
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lom comes into even sharper focus. Th is is most especially true for bedouin 
women (see Chapter 6), whose QOL clearly can be diff erentiated as seen 
through the lens of the resettlement initiative. Bedouin men may have simi-
lar life experiences regardless of where they live, but for bedouin women, 
resettlement in the planned town appears to have had a substantially posi-
tive impact, which is undeniable.
Lastly, despite these improvements, the bedouin do not necessarily ex-
press the sentiment or belief that they are better off  than they were in the 
past. Rather, a sense of loss permeates much of their daily discussions—
much of it bordering on anger. Residents who spoke with me, including 
some of those quoted in Table 3.4, are highly educated and employed. Still, 
most bedouin town dwellers living in Segev Shalom twenty-fi ve years after 
its creation expected more when they relocated than what they have. 
Indeed, the more affl  uent and educated are often the most disillusioned 
of town residents. Today’s bedouin is not an illiterate herder holding onto 
fl ocks and wishing to live in a tent; rather, he (and increasingly, nowadays, 
she) is often a savvy, educated, knowledgeable professional or businessper-
son who is well traveled, and is quite familiar with Jewish Israel. One 39-
year-old female survey respondent stated that it was her wish that someday, 
“Segev Shalom will be like Tel Aviv or Jerusalem.”
And yet, of course, the town is nothing of the kind. Most residents view 
it as cramped, dirty, and neglected. Many state that they relocated not 
because the government forced them, as was once the case, but because 
nowadays, urban life is simply a more viable lifestyle in the global economy, 
something in which they are very much a part. And yet, as disappointment 
builds upon disappointment and unmet expectations are commonplace, 
the sense of disenfranchisement grows. As will be discussed in further de-
tail in Chapter 5, voting rates are dropping, and those who are voting in-
creasingly are throwing their support to the Islamic parties, not because 
they are “religious” per se, but because they are seeking an alternative to 
a government and public at large, which they perceive, perhaps with good 
reason, treats them as less than equal citizens. 
Th ey believe that they are being told to settle for less than what they 
deserve as full citizens of the State of Israel, to take the “bone” that is being 
thrown to them and quietly, obediently, willingly accept their fate. As will 
be seen in the following chapter, the gap between the state’s perceptions 
and the bedouin’s views is, therefore, incredibly wide. For, like the other 
services provided, none have shown greater promise—and greater success 
from the state’s perspective—than the provision of healthcare and educa-
tion services. And yet, from the bedouin community’s perspective, no two 
areas of service provision are more controversial, more dysfunctional, or, 
ironically, more inadequate.
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 1. In Native Alaska, this dynamic has been referred to as the ‘crab-pot’ syndrome. 
As certain innovative, risk-taking individual ‘crabs’ strive to get ahead and exit 
the ‘cooking pot’ (i.e., seeking formal education, wage labor or other ways to 
progress or better themselves), others who are less resourceful, capable or 
entrepreneurial ‘reach’ up with their large claws and pull the culprits back 
in—out of jealousy, envy, resentment, and so on. I have yet to fi nd a culturally 
appropriate equivalent term to be applied in the desert, where crabs are few 
and far between, but the dynamic appears to be similar in any case.
 2. It is not coincidental that these extensive comments are all provided by men. 
Bedouin women remain largely quiescent in the Negev, especially when men 
are present (which is, by design, almost all of the time). It is for this reason that 
I created the Bedouin Women’s Focus Group (see Chapter 6); women have a 
great deal to say and contribute, but many, especially those over age 40, remain 
reluctant to speak up in mixed environments.
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Health and Education
Th ere is no way out of what’s fated
 — Clinton Bailey, A Culture of Desert Survival: 
Bedouin Proverbs from Sinai and the Negev
Teaching the young is like carving in stone;
Teaching the old is like carving in the air 
— Clinton Bailey, A Culture of Desert Survival: 
Bedouin Proverbs from Sinai and the Negev
As seen in Chapter 3, an analysis of planning in Segev Shalom and through-
out the resettled bedouin sector reveals mixed outcomes. Th ere is no ques-
tion that some successes may be noted, and a failure to do so, or to condemn 
the state at every turn regardless of what the statistics show—though com-
monplace in the Negev today—is simply disingenuous. 
On the other hand, like much of the change now under way in the Negev 
bedouin community, the planning has been inconsistent, spotty, haphaz-
ard, and at times implemented in such a poor and neglectful fashion that 
often any positive outcomes that do accrue are simply overshadowed by 
patterns of sheer negligence, which serve to reinforce a sense among the 
bedouin that even when they are gaining, they are in fact losing. Th ere are 
no better social development areas that exemplify this sentiment more co-
gently than those of healthcare and educational services.
Healthcare Issues—Th ree Steps Forward, Two Steps Back
Th ere is little doubt that the bedouin of the Negev today have access to 
more healthcare opportunities than they have ever had in history. Th at, as 
the saying goes, is the good news. Th e bad news is that the resettlement ini-
tiative has fostered a situation in which the bedouin of the Negev now show 
a greater need for healthcare than at any time in their history as well—and 
much of that need can be traced to the resettlement initiative.
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Historically, the forced sedentarization initiative was rationalized largely 
upon the need to provide, above all else, healthcare services to the Negev 
bedouin community. Th e state’s argument for the settlement of the popu-
lation, like so many other nomadic communities during the same period, 
was straightforward: “they are citizens, so it is incumbent upon the state to 
give them adequate healthcare … [but] when they are spread out they are 
diffi  cult to access” (Shapira, 24 November 1992). Moreover, Shapira notes, 
in the mid 1940s, prior to the creation of the State of Israel, there was only 
one road connecting Gaza, Be’er Sheva, and Hebron. By horse or camel, 
it took two to three days to secure medical assistance in Hebron, the site 
where many bedouin acquired care—if at all—at that time. 
Infectious disease, malaria, and tuberculosis (TB), in particular, were 
common throughout Palestine during the 1930s and 1940s (Abu-Rabia 
2005: 422). Soon after the creation of the siyag, however, a high incidence 
of TB was identifi ed among the bedouin community; the state determined 
that all members should be inoculated as fully and as quickly as possible 
(Shvarts et al. 2003: 50). “Isolated” and “ignorant” (Abu-Rabia 2005: 424), 
the bedouin practiced a variety of home, nature-based remedies using tradi-
tional healers to treat malaria and other ailments, injuries, and infections.
In 1949, the fi rst mobile health unit was created out of Soroka Hospital 
in Be’er Sheva, charged most especially with providing inoculations to the 
bedouin. In essence, the authorities blamed the living conditions for the 
spread of the disease; poor nutrition, poor hygiene, and the like were all at-
tributed to living in what amounted to an unhealthy environment (Shvarts 
et al. 2003: 51). Moreover, there was fear that, in time, the disease would be 
spread throughout the Jewish population as well. 
And yet the irony of the situation is that, at the very time that the state 
was contending that the inability to provide complete inoculations and to 
stop the spread of TB and other infectious diseases lay with the fact that 
the bedouin population was too dispersed and could not be reached, a root 
cause of the disease’s very contraction and rapid spread was to be found in 
the fact that the community was concentrated into a confi ned geographic 
area maintained by the authorities for the purposes of securing and con-
trolling this Arab Muslim population. Th us, Shvarts et al. reveal that it was 
largely confi nement to the siyag—and not, ironically, the fact that the bed-
ouin were too dispersed—that led to the spread of TB and to malnutrition 
(2003: 57–58). 
Nonetheless, since the 1950s and 1960s, bedouin health policy has al-
ways been hampered by the ability successfully to provide needed services. 
Often, government offi  cials, academics, doctors, and even social workers 
are quick to blame logistical constraints or, more broadly, “cultural issues” 
as the primary barriers to eff ective service delivery (Moshe, 15 February 
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2007; D. Cohen, 24 April 2007; Meir 1997: 183; Dreiher, 14 March 2007; 
Shimshoni, 1 June 1993). And yet, there is evidence that shows that, when 
proper inducements are provided, bedouin healthcare has proven eff ective 
and successful, regardless of the logistical, cultural or other barriers at play. 
One example reveals this well. In 1953, the Maternal Insurance Law was 
instituted. Th e maternity allowance was created to cover delivery costs and 
to pay for expenses associated with having a newborn, in order to encour-
age hospitalization for the delivery of babies, which to that point was virtu-
ally unheard of (Shvarts et al. 2003: 53). Four decades later, 95 percent of 
all bedouin babies were born in the hospital (Belmaker, 19 April 1993), and 
not the tent as had been the case going back in previous generations. Th us, 
given this sort of appropriate incentive, the bedouin were able to “overcome 
the cultural barriers and geographic concerns” often cited as hindrances to 
eff ective healthcare provision in the Negev community. 
Limitations on the provision side of the equation have drawn less atten-
tion, although the lack of trained staff  was in truth a “primary obstacle” to 
serving bedouin medical needs throughout the 1950s (Shvarts et al. 2003: 
55), and many doctors resisted even living in the Negev, where their ser-
vices were needed. A lack of doctors with the cultural sensitivities needed 
to work with such a special clientele was a problem then and, as will be seen 
below, remains a problem to the present day.
Nonetheless, the Ministry of Health developed a document in 1961 en-
titled “Development of medical services for the Bedouin,” which stressed that 
it was “impossible” to raise the health standards of the bedouin as long as 
they remained “scattered over a wide geographic area in transitory tent en-
campments aff ording insuffi  cient shelter, lacking potable water, and adequate 
education facilities” (Shvarts et al. 2003: 60). Th e solution to the problem, 
the document contends, is to settle the bedouin in “solid stone structures 
in villages or cities in one or several locations and to integrate them into the 
economy of the country as farmers, unskilled laborers or skilled craftsmen.”
Th e creation then of Tel Sheva in the late 1960s was good medicine and, 
in fact, results were almost immediate. Th ere is no question that, once the 
siyag was removed concomitant with the initiation of the planned town 
initiative, it “[brought] about an immediate improvement in the standard 
of living of the Bedouin and their economic situation” (Shvarts et al. 2003: 
64). But was it the “traditional bedouin lifestyle” that was burdening the 
bedouin community, making it “sick,” “diseased,” economically weak, and 
untenable? Or rather, did the Israeli military presence that sought to con-
centrate and to control the bedouin community in an artifi cially controlled 
and confi ned space against their will, against their interests, and against 
their long-term health and well-being play a role? Regardless, it was this 
very pretense of economic and physical weakness that further fed into the 
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argument for the need to concentrate and settle the community still fur-
ther, moving from the siyag environment to today’s “healthy,” modern stone 
homes in the planned “villages and cities.” 
As recently as the early 1990s, a considerable degree of concern in the 
medical community still placed its emphasis upon issues that are related to 
the largely nomadic, dispersed, non-urbanized nature of the bedouin com-
munity. Attempts to immunize bedouin children against various diseases 
(Hepatitis B, polio, measles, tetanus) were high on the list of healthcare 
professionals’ priorities, as well as were eff orts to encourage basic hygiene. 
Problems with nutrition, which were directly connected to stunting and 
Failure to Th rive syndrome (FTT), were also emphasized. 
Two mobile health units operated out of Soroka Hospital in Be’er Sheva, 
serving 9,000 households in the pezurah in an attempt to address these 
concerns. From Regional Medical Offi  cer Ilana Belmaker’s perspective, six 
units might have been adequate, though the process, she noted, of using 
the jeeps was simply not cost-eff ective. (Having gone out with the unit a 
number of times in 1992, I personally saw that it was a time-consuming 
process as well.) And yet, she suggested, the service had a positive side to 
it: “Th e use of the mobile units gives the message of door-to-door service. If 
we’re to face problems of diabetes during pregnancy, premature births, and 
stunting, we have to go to them if they won’t come to us.” She concluded 
by again noting the need for more mobile units. “Th ere are so many prob-
lems. We just can’t attack them all at once” (Belmaker, 19 April 1993). Sig-
nifi cantly, there were Tipot Halav (Hebrew: mother/child clinics) and full 
service Kupot Holim (Hebrew: public clinics) in all of the planned bedouin 
towns at the time, as well as nearby Jewish communities where the bedouin 
might seek out medical help. Yet also at this time, the Emergency Room at 
Soroka Hospital in Be’er Sheva served as the primary medical facility for 
the bedouin community’s healthcare needs. 
Over the past two decades, there is no question that one now sees a sub-
stantial improvement in the health of the Negev bedouin community. Th at 
said, as will be seen below, there is in truth a diff erence between healthcare 
provision and access for those who live in the towns and those who resist 
relocation and remain in the pezurah. But what is also true is that within the 
community as a whole, a variety of problems exist that all bedouin share. 
Moreover, there are a number of medical concerns in the pezurah that are 
less common in the towns (such as accidental injury); in turn, as the bed-
ouin urbanize, new healthcare concerns are arising in the towns that were, 
heretofore, previously nonexistent.
One particular issue that has attracted attention has been the occur-
rence of diabetes. Abou-Rbiah and Weitzman, for example, note that, “dia-
betes, virtually unknown among Bedouins in the Negev three decades ago, 
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has become a major health problem in this population” (2002: 689). More 
recent studies confi rm this fi nding, noting that diabetes rates are signifi -
cantly higher in the towns (5.5 percent) than in the pezurah (3.9 percent; 
A. Cohen et al. 2005: CR378). A. Cohen and his colleagues found that LDL 
cholesterol levels were also higher among urban town dwellers, fi ndings 
that “imply that urbanization of nomadic Bedouins and the changes associ-
ated with it, increase the risk of cardiovascular diseases” (2005: CR379).
In other words, changing dietary habits and a reduction in physical ac-
tivity due to lifestyle changes are largely to blame for these developments. 
Th ese medical professionals also note that obesity rates are higher among 
those living in settled environments (i.e., the towns), and that women, who 
are signifi cantly more obese than men (Abou-Rbiah and Weitzman 2002: 
688–689), are also more prone to develop diseases such as diabetes. Drei-
her has also found that African/black bedouin women (i.e., the Abid), have 
twice the levels of hypertension as Arab women (14 March 2007). 
Th us, throughout the past two decades, as the Negev bedouin com-
munity has become increasingly sedentary, healthcare issues related not 
to their level of dispersion, but rather to their concentration in urban ag-
glomerations have increasingly become apparent. Below, I will turn to the 
specifi c case of Segev Shalom, in order to address three interconnected 
queries: 1) does the town’s citizenry manifest any particular healthcare 
needs?; 2) what provisions are being provided by the state to meet these 
needs, and to what extent are residents turning to private medical care as 
an alternative?; 3) overall, how have the services been utilized and viewed 
by the town’s residents during the 15 years that this study was under way?
Segev Shalom: A Healthcare Profi le
Looking specifi cally at Segev Shalom’s healthcare services, nearly all of 
those households surveyed in 2007, 99 percent, stated that they use the 
town’s healthcare services. In addition, 84 percent stated that they some-
times go to Soroka Hospital for healthcare, and 38 percent use private doc-
tors, a handful of which have now begun opening their offi  ces in Segev 
Shalom in recent years (see below). Still, for most, as was the case when the 
study was initiated in the early 1990s, healthcare services are publicly pro-
vided (as is the case for the majority of Jewish Israelis as well, though again, 
this is changing). Services are centered at a Tipat Halav clinic, which serves 
as a facility for pre-natal, maternity, and post-natal care to new mothers 
and is operated by the Ministry of Health, and a Kupat Holim family clinic. 
All of these facilities are located in the town center. 
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Th e Kupat Holim is in truth where most town residents go for their ini-
tial care. A new, state-of-the-art building opened in the town in January 
2007 (see Illustration 4.1); the old building (not shown) houses offi  ce and 
storage space. Notably, approximately 60 percent of the 15,000 patients 
enrolled in the Segev Shalom Kupat Holim membership come from com-
munities in the pezurah. As noted, Soroka Hospital’s Emergency Room has 
served as the bedouin community’s primary “clinic,” and has been used, in 
the words of some observers, “excessively” for decades. But this use has 
begun to decline since 2000, most especially among bedouin from the pe-
zurah (A. Cohen et al. 2007: 332). While some attribute this to the opening 
of Kupot Holim clinics in the periphery to meet the needs there (A. Cohen 
et al. 2007: 334) (over 20 Kupot Holim Clalit (Hebrew: General Public Clin-
ics) have opened in the pezurah in the 2000s; nearby Wadi Na’am had 1,000 
subscribers alone as of mid 2007), the use of clinics in the nearby bedouin 
towns such as Segev Shalom clearly plays a role as well.
Th e Segev Shalom Kupat Holim clinic is staff ed by 6 doctors per day, 
each seeing about 30–50 patients, averaging about 250 patients/day. Th e 
facility is open Sunday–Friday (which is a half day); it is closed on Saturday, 
the Jewish Sabbath. 
Dr. Jacob Dreiher, who has worked as an internist in the clinic for four 
years, notes that in general, patients tend to be women bringing children, 
especially young children, in for various ailments. While this was true back 
in the early 1990s, his elaboration of the state of healthcare in the town as 
well as the surrounding post-nomadic pezurah, where more than half of his 
patients now originate, well informs the situation today. I quote Dreiher 
here (14 March 2007) at length:
Many of our patients have diabetes, they adopt bad habits very quickly 
like not walking and driving everywhere, not exercising, eating junk food 
and so on. Th ey are less likely to adopt good habits like physical activity, 
sport—they don’t have a sports center here in Segev, and women are not 
allowed to jog or walk in the streets on their own so they sit at home.
Even the sheep they eat, the lamb, in the past would graze and eat the 
grass that is growing. Now they have a special mixture which is artifi cially 
made, enriched with all these growth hormones and vitamins. Th e lambs 
don’t get much exercise and the meat is very high in fat. So even if they eat 
the same amount as before the meat itself has much more fat content than 
before. Th ey also eat a lot of bread, and drink a lot of tea with sugar.
Doctors who treated the bedouin in the 1960s had ten patients with dia-
betes, and less than fi ve had hypertension in the whole Negev. It wasn’t 
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recognized at all. Today we have an epidemic of diabetes and hyperten-
sion, more than the Jewish sector.
Although it is clear that detection and treatment of these sorts of ailments 
was also likely to be of a lower level and quality 50 years ago, the doctor’s 
Illustration 4.1. Th e Segev Shalom Kupot Holim in 2007.
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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point is a signifi cant one. Dreiher also notes that in the pezurah, there are 
healthcare issues that are not as common in town: high accident rates, in-
cluding accidentally drinking of dangerous liquids because they are stored 
in transparent bottles, home injuries due to open fi res, and so on are all 
common events outside of the towns (14 March 2007).
Overall, there is a greater need for healthcare services in the bedouin 
sector than ever before and that, in general, these services are being used. 
Ironically, there are now studies that reveal that these services may in fact 
be “over-utilized” by the bedouin (A. Cohen et al. 2007; Groode & Dreiher 
2007), a trend suggesting potentially newly developing pathologies amongst 
a bedouin community that is chronically, for want of a better word, “sick.”
But eff ective healthcare service provision is, like all aspects of the reset-
tlement initiative, wrought with political, cultural, and economic concerns 
that problemacize eff ective delivery at virtually every level. While provision 
of the service, which is culturally sensitive and appropriate, off ers one side 
of the equation, eff ective use provides the other equally signifi cant side. 
In the Negev, the disconnection between healthcare service providers and 
users is profound.
It has been argued in the past that two primary issues stood in the way 
of eff ective service delivery in the bedouin community, namely, logistical 
considerations and “traditional” bedouin culture. In essence, the inability 
to access healthcare was the bedouin’s own fault. Th eir belief in supernatu-
ral forces, their lack of understanding of “modern medical methods,” and 
“tribal nature” (expressed through the desire that each community would 
have its own clinic), and lack of confi dence in medical personnel have all 
been cited as barriers to eff ective service delivery (Meir 1997: 183–184).
Dreiher’s comments on the challenges of providing eff ective care seem to 
refl ect this sort of sentiment. Again, quoting him at length (14 March 2007):
Th ey have a fatalistic attitude that everything is from Allah and it doesn’t 
matter whether you comply or not with the doctor, everything is written 
from above and you can’t do anything to change it. Th is aff ects eff orts to 
stop bad habits such as smoking. If a cure helps, the assumption is that 
Allah intervened—“I got better because Allah wanted me to, not because 
of my doctor’s advice, physical activity, whatever.” So it doesn’t really mat-
ter what you do since everything is dictated from above. Th e result is low 
rates of compliance with taking medications, responding to doctor’s or-
ders for physical activity, stopping smoking, diffi  culty in achieving educa-
tional goals …
Th ere is now greater awareness of problems that arise out of consan-
guineal marriage and genetic disease. Th ey come to consult before get-
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ting married, or during pregnancy. Th ey have a nurse trained in genetic 
counseling. She’s in the clinic once a week. In the fi rst six months, there 
were 1,000 consultations. In next twelve months, 3,000. So the services 
are used. But what is done with the recommendations she provides to 
these couples?
Amniocentesis? Termination of pregnancy? Who complies with these sug-
gestions? Th ey don’t always do what she tells them to do. Even when they 
have children at home with a disease, and the pregnancy tests positive for 
that same disease and they know how terrible it is, do they terminate? It’s 
a problem because it goes against Islam—they have very strict rules on 
when an embryo is a living creature and you can’t end a pregnancy and the 
cutoff  is very early. And once you know [that a certain disease of problem 
is evident] it’s still against the tradition to [end the pregnancy].
Dreiher concedes, however, that considerable changes have occurred only 
in the brief period since he fi rst began working in the clinic:
I’ve seen a few couples that induced abortion just because they didn’t 
want to have more children, where they didn’t have any problems, but 
this is very rare. I was really amazed. But I said “ok, you have 10 kids, it’s 
enough for you, go ahead, sign the papers, no one will question, go, do it.” 
But I was shocked. [I thought] are you a bedouin!?
Th e frustration in Dreiher’s tone is palpable as he discusses his eff orts. 
And yet, there is a certain lack of cultural awareness or appreciation of 
bedouin society that also can be read between the lines of his thoughts. 
Other healthcare professionals working with the bedouin have viewed this 
perspective on medical care in a diff erent manner, which is perhaps less 
judgmental (Sheiner et al. 2001: 457):
[Th e bedouin] view pregnancy and childbirth as natural events, which 
require medical attention only when there are medical problems. Th is at-
titude renders them quite suspicious of the health services available and 
in particular invasive procedures. Th is position may be emphasized by the 
low usage of epidural analgesia, although it was highly recommended by 
the medical staff .
A bedouin medic employed by the Soroka mobile unit, a resident of Laq-
iya, related a series of anecdotes to me in the early 1990s that places this 
“fatalistic” attitude toward healthcare in an alternative light (Al-Sana, 11 
November 1992):
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I went out with a social worker to a bedouin family. Th e man was blind 
and the wife was mildly retarded. Th ey had four children, all genetically 
deaf, all mute. We suggested she stop having children. Th e wife said no; 
maybe if she kept having children, she would have a normal child who 
could take care of the rest of the family. 
When he last heard, she had had two more children—both were deaf and 
mute.
A woman was pregnant, and when they did an ultrasound they determined 
that the child would be a Downs child, and would be missing an arm, and 
perhaps would have other problems. We suggested she abort. She refused, 
she had the child, and it was born totally healthy and normal.
Th ere was another woman who was in labor. She had had two C-sections 
previously, but this time she refused a C-section. I went into the fi eld to 
locate the husband, but it isn’t so easy to fi nd someone out there in the 
dark. I found him, brought him to Soroka, he and wife talked, and they 
decided to go home. Th e husband signed a release saying he knew of the 
danger to the mother and child alike. Th e following day, I went out to their 
tent, and there were the parents and child; the child had been born in the 
tent without problems.
And fi nally:
I heard of an old man who was dying. I went to help with the preparations 
for death; I took his pulse, his blood pressure, and I determined he was 
simply dehydrated. I wanted to take him to hospital, but his family re-
fused. I went to Be’er Sheva, got an off -duty doctor friend to join me, went 
back to tent, but [by then] the man was already in a coffi  n.
Th ese and other stories reveal the Azazmeh mentality, yes. All is in Allah’s 
hands. What Allah wills is what will be. Only the parents of a child who 
died after we inoculated him refused to accept this submission to fate. 
Th ey argued that it was the doctor—not Allah—who was to blame for the 
death of their son.
“Fatalistic” as the bedouin may be, they are using the clinics in record 
numbers. However, the growing use of private medical professionals, as 
opposed to the public healthcare system, is clearly a sign of growing wealth 
and class distinction in Segev Shalom. In January 2007, a new development, 
a privately created and run dental clinic, was also established in Segev Sha-
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lom, housed in what all recognize to be a rather unique looking building 
built literally in the town’s very center. 
Not surprisingly, the divisions within the town with regard to the use of 
such services are economic and, as discussed previously (see Dinero 2006), 
tribal. Th e Azazmeh, for example, are more likely to use a private doctor 
(p=.05), especially those under the age of 40 (p=.02), as are the more edu-
cated (p=.04) and those with more highly educated fathers (p=.03). Th ose 
choosing the term “Israeli” as an identity label (see Chapter 5) are also more 
likely to access a private doctor for healthcare (p=.03), especially those un-
der the age of 40 (p=.02). Th ose with higher incomes tend to use a private 
doctor as well (p=.03). 
In 1993, men were found to be more likely than women to use healthcare 
facilities other than those in Segev Shalom, a sign of their freedom and 
mobility, unlike their wives, sisters, and mothers, who are more confi ned 
within the town’s city limits (p=.00). In 2007, women were still more likely 
than men to use the local Segev Shalom clinics rather than outside medical 
facilities (p=.03).
Use of a private doctor is one indication of the sense that, as the bed-
ouin socially develop and progress, they will seek out alternative ways in 
which to address their healthcare needs. And yet, as Figure 4.1 reveals, sat-
isfaction with the Segev Shalom healthcare provisions, which are used by 
virtually every household, has improved continuously over the past two 
decades. Th is is not surprising; in 1993, the Kupat Holim operated out of 
one of the larger houses in town, providing basic care; by 2007, healthcare 
services were provided in a modern, multi-fl oored facility. 
Still, Segev Shalom residents are more than willing to voice a variety of 
criticisms of the town’s healthcare facilities, not, as some might contend, 
because they expect miracles, but rather, because they view the provisions 
as unacceptable or inadequate. Signifi cantly too, a number of correlations 
can be found that suggest that who one is, one’s economic success, how one 
views oneself, and so on all play a role in one’s experiences and attitudes 
toward Segev Shalom’s healthcare facilities and provisions.
In general, older residents in the 1993 survey were more satisfi ed than 
younger residents under the age of 40 with the town’s healthcare services 
(p=.03). Th is was not found to be true in later surveys. What was found 
in the 2007 data, however, was that those living in the town the longest 
rated the clinics higher than the others (p=.00). Th is was especially true 
of those with low incomes (p=.00), those under the age of 40 (p=.00), and 
members of the Azazmeh tribe (p=.00). Residents with less education 
rated the medical facilities in town higher than those with higher levels 
of education(p=.03), especially women (p=.01), Azazmeh respondents 
(p=.05), and those over the age of 40 (p=.02). Th e low income Tarabeen 
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also tended to rate the town doctor higher than those Tarabeen tribe mem-
bers with higher incomes (p=.02). In other words, those in the town who 
are the least educated, poorest, and “traditional”—i.e., they who fi t the ste-
reotypical bedouin profi le that lends to a fatalistic worldview—are most 
satisfi ed with the town’s healthcare provisions. Th ose who expect more and 
who are better off  fi nancially are seeking out in increasing numbers what 
they perceive to be higher quality privatized care.
As for the problems and concerns that are cited by town residents, many 
that were voiced as far back as the early 1990s were still being repeated in 
the 2007 survey. All appear to suggest that the services remain inaccessible 
to patients, even if the providers do not view them as such. Inconvenient 
hours of operation continue to be a complaint, cited in 1993 (Dinero 1996: 
113), and is still an issue of concern today. Th e lack of adequate person-
nel (both quantity and quality) to meet the demands of the Segev Shalom 
population and its periphery has even made the national news (“Beduin 
complain…,” 13 April 2000).
In addition, a new phenomenon, never voiced in previous surveys, was 
found among the 2007 fi ndings. A small but notable number of respon-
dents (9 percent of those who responded) complained about the existence 
of “only one” dermatologist on staff  at the Kupat Holim, who is available 
for consultations “only once a week.” Th e medical staff  found these fi ndings 
somewhat bewildering, insofar as there are no waiting lists for the derma-
tologist, and “usually, skin disorders don’t have many emergencies in which 
we feel the need to consult more often then once a week.” (Dreiher, 3 June 
2007). As for why this is even considered a concern, Dreiher suggests that, 
“we can only speculate that skin problems are an especially sensitive issue 
in bedouin culture, as it [is] related to the appearance of the patient, rather 
than some hidden internal disease. After consulting with the clinic’s staff , it 
does appear that skin problems are conceived as bothering as they provoke 
questions by neighbors and friends and are interpreted as a sign of being 
unclean and of lower socioeconomic status.”
Th e other most commonly voiced complaint, which was cited in the 1993 
survey (7 percent) and has been noted in every survey thereafter, including 
the 2007 study (26 percent of those who responded, and it is even noted as 
a concern by Shvarts et al. in the 1950s in the Negev [2003: 56]), is the lack 
of Arabic-speaking nurses, doctors, and other medical personnel in the Se-
gev Shalom healthcare facilities. And, yet, this view is disputed by those 
working in the clinics. “Th is is highly imprecise; of eighteen people working 
in the clinic (physicians, nurses and clerks), fi ve are of Arabic origin [sic] 
and speak Arabic as a native language. Th ese include two nurses, two clerks 
and a physician. Most of the others speak Arabic to various degrees. If a 
doctor or a nurse does not understand the patient (or vice versa) he usually 
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asks for translation by his/her Arab-speaking colleagues. We believe that 
the professionality [sic] of the healthcare worker is more important than 
his/her ethnic background” (Dreiher, 3 June 2007). 
Such a gap between the perspective of the service provider and the user 
prevails throughout virtually every aspect of healthcare provision. Th e 
bedouin community’s perceptions and the medical community’s percep-
tions repeatedly appear to be at odds. Th is not only serves to compromise 
eff ective provision, but also causes further stresses and anxiety for service 
users and providers alike.
Psychological health and welfare services also require increased attention 
in the sedentarized environment. Th ough few studies have been under-
taken to make such comparisons, one signifi cant work by Hays and Zouari 
compared village, urban, and sedentarized bedouin women in Tunisia. Th ey 
found that the bedouin were signifi cantly more likely to experience higher 
levels of psychological distress and depression than village or urban women 
(Hays and Zouari 1995: 84), and that these diff erences were largely related 
to stresses brought on by multiple child bearing and economic diffi  culties, 
which were new to the settled bedouin community.
Indicators in the Negev similarly suggest that the demand and need for 
social welfare services is high (see Dinero 1998a). And yet, Lubetzky et al. 
suggest that despite the presumed need of the resettled Negev bedouin to 
utilize social welfare services, they often go unused due to a “clash of cul-
tures” in which they “appraise the value of health … in diff erent ways” (2004: 
187). Th ey note that Western medicine is premised upon “logic” and that 
rehabilitation, therapy, and the like are all crucial to rehabilitation. 
Here again, trust and understanding are central to this service delivery 
eff ort, for if one does not believe in a certain approach or therapy, this does 
not mean that the parent of a disabled child, for example, does not under-
Figure 4.1. Percentage of Survey Respondents Expressing Satisfaction with 
Healthcare Service Provisions in Segev Shalom (by Survey Year).
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
 1993 1996 2000 2007
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stand or appreciate the “wonders of modern medicine,” but possibly, that 
they simply do not trust those delivering the service or do not feel that 
those providing the service genuinely wish to make a diff erence. Curiously, 
Lubetzky et al. suggest that the fact that the bedouin’s use of speech and 
language therapy services in the Negev is signifi cantly less consistent and 
reliable than Jewish patients on average “could be due to the fact that the 
Hebrew language is the main therapy tool of this sector” (2004: 190, em-
phasis added). Th at such a question must even be posed is bewildering, for 
it again places the onus of service delivery failure upon the user, without 
taking note of the dysfunction of the service provision itself.
Meir provides a more sobering approach to the issue. He notes that by 
turning to social welfare services, the bedouin often lose tribal and family 
support (Meir 1997: 185). Moreover, as a people that has long functioned 
on its own under harsh conditions, such dependency is also a sign of lost 
respect and pride. As he notes, social workers in the bedouin sector have 
historically relied upon Western ideas and methods. Even the bedouin so-
cial workers use such methods given their educational background, and 
thus, such approaches typically do not meet bedouin needs, or respect bed-
ouin culture. Th us, a tension mounts between the desire to intervene, and 
the willingness of this society to allow it to occur (Meir 1997: 191; Dinero 
1998a: 31–32).
Put simply, the twenty-fi rst century Negev bedouin resident of Segev 
Shalom has needs and demands that are not being met, or that are barely 
being satisfi ed, due to this sort of cultural gap between provider and user. 
Until 2007, Segev Shalom did not, in truth, even have social welfare services 
and aid dedicated solely to its residents; they were off ered “the minimum of 
the minimum” out of the offi  ces in Be’er Sheva, which were later relocated to 
the town. Moreover, fi nancial aid to needy families—one of the primary ser-
vices of the bedouin social welfare agencies—was extremely limited; “they 
got very little, and in time they would stop coming” (Goren, 7 May 2007).
Today, suggests social worker Tsofi t Goren, the Offi  ce of Social Welfare 
and its services are far more visible, and are being utilized at a far higher 
level than ever before. As she notes (7 May 2007):
Th e major change we see [today] is that the population is demanding 
more services. Th ey want more quality services here in Segev Shalom. But 
they don’t want a special needs school for example, they want a school 
with qualifi ed teachers which is specialized, which looks more like that in 
the Jewish system. Th ere’s greater knowledge now. Th ere are people now 
who say ‘“we moved to the town”—this is especially true if they have kid 
with special needs—“for something better.”
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Th is well sums up why so many have moved to the town—and why so 
many today are so disenchanted. So much of the resentment and frustra-
tion comes down to an issue of expectations, that is, the belief and assump-
tion that town living would provide what living in the pezurah could not. 
Nowhere is this truer than in the area of providing for one’s children, most 
especially, in the area of accessing the educational services off ered by the 
state. Like healthcare, it has traditionally been one of, if not the primary 
motivations for relocating to a planned bedouin town. It is to educational 
service provision that I now turn.
Educational Services—A Case of Unintended Consequences
If there is one area of service provision in the bedouin sector that has been 
critiqued the most—and yet, has shown the most success and promise—it 
is the area of education. As numerous scholars continue to show how in-
adequate educational service provision is in the bedouin sector (Abu-Saad 
1991; 1995), what is rarely said but should be noted clearly at the outset 
is that today’s Negev bedouin community as a whole is the most formally 
educated community in its history, and perhaps, is the most educated bed-
ouin population in the entire Middle East.
And yet, despite this, the provision and use of educational services is, like 
healthcare services, highly controversial (see Dinero 2009). Th e Compul-
sory Education Law was created soon after the creation of the state, though 
early on, few bedouin students actually attended school and the state made 
little eff ort to enforce the ruling (Abu-Saad 1997: 25–26). By the mid 1950s, 
roughly 17 percent of the school-aged population was actually enrolled, 
though this fi gure refers only to boys. A dropout rate of 37 percent before 
graduation (Abu-Rubiyya et al. 1996: 2) led to a very low level of bedouin 
education overall. Only after the siyag was removed (which, incidentally, 
coincided with the aftermath of the 1967 war, when marriage with more 
educated women from the West Bank and Gaza brought new views of educa-
tion to the Negev) did enrollment begin to rise (Abu-Rubiyya et al. 1996: 3).
In part, the tensions associated with the implementation of education in 
bedouin society are connected to the role of children in the household. As 
Abu-Rabia discusses at length (2006: 867), children played, and still play, 
a key role in household activities connected to the raising of and caring 
for livestock. Sending children to school is a luxury few could aff ord his-
torically, and in truth for many in the pezurah, the value of having a child 
working at home still outweighs the value of sending a child off  to pursue a 
formal education, which will surely train him (or her) for activities that, at 
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least in the short term, have little likelihood of contributing directly to the 
economic viability of the household.
By the 1990s when this study was initiated, the literature recognized a 
number of general problems in bedouin education. Negev bedouin schools 
are recognized for having the highest dropout rates in all of Israel (see 
Abu-Saad 1995). For example, according to one study, in 1995, 67 percent 
dropped out before graduating, compared with 43 percent in other Arab 
areas (Katz et al. 1998: 4). Th is was an improvement over previous years. 
While other studies quote even higher rates (Abu-Saad 1997: 33), perhaps 
to make a political point, a statistic of roughly 55 percent appears to be the 
most consistently cited (Abu-Rabia 2006: 879) and still, needless to say, is 
well beyond acceptable.
Regarding the nationally held matriculation exams, it has been argued 
that principals often seek to overcome the negative reputations that the 
bedouin schools experience by recommending only the best students take 
the exam, in order to make their schools look better, seeking to “enhance 
[their] prestige” (Abu-Rubiyya et al. 1996: 8). Th at said, in 1995, 6 percent 
of all bedouin high school students who took the national Bagrut exam suc-
cessfully matriculated, compared to 22 percent in the rest of the Arab sec-
tor, and 40 percent in the Jewish sector (Katz et al. 1998: 5). Th e fi gure saw 
considerable improvement by 2002, with 26 percent of bedouin students 
matriculating. And yet, that same year, 34 percent matriculated in the rest 
of the Arab sector, and 52 percent in the Jewish sector, again revealing that 
the Negev bedouin remain behind the other sectors of Israeli society due 
to socioeconomic and other factors, directly impacting access to higher 
education (Abu-Rabia 2006: 877). 
Other issues also play a role. Recent statistics, for example, reveal that 
only 60 percent of the regional teachers are Negev bedouin, the rest hail-
ing from the north (Galilee), where there tends to be a surplus of teachers 
(Abu-Saad 1995: 156; Human Rights Watch 2001: 113). Yet this presents 
some issues as well, especially when single Arab women living far from 
home and teaching in bedouin culture are not fully comfortable with the 
situation (Abu-Saad & Isralovitch 1992: 778). Diff erences in dialects, dis-
similarities in acceptable clothing, and other mores make teaching and 
learning a challenge for students and teachers alike (see Dinero 2009).
Most local bedouin elementary school teachers were men in the past, 
though this is slowly changing (Abu-Rubiyya et al. 1996: 4). A high propor-
tion of the teachers who have taught in the bedouin schools, historically, 
were uncertifi ed (Abu-Rubiyya et al. 1996: 17). Th is lack of role models is, 
of course, problematic and cyclical, and relates back to the fact that many 
bedouin students still do not complete their schooling, and very few see 
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the value in pursuing an education as an attractive, viable career option (El-
Farona, 19 February 2007).
Predictably, observers have again argued that problems in bedouin edu-
cation, including high dropout rates and low scores on national tests, are 
due to bedouin culture (Meir 1997: 176), rather than to the innumerable 
ways in which the bedouin educational system is inadequate and inferior 
to the Jewish one. Th e issue, it is argued, is “related to Bedouin society’s 
receptivity to modern and formal education … from a cultural perspec-
tive—modern education is still irrelevant for a considerable proportion of 
the Bedouin population” (Meir 1997: 176–177). Based on such arguments, 
it has been concluded by some that “educators concerned with the Bed-
ouin educational system need to be guided by a worldview that regards the 
school as a means of integrating the bedouin into the mainstream of Israeli 
society” (Abu-Rubiyya et al. 1996: 25). 
Abu-Saad is one of very few scholars who has documented the ways in 
which bedouin education is jeopardized not, as so many wish to argue, be-
cause of culture, traditional mindsets, and the like, but, rather, due to the 
purposeful neglect and unequal treatment of Arabs in Israel in general, and 
of the bedouin in particular. He notes, for example, the disproportionate 
distribution of funding, noting that the “Israeli State Comptroller’s 1992 
report comparing Jewish and Arab education in Israel reveals that school 
budgets, teaching hours, professional resources and facilities are not eq-
uitably distributed between these systems. In the 1990–1991 school year, 
the annual per capita expenditure of the Ministry of Education and Culture 
was 308 New Israeli Shekels (NIS) for Jewish students, and 168 NIS for 
Arab students” (Abu-Saad 1995: 150). 
And yet, though it has been said that “Bedouin schooling is not a prior-
ity of the Israeli Ministry of Education” (Abu-Rabia 2006: 880), all statistics 
suggest that the bedouin are accessing educational opportunity, and at a 
relatively rapid rate. Not only is this true of the boys, but, increasingly, the 
bedouin girls as well; the educational gap between the genders that saw 
only one-half to three-quarters of the female student-aged population in 
school in relationship to similarly aged male peers in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Abu-Rubiyya et al. 1996: 10–11; Dinero 1996: 109) has all but disappeared 
as of 2007 (see Figure 4.2). Of related relevance, literacy rates have concur-
rently risen (Figure 4.3).
As will be seen below, educational level is a predictor of numerous so-
cial and economic development indices in Segev Shalom and throughout 
the Negev region, in the post-nomadic era. It is notable then that although 
the schools in town are educating more bedouin schoolchildren than ever 
before, there are a variety of diffi  culties that the educators must also face as 
the town continues to grow and to develop.
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Segev Shalom Education: Challenges and Successes
As of 2007, there were three elementary schools in Segev Shalom, with 
populations of at least 600, 750, and 1,000, totaling over 2,350 pupils. Th ere 
is one high school in town that has 1,800 students, and the town now has a 
middle school with over 150 students (Illustrations 4.2, 4.3); adding a class 
each year, its expected population will also be 1,800 (Jirjawi, 7 February 
2007). By way of comparison, in 1992, there was one elementary school 
and one high school (grades 7–12) in the town. Th e entire student body 
of the secondary school at that time was only 580 students (Hamamdi, 
9 November 1992).
In addition to the growth of the town’s population over the years, a sub-
stantial proportion of students are bussed to the town schools from the 
pezurah. Th e shortage of schools there is well known (Abu-Rabia 2006: 
877) and is in part purposeful; after all, one of the primary goals of the 
resettlement initiative was to provide services in a concentrated environ-
Figure 4.2. Percentage of High School Graduates in Segev Shalom 
(Male/Female).
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
Figure 4.3. Adult Literacy Rates (%), One or More Languages, Segev Shalom.
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
110 Settling for Less: Th e Planned Resettlement of Israel’s Negev Bedouin
ment, and if this were shown to be possible outside of a town, the rationale 
for resettlement would be further weakened. On the other hand, there are 
genuine logistical diffi  culties in building schools fast enough even in the 
planned towns to keep pace with the growing population (see below); this 
problem is compounded all the more so in the pezurah.
Regardless, only elementary schools are built in the pezurah; students 
must be bussed to the Segev Shalom High School (or one of the other town 
schools) at the secondary level, which plays a particularly central role in the 
dropout rates of high school-aged girls (Human Rights Watch 2001: 40), 
whose male relatives do not want them to travel too far from their homes 
and outside of the household infl uence in order to attend school. In most 
instances, these schools are viewed as “temporary” in any case (Abu-Saad 
1997: 31), with designs refl ecting the assumption (and purposeful inten-
tion) that, in time, the students and their families will relocate permanently 
to one of the planned settlements.
Be that as it may, in 1992, 20 percent of the elementary school popula-
tion came from outside of the town (Dinero 1996: 109); in 2007, the fi gure 
at the elementary level is closer to 40–60 percent (Jirjawi, 7 February 2007; 
El-Farona, 19 February 2007). Sixty percent of the secondary school popu-
lation hailed from the pezurah in 1992 (Hamamdi, 9 November 1992); that 
fi gure remained unchanged in 2007. Th us, new schools to accommodate 
this ever-growing student body are under construction in the town almost 
incessantly, as overcrowding and the use of “caravan” outbuildings lack-
ing air conditioning or proper heating are a constant aspect of education 
delivery in this (and every other) bedouin town. A late 1990s government 
study determined that in order to keep up with demand, 146 additional 
classrooms would have to be built each year (Human Rights Watch 2001: 
81), though this has not occurred. Th e overcrowding issue, which in truth 
is also of concern in the Jewish sector, is therefore a dominant feature of 
any bedouin classroom. Th e dynamic created by this fact is problematic 
not only for the pupils, but also for the bedouin faculty seeking to give the 
children the attention they believe they are due.
Let’s start with the number of students. Today the number of students has 
changed. Once there was a smaller, fewer students, and fewer numbers of 
schools. Now there are more students and more schools. Th eir needs—
like computers and such—has grown. Once in education there wasn’t any. 
Once there were fewer students, fewer needs, but more achievements. For 
example, the class I taught, the whole class was 20 students, two left, and 
there were 18. Th at was enough for a teacher. Today in a class there are 
39, and sometimes classes with 40, with 36. Th e minimum, no the average 
class is 36. 
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Even the teacher who really wants to give, he can’t. It’s like you’ve got a 
sandwich of bread and you need to divide it up to 4 or 10. So how much 
can you give from this? So it’s a problem. (El-Farona, 19 February 2007)
But the issues impacting education delivery, according to bedouin educa-
tors, go beyond the question of the ongoing need for more facilities. Th at 
the schools in the bedouin towns are lacking in every material way in re-
Illustrations 4.2. and 4.3. Th e Segev Shalom Middle School and High 
School—2007.
Source: Photos by Steven C. Dinero.
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lation to schools in nearby Jewish communities is blatantly obvious and 
recognized by most observers, including those working on behalf of the 
state (Katz et al. 1998). Unequal governmental expenditure leading to un-
equal opportunity is well documented throughout the literature (Abu-Saad 
1991). But how this is translated and experienced on the ground, in the 
day-to-day lives of Negev bedouin educators, has gained little attention. 
Moreover, just as healthcare professionals see ways in which the bedouin 
appear to be “less than cooperative” in how they use healthcare, educa-
tors also see that making the transition to formalized education appears to 
some to be a generational process.
For example, the role of parents who, though they may value formal 
education for their children, are unprepared to help them fully with their 
schooling, is one crucial element that few have discussed (see Abu-Saad 
1995; Dinero 1996, as exceptions). As the aforementioned statistics reveal, 
formalized education is new to bedouin society. In 1993, only 1.2 percent 
of those surveyed in Segev Shalom stated that their fathers had graduated 
high school, while 78 percent had no formal education (Dinero 1996: 110); 
by 2007, 16 percent stated that their fathers had graduated high school, 
while only 49 percent stated that their fathers lacked formal education. 
And yet, just as assumptions about healthcare access and satisfaction 
are not always born out by reality, attitudes toward education, and access 
to it, do not always follow patterns that modernization theorists might an-
ticipate. Th ough admittedly some statistics appear to suggest that educa-
tion levels reveal that the bedouin are in a period of transition from one 
generation to the next and from the nomadic phase to the planned town 
environment and that it will take time before this transition is complete, 
this does not mean that all of the players on the “continuum” (Meir 1988) 
are in fact following the progression from “traditional” to “modern” in an 
orderly fashion. Middle School Headmaster Ibn-Nasir explains (19 Febru-
ary 2007):
Th e problem is with the parents, yes. Th ey don’t always worry about 
their kids’ education. Th e kids don’t do their homework, they don’t have 
the commitment. But the parents who don’t have much education, they 
sometimes tend to have a greater commitment to get their kids educated 
than the others.
Headmaster El-Farona sees the issue similarly. He states (19 February 2007):
It doesn’t matter if [a student] lives in the settlement or outside [in the 
pezurah], in connection to education. Th ere’s no connection. I see some-
times that there are children whose mother and father know how to read 
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and write and they help them, and they’re better students than those who 
live in the settlement. It doesn’t matter about the living conditions. Th ose 
who live in a tin shack—sometimes they have electricity, sometimes they 
don’t have electricity—but it doesn’t depend on those conditions, it de-
pends on who is looking after the children. Th ese things matter. Even if a 
child lives in a castle, he has everything, but who’s looking after him? 
…
(T)here are people in the town who don’t want to raise their children. Th is 
one will have his house, he’s got everything. But he doesn’t want to look 
after his children. Th ere are people outside [in the pezurah] who don’t 
have anything, but they invest all their energy in their children. Th at’s the 
diff erence. 
Another “diff erence” that plays a signifi cant role is the question of student 
motivation and commitment to the educational enterprise. For most peo-
ple, formal education amounts to a means to an end, the end being a better 
job, fi nancial security, and so on. To suggest to a post-nomadic indigenous 
population that formal education is a worthwhile endeavor in and of itself 
is not only naïve, but fails to consider the economic foundation of this clas-
sic social development measure.
In Negev bedouin society, economic success does correlate statisti-
cally with educational achievement (see below). But as with the case of 
healthcare, perception plays a key role here as well; if the perception in the 
bedouin community is that educational success will not lead to economic 
success, then it should be no wonder that teachers will continue to struggle 
in the classroom to convince their charges that their scholastic endeavors 
are worthwhile. El-Farona, who was a classroom teacher for 12 years be-
fore taking on his new role of the past 8 years as Headmaster of one of the 
town’s elementary schools, states (19 February 2007):
If we take a boy who has completed 12th grade and has his matriculation 
exams but he doesn’t have any money, he won’t go on to study … He’ll 
think, “For what?” His brother did it, he completed it, and for what? To be 
unemployed? Th e father sits at home, the brothers sit at home, [and] they 
get unemployment payments. Today, what will the boy think? Th ey’re sit-
ting and sitting every day getting unemployment checks. He won’t even 
make an attempt. Once, we all went out to work. Everyone went out to 
work. Today, no. Now the father explains to him, “Look, I get money from 
the State.” Th e child, what does he think? “Why should I even make an 
eff ort?”
…
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Sometimes there’s a job notice in the paper, and we’re sitting around, and 
there’s folks who say, “Listen, [it’s not for me], I’m an automobile techni-
cian, or whatever.” Th ey say that because since they didn’t do the army, or 
because they’re bedouin, they fear they won’t take them. So I say, “Look, 
try. Go. Show them that you’re capable.” So, he’s thinking he’s screwed 
from the start. He won’t even put himself out as a candidate. Th ere’s also 
that thinking. “Go, try to change it. You may not succeed, but go, try.” 
Th ese are the things you have to try to change. But that’s the outlook of 
our young people. 
Despite such perceptions, there is no question that educational level is a 
primary indicator—if not, the primary indicator—through which much of 
the nature of social and economic development and political change now 
occurring in Segev Shalom can be examined, measured, and traced. Edu-
cation is central to the process of moving the bedouin community from 
an ascriptive-oriented society to an achievement-oriented one (Abu-Saad 
1995). Th is has been true since data was fi rst gathered in Segev Shalom in 
1993, when it was found that education levels correlated with reasons for 
relocating to the planned town. Less educated bedouin were more likely to 
state that they relocated seeking the development opportunities that town 
life had to off er, while the more educated were more likely to cite other 
reasons for relocating, such as government force (p=.04). In the same sur-
vey, it was also found that those living in the town for 5 or fewer years, the 
“newcomers,” tended to be less educated than those living in the town more 
than 5 years (p=.03). Lastly, education and employment correlated (p=.00) 
as did education and gender (p=.00); the more educated were male and had 
a greater likelihood of being employed.
By 2007, several additional factors correlated with educational levels. 
More educated residents tended to be under 40 years of age and were 
single/never married (p=.00). As suggested by the educators’ sentiments 
above, parents’ educational levels played a role in one’s own ability to ac-
cess scholastic achievement. Th e more educated bedouin were found to be 
more likely to have more educated fathers (p=.00) and mothers (p=.00). 
Th e father’s education also played a role in one’s economic status. Curi-
ously, an inverse relationship was found between the father’s education and 
the possibility of owning a stone/permanent house, although the relation-
ship was not strong (p=.05). Perhaps more predictably, those with less edu-
cated fathers were less likely to own a phone, (p=.01), a TV (p=.00), or a 
VCR/DVD player (p=.00).
As one would expect, younger residents (under the age of 40) tend to be 
more educated than older residents (p=.00). Th is impacts dynamics in the 
town; those who came to the town longer ago, the “veterans,” and “found-
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ing fathers,” are less educated than the recent arrivals (p=.00), especially 
those in-migrants under the age of 40 (p=.02). Th e Azazmeh newcomers 
are more educated than the Azazmeh veterans (p=.00)—that is, they who 
founded the town in the early 1980s and who feel a particularly vested in-
terest in the planning and development of “their” town. In general though, 
members of the Azazmeh tribe are more educated than the Tarabeen 
(p=.05). Lastly, lower income newcomers are more educated than veterans 
(p=.00); they may come to the town with limited fi nancial resources, but 
the one thing they have that many low income town residents still lack is 
education. 
As for the role of education in Segev Shalom’s economic development, 
the ramifi cations from a statistical viewpoint appear to be clear. And yet 
factors such as age and tribe play a role in one’s ability—beyond educa-
tional level—to access economic resources in bedouin society today. When 
looking at the labor force as a whole, for example, the more educated resi-
dents of Segev Shalom are more likely to be employed (p=.00). And yet, 
this is especially true for women (p=.00), though not for men; for those 
under 40 (p=.01), but not over 40; for Tarabeen members (p=.00), but not 
the Azazmeh; for those with lower incomes (p=.00), but not for those with 
higher incomes. 
In other words, those in Segev Shalom who could be referred to his-
torically as the strongest, proudest, ablest community members—namely, 
through the ascribed status as “True” Azazmeh bedouin men who have 
come of age and have wealth and means to prove it—now are able to ex-
press these same ideals through the obtainment of education. But when 
they do so, there is no statistical correlation between this achievement and 
whether they will ever acquire a wage-labor position compatible with their 
educational accomplishments.
When, however, the data that includes all of the town’s sectors are 
considered, the fi ndings do confi rm what one might anticipate about the 
connections between educational achievement and economic well being 
and behavior. Th ose with more education, for example, also were found to 
have higher family incomes (p=.02). Th ey were less likely to raise animals 
in town (p=.00) to supplement their incomes, especially those with young 
households (p=.01). Th e more educated were also less likely to raise crops 
or fruit-bearing trees in town (p=.00), another sign of both social and eco-
nomic transition away from a subsistence economy. Again, this was found 
to be especially true of young families (p=.02) and the Tarabeen (p=.03).
Education levels also were found to play a role in goods ownership. While 
this was true to a limited degree in the 1993 fi ndings, by 2007, several cor-
relations could be found within the data. Th e more educated residents, for 
example, were more likely to own a phone (p=.00), especially the young 
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(p=.01) and those with low incomes (p=.00). Th e same was true of those 
owning VCR/DVD players (p=.00, .01, and .00, respectively). 
Th e more educated were more likely to own a car (p=.02), especially 
those with low incomes (p=.01). Among those under 40, the more edu-
cated were more likely to own a satellite dish for their TVs (p=.03); this 
was also true of those with low incomes (p=.04). Among the Azazmeh, 
the more educated residents were more likely to own a washing machine 
(p=.04); this was also true of those with low incomes (p=.01). And lastly, 
those bedouin in town who were more educated were more likely to own 
a computer (p=.00), and again, this was especially true of those under the 
age of 40 (p=.00), the Azazmeh (p=.00)—and, of course, those with low 
incomes (p=.00).
Once again, the bedouin seem to be following a classic model of so-
cioeconomic development, and yet once again, they appear to be divert-
ing from it in unique and signifi cant ways. For while it is to be expected 
that higher educational rates might yield exposure to new ideas, interests, 
changed tastes, and so on, all of which would lead to new patterns of mate-
rial consumption, what stands out here is the factor that should play the 
biggest role—can one aff ord to buy all these consumer products—is an in-
verse variable. Rather than fi nding that those with higher incomes are the 
standard bearers of early bedouin consumerism, it appears that those with 
lower incomes, but who have achieved higher levels of education are by far 
the most likely to wish to acquire the material accoutrements of twenty-
fi rst century Israeli society.
Th e picture becomes cloudier still when one considers political attitudes, 
both local and national, and how educational levels infl uence these views. 
In previous data sets, correlations were found between one’s educational 
achievement, and one’s views and satisfaction with local services, national 
governance, and the state of bedouin society as a whole. As but one ex-
ample, in 1993, more educated male respondents were more likely to be 
critical of Segev Shalom’s sanitary services than the less educated (p=.01). 
Th e 2007 data set provided similar fi ndings. Th ose residents, men and 
women, with higher incomes and who were more educated tended to rate 
the local water service lower than the less educated (p=.04). Although, in 
general, more educated residents tend to be more critical of town services 
as these examples reveal, there are exceptions. More educated men, for 
example, rate the electrical service in town higher than those with less ed-
ucation (p=.01). But perhaps of greater relevance and signifi cance to the 
long-term growth and development of Segev Shalom and to the urbanizing 
bedouin community as a whole is the role of education as it informs the 
increasingly politicizing nature of the community (see Chapter 6), for it is 
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these fi ndings which may provide a window into better understanding the 
direction in which the community is now heading.
For example, the more educated residents of Segev Shalom were found 
to be less likely to have participated in voting in the most recent national 
elections (p=.01). Th is group, which presumably represents a signifi cant 
alienated sub-population of today’s most informed Negev bedouin, tend 
to be under 40 (p=.05), Tarabeen (p=.00), and with overall higher incomes 
(p=.03) in the town. 
Th e pattern is reinforced still further by the fact that those with more 
educated fathers were also less likely to have voted (p=.02), especially the 
Tarabeen (p=.00). Th ose with more educated mothers also were less likely 
to have voted (p=.05), especially those with lower incomes (p=.05), the 
Tarabeen (p=.03), and women (p=.01). Th e more educated bedouin also 
were more likely to choose an option on the survey stating that the na-
tional government is “failing to serve the needs of the bedouin commu-
nity” (p=.05) than those with less education. Th is is especially true of those 
under 40 (p=.04). Th ose who are more educated with higher incomes are 
more likely to express that they “feel unequal with other Israelis” (p=.02), 
another survey option. Further, those who are more educated with fathers 
who also are more educated are more likely to say that they feel less equal 
with other Israelis (p=.04). 
In other words, these statistics suggest that those who are more educated 
and are on top of the bedouin socioeconomic ladder have a better idea than 
anyone else (or so they believe) that their political situation is unequal, and, 
one might conjecture, apparently with little promise. 
If there is any solace to be found in their situation, it is clearly not in the 
maintenance of the political status quo, but in seeking a viable alternative. 
Th us, the 2007 data reveal that more educated men are more likely to favor 
the Islamic parties over the Jewish/Zionist parties than the less educated 
(p=.02). Again, what is notable here is that this is especially true of those in 
Segev Shalom coming from households enjoying higher incomes (p=.00). 
Th e Islamic party option need not be viewed as wholly indicative of an 
increasing level of Muslim orthodoxy in Segev Shalom, although this is, 
in part, occurring. It should be noted, for example, that more educated 
residents under 40 are less likely to state that they frequent the mosque 
(p=.01), especially more educated women (p=.04). 
It does, however, suggest that as the bedouin residents of Segev Shalom 
become more formally versed in the Israeli educational system, they are 
not merely learning the “3 Rs.” Rather, the aforementioned statistics ap-
pear to suggest that today’s Negev bedouin, as he or she becomes more 
educated, is also becoming all the more aware of the social, political, and 
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economic inadequacies and injustices that are a part of daily bedouin life 
in Israel. Th e more they learn, the more they see of Jewish society, then the 
more they realize just how much Segev Shalom and the neighboring areas 
are truly lacking and are victims of neglect. As the above has introduced 
and as the following chapter will allow for further extrapolation and explo-
ration, more educational opportunities for the bedouin is a double-edged 
sword, exposing them ever increasingly to new ideas and modes of perceiv-
ing their newly developing identities within a globalizing Israeli context.
As their formal educational experiences expand, so too do their expecta-
tions—expectations that are, to this point at least, largely unmet. Moreover, 
no sector of bedouin society has been impacted more profoundly by the 
changes brought on by the expansion of educational opportunity than bed-
ouin women (see Chapter 6). As each new class entering school each year 
is now 50 percent female, Negev bedouin girls’ and women’s expectations, 
hopes, and dreams for the future bare little resemblance to their moth-
ers’ and grandmothers’ lives. And yet, a variety of barriers and limitations 
remain, which are not easily resolved outside of a modernization-minded, 
Orientalist framework. It is to these issues and challenges that I now turn.
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Negev Bedouin Identity/ies 
Development in Segev Shalom
He who has no sheep has nothing 
— Clinton Bailey, A Culture of Desert Survival: 
Bedouin Proverbs from Sinai and the Negev
Th rough its policy of land confi scation and forced resettlement, it may be 
said that the Israeli state has sought over the past four decades to de-territo-
rialize, control, encapsulate, assimilate, proletarianize, and essentially “de-
bedouinize” this Arab minority community. As this chapter further reveals, 
this active policy of social conquest has had little success in accomplishing 
the state’s sought-after goals, but, rather, has only served to strengthen the 
resolve of the community against these aggressive measures. It has fostered 
unanticipated consequences that, from a Jewish Israeli perspective, are 
problematic at best.
As the following suggests, the social changes fostered by the forced sed-
entarization initiative are manifested by processes of Arabicization and Is-
lamicization, shown in a variety of ways in which the bedouin now express 
their identity/identities, most especially in the public sphere, as a part of 
the Palestinian Arab Muslim minority within Israeli society. An active pol-
icy of half-measures on the part of the state, seen, for example, in the areas 
of health and education provision as discussed in the previous chapter, is 
further elaborated upon in the pages that follow in an attempt to further 
explain this politicization process.
Although it is, of course, risky to speculate about the future direction 
and development of identity/identities development in Segev Shalom, I do 
so here as a corrective to the persistent eff orts by a number of other observ-
ers who show little reluctance to do so. For, while it is clear that a just reso-
lution to the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict would likely be a signifi cant part of 
this process, it is the contention here that all indications suggest that, for 
these Arabs at least, concern over Palestinian statehood, while signifi cant, 
is a low level priority. Rather, the state’s domestic development policies, 
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priorities, and agenda, and not its foreign policy concerns, are central to 
staving off  what is referred to in the mainstream Jewish Israeli academic 
and media publications as an impending “bedouin intifada.”
Th e Re-Defi nition of “Bedouinism” 
in the Twenty-fi rst Century
Before it is possible to deconstruct twenty-fi rst century Negev bedouin 
identity/identities development and composition in the post-nomadic Is-
raeli context, it is fi rst necessary to acknowledge and address the changing 
nature of bedouinism and bedouin behaviors and identity construction, 
which exist throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) today. 
While the bedouin of the Negev are situated in a unique and exceptional 
set of circumstances, their situation must be contextualized within the vast 
set of changes now taking place in bedouin communities throughout the 
region.
One of the most recent and complete analyses of the changing mean-
ing and “fl uidity of Bedouin-ness” is made by Cole (2003). While Cole ac-
knowledges that there are certain cultural markers (hospitality, honor) that 
have historically typifi ed bedouin communities, he states from the outset 
that all/most of bedouin societies and cultures today are in the midst of se-
vere change. Given that bedouinism is a lifestyle and not a national/ethnic 
group,* it is clear that as the bedouin lifestyle changes, so too is the sense 
and expression of identity/identities that go along with it.
Th is is seen most profoundly in the negative manner in which bedouin 
historically viewed settled life. In recent years, bedouin communities through-
out the MENA have accepted a settled lifestyle—some voluntarily, some far 
less so—with the recognition that it allows and facilitates access to public 
services, modern conveniences (Cole 2003: 247), healthcare, education, and 
the like. But such a lifestyle change, Cole argues, in which most bedouin 
today typically reside in permanent housing, where herds may be “visited” 
by family members, but are tended by hired hands for wages (2003: 249), 
suggests that bedouinism, and the nomadic behaviors embedded within it, 
no longer has the resonance or the relevance that it once had.
Bedouin identity in the MENA does continue to be expressed through 
tribal connections, however. Unlike the capitalist West, neither geographic/
residential connections to place, nor one’s occupation, have replaced tribal 
affi  liation as the primary factor in identity construction. And yet, Cole sug-
gests, as bedouinism declines as an economic and social system, “one might 
argue that an emergent ethnicity is replacing tribal identities of the past” 
(2003: 252). 
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Cole is “hesitant to overstress” this new ethnicity as something greater 
than Arabness itself and it need not be viewed as such. But what can be said 
here is that what he is referring to is an “ethnicity” that, unlike the bedou-
inism of the past, may be defi ned by what these post-nomads do not do, or 
are lacking. Th e bedouin of today, he suggests, are those who have an an-
cestral/historical connection to the herd, that is, to those animals they used 
to have (Cole 2003: 259). Th eir identity is based in large part not upon who 
they are, but on who they are not (Cole 2003: 254). In a word, bedouin iden-
tity in the MENA today is being expressed in terms of deprivation, both in 
terms of what was once theirs and is now lost, as well as in relation to that 
which is possessed by those around them (culture, access to wealth, em-
ployment, and so on), motivating them to “rebellion or resistance against 
the dominant political economy” (Cole 2003: 253). 
Th e formulation of communal identity based upon perceptions of: 1) 
who you are, and who you are not, as well as 2) who you perceive yourself 
to be versus who others perceive you to be, is central to the discussion at 
hand. A signifi cant aspect of bedouin identity formulation in Arab states 
stems, in part, from stereotyped images of the bedouin as tribespeople, 
which diff erentiate them from the rest of Arab society (Altorki & Cole 
2006: 649). In the Negev case, however, bedouin identity formulation today 
is almost entirely fostered by external forces, that is, based not only upon 
endogenous changes experienced by similar nomadic peoples throughout 
the Arab Middle East and the world as a whole in the present-day global-
izing era, but, rather, also by exogenous factors rooted in the perceptions 
and fears of others. 
Moreover, much of the academic literature and media well refl ects bed-
ouin identity as one of “other,” developed as a byproduct of the Jewish/
Zionist narrative, rather than as an introspective process to be carried out 
by those actually undergoing the changes within their community. Th is 
narrative is founded largely upon a principle not simply of identifying who 
is to be included in the Israeli collective, but by who is by defi nition outside 
of the collective bounds. Th us, the early Zionist movement’s “institutions 
systematically excluded Arabs since their very raison d’etre was this exclu-
sion” (Shafi r & Peled 2002: 44, emphasis added).
Th is ideology continues to inform present day Israeli discourse. For 
example, as the state seeks to conquer and control land/space, terms such 
as the “Judaization” of Israel/Palestine (Yiftachel 2003: 42) and the “de-
Arabization of space” (27) are bandied about, seemingly suggesting that 
space carries with it the identity of a people, and through the conquest of 
that land, so too are the people, and the identities they hold, erased or 
cleansed, “whited-out,” and replaced with Jewishness. But, of course, the 
identity changes taking place among the bedouin of the Negev today are far 
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more complex and nuanced than this, and such binaries, easy as they may 
be to understand, do not off er a complete picture of the situation at hand. 
For decades, Jewish Israeli scholars have long used such dichotomies 
regularly in their defi nitions of the minorities of Israel, typically present-
ing Arabness as having features which “are often diametric oppositions of 
features many [Jewish] Israelis see as typical of their own identity” (Rabi-
nowitz 2002: 307). Such binaries thereby foster the use of oppositional 
relationships (us/them, modern/traditional, urban/rural, developed/unde-
veloped, advanced/primitive) and so on. In essence, in other words, Jewish 
Israeli scholars have typically presented the Arab minorities as the “anti-
Jews.” Such “anti-Jews” may, Rabinovich argues, be typifi ed as providing 
a counter-narrative to Zionist ideology, as “the underlying emphasis of all 
these features [of Zionism, based] on modernization, hope, and vision is 
implicitly strengthened by the depiction of the ultimate other as possessing 
diametrically opposed characteristics” (2002: 319, emphasis added). 
Th e bedouin of the Negev have long been viewed within this context as 
“peculiar and exotic,” living a “life at the margin … [but in] the process of 
modernization that brings an era to an end” (Rabinowitz 2002: 309–310). 
Meir’s As Nomadism Ends, (1997), is but one of many examples of this tra-
dition-modernity continuum, in which bedouinism is at one end and mod-
ern Jewish Israeli society is at the other, and the “traditional” lifestyle slowly 
but surely ceases to exist as patterns of nomadism weaken and stagnate in 
the face of new processes of sedentarization and development in the mod-
ern Jewish state. 
Th us, concludes Rabinowitz, the Negev bedouin have long been pre-
sented to a receptive Jewish public as both “geographically marginal and 
politically dependent—the opposite of being metropolitan and self-reliant” 
(2002: 317). In order to better understand and contextualize this changing 
sense of identity in Negev bedouin society—as defi ned both internally as 
well as by those outside of the community—it will be helpful to examine 
how identity patterns were fi rst formulated prior to the forced resettlement 
initiative of the 1960s.
Lastly, it must also be recognized that while such identities as “bedouin” 
and “Israeli” are quite slippery and malleable and need not (indeed, should 
not) be equated here with “pastoralist” and “Jew,” respectively, so too are 
such identity markers as “Arab,” “Muslim,” and similar terms subject to a 
wide degree of interpretation. While, quite obviously, the Negev bedouin 
belonged to the larger Arab and Muslim collectives prior to sedentariza-
tion, their senses of identity and membership in and with those collectives 
is undergoing alteration in the post-nomadic period. As but one example, 
the practice of regularly attending formally held religious prayer services 
within a mosque setting is not something that was historically part of bed-
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ouin culture and society. As will be seen below, this has begun to change in 
the settled/urban environment, both a refl ection of, as well as an incubator 
for, the development of a variety of newly developing ideals, values, and 
practices.
Identity in the Negev Before and After De-Territorialization
As discussed in previous works (Dinero 1999; 2004), identity/identities 
formulation among the Negev bedouin was situated within two interre-
lated contexts. At the “micro” level, identity formulation stemmed from 
one’s place within one of three diff erent allied groups, ‘Arab (tribesmen), 
fellahin (peasants), and Abid (blacks/“Africans”). Members of the ‘Arab are 
recognized by the others as the “True” bedouin of the region, with the most 
noble heritage. Th ese tribes originated in the Arabian peninsula (some, like 
the Azazmeh, via the Sinai), most arriving in the Negev beginning in the 
latter years of the eighteenth century (Kressel et al. 1991), likely coinciding 
at some point with Napoleon’s Palestinian ventures (Bailey 1980: 36). 
Ethnicism in bedouin society may be demarcated by the arrival of the 
fellahin to the Negev thereafter in the nineteenth century. Th ey, as well 
as a community of blacks who at one time served as slaves to the “True” 
bedouin, were viewed by the “True” as socially inferior (Marx 1967). Th ese 
black or “African” bedouin had, until slavery was outlawed with the cre-
ation of the state, served in a variety of roles, looking after animals, caring 
for crops, and carrying out household duties (Beckerleg 2007: 295). 
Th is increased social heterogeneity of a previously homogenous society, 
combined with greater population pressure on the land, created new po-
litical tensions and competition from within for scarce resources. As sug-
gested above, this stratifi cation continued to strengthen throughout the 
twentieth century and is manifested today in a variety of developmental 
ways in Segev Shalom and the other planned towns.
In addition to these internal divisions within the in-group, however, 
traditional Negev bedouin identity was also constructed in terms of how 
community members saw themselves in counter-distinction from the out-
group non-bedouin majority around them. Th e Israeli case is complicated 
further by the fact that the non-bedouin, that is, the Jewish Israelis, are also 
non-Arab, non-Muslim, and are historical enemies to both of these lat-
ter groups as a result of the uprooting of the Palestinian Arab population, 
which resulted during the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.
At the “macro” level of the Negev bedouin world, one may identify two 
groups, El-‘Arab (Arabic: Arabs) or El-Bedu (Arabic: the bedouin commu-
nity as a whole), and El-Yahud (Arabic: the Jews). Signifi cantly, one need 
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not embrace the Jewish religion or be an ethnic Jew in order to be consid-
ered a member of the realm of El-Yahud. Th at is, anyone not inside the col-
lective is an outsider and is viewed in opposition to “bedouinness,” at least 
as defi ned within this context. 
Just as bedouin attitudes toward the Jews well typify their minority sta-
tus, Jewish attitudes toward the bedouin similarly fi t the dominant group 
paradigm. Historically, the Arabs of Israel, including the bedouin, have held 
separate identities as compared to Jewish Israelis. Th e inability to access 
“Israeliness” in a nationality sense, due to the separate status held by Israel’s 
Arab citizens, is in part a refl ection of an existing system of inequality and 
seclusion that has plagued the community since the creation of the state 
(Grossman 1993).
Th e issue of Israeli identity, of who is or is not an Israeli, is not easily 
unraveled. Jews who see Israeliness as an extension of Jewishness (or vice 
versa) by defi nition exclude the minorities from the equation altogether. 
Issues related to the Jewish symbolism of what is in truth a binational state, 
such as the National Anthem and the fl ag, off er Jewish Israelis a sense of 
identity that by defi nition excludes the Arab communities. It is important 
to note, however, that an expressed sense of “Israeliness” had slowly been 
on the rise among the Arab communities from the mid 1970s through the 
mid 1990s, but this trend saw a sharp decrease throughout this sector ac-
cording to national polls beginning in the late 1990s (Ghanem & Smooha 
2001).
Moreover, as will be elaborated upon further below, the idea of one see-
ing oneself/being seen as “Israeli” also may be moving toward being a class 
distinction, at least as it is beginning to become manifest within the bed-
ouin community. Th is is signifi cant, stemming from an eff ort on the part of 
Israel’s planners to use the resettlement sites as socializing agents, drawing 
together a number of ‘Arab tribes, as well as fellahi and Abid groups, each 
of which would reside in its own separate neighborhood (Fenster 1991). 
Th e resettlement initiative has torn the bedouin not only from their geo-
graphic roots, but also from their social connections both to one another 
and to the world in which they were formally situated. At the same time, 
new internal relationships between the three sub-groups previously at odds 
with one another, and new connections with the dominant Jewish society 
at large, have begun to take form. Increasingly, evidence suggests that the 
Negev bedouin community is internally divided not as it once was, but, 
rather, between those who have opted for an “urbanized” lifestyle and those 
who continue to resist the government’s relocation initiative. Further, bed-
ouin identity today is increasingly defi ned by interactions with the domi-
nant Jewish society at large.
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Upon fi rst entering bedouin towns today, one is often met with the same 
repeated refrain, here summed up by a Segev Shalom shopkeeper who lives 
in the pezurah, in an encounter I had with him in early March 2007, when 
he confronted me in halting, broken English:
Why did you come here [to Segev Shalom] to learn about the bedouin?! 
You can’t learn anything here! Do you have a car? Drive out there [point-
ing towards the hills to the East], go nearer to the mountains. Th ere, you 
will fi nd bedouin. Not here! When we lived out in the desert, we were free. 
We lived there without limitations. Th at’s not how it is in the town.
Such attitudes are ever-present throughout bedouin society today, and re-
fl ect the views expressed to me years ago that, as the resettlement initiative 
takes hold and the tent becomes a thing of the past, “there are no more 
bedouin” in the Negev (Dinero 1999: 25). 
Haidar, a local café worker in Segev Shalom, was one of many resettled 
informants to affi  rm that town living and the modern values associated with 
it have negatively impacted bedouin life. He states in 2007:
No one just sits and drinks and talks like this anymore. It’s not like fi fteen 
years ago—it was better then—and it was even better fi fteen years before 
that. Today, everyone is running. Th ey run here, they run there. Th ey have 
no time for anything. All anyone does anymore is just run.
While such views can be attributed in part to the nostalgia that many com-
munities tend to fall back upon during times of change and transition, this 
should not in any way weaken the power of the sentiment expressed. If 
nothing else, the fact that such attitudes sound familiar with the worka-
day lifestyle of many Americans and other Westerners only reinforces the 
fact that bedouin identity is not only fl uid and layered, but at times fails to 
connect with the realities of the changes that are now a very real part of 
bedouin lives and lifestyles. 
And yet, from a Jewish planner’s perspective, such changes in who and 
what the bedouin are today well refl ect and further reinforce the rationale 
for the state’s resettlement initiative, essentially confi rming and affi  rming 
the need to facilitate still further the de-nomadization/“modernization” 
planning process, especially among the youth. As Dudu Cohen puts it (24 
April 2007):
It’s clear today that the process that the bedouin are going through is a so-
cietal change, cultural change, mentality change, but apparently, you have 
to go through it. It’s not immediate … and so, it’s clear to every one that 
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it’s a process. It’s a long process that will take its own time … Every society 
adapts diff erently to change of this kind. But in the end it will happen, 
because the bedouin are being absorbed into Jewish Israeli society …
[So now you hear] “Listen, my children want Nike shoes.” Once, bedouin 
didn’t think like this. But because he and his kids are walking around the 
mall in Be’er Sheva, meeting other kids, or his children are studying in 
Omer [sic] and not in Laqiya, suddenly his children think diff erently, [they] 
want diff erent things. So this absorption into the Jewish society, the more 
modern Israeli society, causes the bedouin to ‘go up’ a little bit higher.
Th e planning initiative seeks not only to alter bedouin identity through ex-
posure to “modern Jewish values,” but, similarly, to break down the tradi-
tional divisions between the ‘Arab, fellahi, and Abid sub-groups, “meshing” 
and interweaving them in a manner that will de-emphasize and eventually 
break down the historic/traditional bedouin communal structure (Dinero 
1999: 25–26). Moshe Moshe, a planner for the Bedouin Authority, has sug-
gested that such interactions are similarly playing a role in the development 
of a new bedouin culture and identity (15 February 2007):
Th ere’s another thing here. I’m not pointing this out in a racist way. Davka 
[Hebrew: on the contrary, of all things] the bedouin themselves point this 
out. [And that is that] there are the fellahin. I’ll give you a sentence and 
I don’t care if you quote me anywhere or not, because I say it straight to 
their faces. Th e [‘True’] bedouin is lazy. He doesn’t like to work. He likes it 
when someone else does the work for him. Let him sleep and let him get 
up at 11:00 in the morning and say, “Ya, Daughter, where’s the nargeelah 
[Arabic: water pipe]? And who does the work for him? Th e fellah. So he 
doesn’t have any choice but to put the fellah right next to him. 
Now, if the fellah wasn’t here, what you see here [in the towns] today 
wouldn’t be here. Because he, in essence, gives the stimulation to the 
[‘True’] bedouin to go in the direction of business, the direction of educa-
tional enlightenment. He did that—the fellah. 
As was previously noted, the fellahi bedouin have played a key role in the 
sedentarization process. Still, it is diffi  cult to interpret Moshe’s words as 
less than sharp, even if his sentiment, as well as that of Cohen and other 
government offi  cials, recognizes the signifi cance of the transitions now oc-
curring within bedouin social structures and the identities that these struc-
tures embodied. Th us, this recognition is loaded with certain assumptions, 
ideology, attitudes, and judgments that are often counter-productive to the 
developmental goals that they are charged to fulfi ll.
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Before turning to the quantitative data to further illustrate these changes 
in greater detail, I off er the following unfi ltered views as expressed by an 
ordinary Segev Shalom shop owner (6 March 2007), as they, I believe, stand 
in stark contrast with the perspective of many Jewish State offi  cials. Th e 
views expressed are also useful in the way that this bedouin town dweller, 
without any prompting on my part, summarizes the issues taking place 
within bedouin society, as well as how Jewish Israelis view the bedouin 
within the regional context in which these changes are manifest:
We’re progressing, but we don’t really feel it. In the last ten to fi fteen years, 
people have changed for the worse. In the past, if someone died, no one 
would have a wedding out of respect. Now, someone dies, and their next-
door neighbor will have the wedding [anyway]. Or someone is driving 
to Be’er Sheva and sees someone who needs a ride and drives right past 
them. People think only about themselves now. 
Why? Because of money. In the past, we had very little. Now people have 
quite a bit. But in the past, people would just gather at night in the shiq 
of one of the tents and drink and eat and talk about who was sick, who 
died, who was getting married. Now, in town, everyone has their own shiq 
[Arabic: public sitting area of a tent] in their house. No one sits together. 
Everyone wants to be their own sheikh.
Before the [2000] intifada, we were bedouin, and then there were the Pal-
estinians [in the Territories]. But after the intifada started, they [the Israeli 
Jews] looked at us and looked at them and said ‘you’re Arabs. Th ey are Ar-
abs, you are Arabs, it’s all the same thing.’ [In truth] the Palestinians used to 
live well. Th eir world and our world wasn’t so diff erent. Th ey lived in villas. 
Now, we live in diff erent worlds. Th ings have gotten very bad for them. But 
the Jews here live in a diff erent world than us too. It is like the diff erence 
between ‘the heavens and the earth’ [a reference to the Hebrew bible].
Data Analysis in Segev Shalom: 
Th e Results of De-Bedouinization
Th e qualitative material above provides one aspect of the changing sense 
of identity, as expressed internally and as viewed from outside of the Negev 
bedouin community. Quantitative data gathered over more than a decade 
in Segev Shalom further informs how identity development is being ex-
pressed in the resettled Negev bedouin community.
In order to attempt to parse out how the bedouin see themselves, the 
1996, 2000, and 2007 survey respondents were fi rst asked to provide a one 
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or two word defi nition of themselves and their families (Table 5.1). Such 
labels are one form of expression that can be used, along with other crite-
ria, to measure how one sees oneself and situates oneself within the public 
realm. Such self-labeling suggests shared affi  nities for some groups, as well 
as opposition for still others (i.e., who one “is” and who one “isn’t”). 
While it is clear that the term bedouin was the primary identifying label 
for over three-quarters of the survey respondents in 1996, with one-quarter 
choosing alternative primary labels and over 20 percent not including the 
term bedouin as either a primary or even a secondary term of identity, this 
was no longer true by 2000. Th e term bedouin had been replaced, mostly 
by the term Arab (nearly 40 percent), although Muslim was also chosen by 
more than 20 percent of respondents.
Th e term Israeli, alone or as a suffi  x or prefi x to an identity label, was 
barely mentioned by survey respondents in 1996, short of the 2 percent 
who chose it as a secondary label. Similarly, the term Israeli-Arab, the 
identity label of choice utilized throughout Israeli media and government 
circles, was only cited by 6 percent of the survey respondents as either a 
primary or secondary identity label. Four years later, the identifi er was still 
not used a great deal, though it was chosen by more than 10 percent of the 
survey respondents.
By 2007, the picture of self-identifi cation appeared to be somewhat 
clearer. Th e percentage of those who chose the bedouin identity label were 
virtually unchanged from the 2000 results. Th ose choosing the Palestin-
ian label similarly held somewhat constant over the study period. But what 
has changed signifi cantly is the percentage of those who have chosen the 
Israeli label, which has dropped considerably. More dramatically still, the 
percentage of those now choosing Muslim as their primary identity label, 
50 percent of those surveyed, has risen from less than 10 percent only a de-
cade earlier. I will return to this issue in further detail below. 
Regarding Segev Shalom residents’ sense of belonging to the larger Is-
raeli collective, the respondents’ answers (Table 5.2) confi rm that the vast 
majority of those surveyed in 1996, 2000, and 2007 did not feel that they 
receive equal treatment under the law, despite the fact that they are Israeli 
citizens.
Overall, poorer/lower income residents who are newcomers to the town 
are more likely to state that they feel less equal with other Israelis (p=.05). 
Th e Tarabeen who have been in Segev Shalom the longest are more likely to 
express a greater sense of equality with Jewish Israelis than Tarabeen new-
comers (p=.04). Th e number that answered “yes” to the question, roughly 
20 percent, is just slightly lower than statistics from similar studies asking 
similar questions about bedouin sense of well-being and inclusion (ex. 29 
percent; see Abu-Saad, Yonah, and Kaplan 2000: 57). Although it is appar-
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Table 5.1. Identity Labels
 1996 (N=102) 2000 (N=144) 2007 (N=232)
Arab 0.0 0.0 1.3
Arab Palestinian 0.0 3.5 0.4
Arab Muslim 2.9 21.5 12.5
Arab bedouin 0.0 3.5 2.6
Arab Israeli; Arab Palestinian-
 Israeli; Arab Israeli-Arab 0.0 9.0 1.7
 —ARAB total  2.9 37.5 18.5
Palestinian 0.0 0.0 1.7
Palestinian-Israeli 7.8 1.4 1.3
Palestinian Arab  0.0 1.4 0.9
Palestinian Israeli-Arab; Muslim 0.0 4.9 2.6
 Palestinian Bedouin  0.0 0.7 0.4
 —PALESTINIAN total  7.8 8.4 6.9
Muslim 0.0 0.0 11.6
Muslim Arab  3.9 9.7 14.7
Muslim Palestinian  1.0 2.1 4.3
Muslim Bedouin  2.9 9.0 12.9
Muslim Israeli; Muslim Israeli-
 Arab; Muslim Palestinian-Israeli  1.0 1.4 6.1
 —MUSLIM total  8.8 22.2 49.6
Bedouin 33.3 0.0 3.4
Bedouin Arab  22.5 2.8 3.0
Bedouin Palestinian   0.0 1.4 0.4
Bedouin Muslim 15.7 8.3 9.9
Bedouin Israeli; Bedouin Israeli-
 Arab; Bedouin Palestinian-Israeli  3.9  6.9 2.1
 —BEDOUIN total 75.4 19.4 19.0
Israeli-Arab 2.9 3.5 0.4
Israeli Muslim 0.0 0.0 0.4
Israeli Bedouin 0.0 4.2 0.4
Israeli Israeli-Arab; 
 Israeli-Arab Israeli 0.0 0.0 1.8
Israeli-Arab Muslim 0.0 4.9 0.4
Israeli-Arab Bedouin 0.0 0.0 2.7
 —ISRAELI total  2.9 12.6 6.1
Other  2.2 0.0 0.0
Sources: Dinero, S.C. “Reconstructing Identity Th rough Planned Resettlement: Th e Case of 
the Negev Bedouin,” Th ird World Planning Review, 21/1, 1999: 19–39; “New Identity/Identities 
Formulation in a Post-Nomadic Community: Th e Case of the Bedouin of the Negev,” National 
Identities, 6/3, 2004: 261–275, and Dinero, S.C. 2007 Segev Shalom Household Survey.
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ent that this sentiment is slowly on the decline for men and women alike, 
this contention was found to cut across age, gender, and educational lines.
As for expressed identifi cation in religious (i.e., Muslim) terms, the 1996 
survey found that use of one of the town mosques was relatively evenly 
divided (Table 5.3), with half of the respondents (or, in the case of female 
respondents, their husbands) attending regularly, and half attending rarely 
or not at all. Interestingly, the percentage of those surveyed attending the 
mosque dropped slightly in the year 2000. By 2007, however, the trend re-
versed itself substantially, with nearly 75 percent of respondents claiming 
regular religious participation.
Other factors related to religious observance are also relevant here. Th ose 
in the 1996 survey who identifi ed as bedouin fi rst (more than 75 percent of 
all respondents), rather than as Arabs or Muslims, were signifi cantly more 
likely to be polygynous (p=.04). Th at is, bedouinness and the “traditional” 
bedouin practice of having multiple wives were clearly interconnected.
And yet, by 2000, the bedouin label was far less signifi cant in terms of its 
connection to polygynous practice. However, those who were polygynous 
were found to be less likely to identify themselves using the suffi  x, prefi x, or 
label Israeli, preferring the descriptors Arab, Palestinian, Muslim, or bed-
ouin instead (p=.03).
Th e 2007 data reveals some interesting twists in this evolving sense of 
self-identity as it relates to religious practices and behaviors. For example, 
Table 5.2. Do You Feel that You are Treated Equally with Other Israelis?
 1996 (N=102) 2000 (N=149) 2007 (N=221)
 M F M F M F
No 80 72 78 67 69 62
Yes  9 13 15 15 15 23
Don’t know 11 15  7 18 16 15
Sources: 1996, 2000, 2007 Segev Shalom Surveys.
Table 5.3. Stated Regularity of Mosque Attendance/Religious Participation 
of Respondent/Family Members
 1996 (N=102) 2000 (N=148) 2007 (N=236)
Regular/frequent 48 42 69
Irregular/never 51 58 25
No response/missing  1  0  6
Sources: 1996, 2000, 2007 Segev Shalom Surveys.
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those choosing the term bedouin as a primary label were found to fre-
quent the mosque more often than those choosing the other identity labels 
(p=.03), most especially those over the age of 40 (p=.01). However, the re-
lationship between self-expressed identity and polygyny was to take a turn 
in the 2007 data. Th ose in polygynous households were now found to be 
more likely to choose the Israeli label as a secondary label (p=.03) than the 
other identity labels, a total reversal from the previous fi ndings. Th is was 
especially true for those under 40 years of age (p=.02), who are members of 
the Azazmeh tribe (p=.01), with higher overall household incomes (p=.05) 
in the town. 
In other words, “Israeliness,” based upon this piece of data at least, ap-
pears to be evolving into an identity of youth and economic success, ex-
pressed by these polygynous respondents (see Dinero 2006, for further 
discussion) in what those in the West might deem a manner of “conspicu-
ous consumption.” Th ough it is a small N (only 47 respondents), a corre-
lation was also found between those who are polygynous and those who 
chose an Israeli label for their primary identity (p=.04) as well. I will return 
to this issue of Israeli identity in further detail below.
Another way of formally expressing one’s identity or connection to the 
larger collective is through political party preference (see Shafi r and Peled 
2002: 91–92; Smooha & Ghanem 2001) and other similar mechanisms such 
as voting participation. Such indicators, along with serving in the military, 
may be viewed as signs of “participation in the democratic process” (Al-
torki and Cole 2006: 646), or, put another way, as the bedouin’s exercis-
ing their sense of citizenship and identity within the larger national, rather 
than tribal, collective. 
It has been documented in the media and elsewhere that during the pe-
riod of this study, overall Negev bedouin support for the Jewish/Zionist 
political parties declined signifi cantly, paralleling the pattern found among 
the other Arab minorities, whose support for the Jewish/Zionist parties 
has similarly declined during this period (see Ghanem & Smooha 2001). In 
1992, for example, 17 percent of the bedouin voted for the Labour Party (Il-
lustration 5.1); in the 1996 election, this number declined to only 9 percent 
(“Comptroller Blasts Government…,” 6 May 2002). Structural electoral re-
form in the early 1990s allowed the bedouin to vote for the Arab parties 
in large numbers thereafter, splitting their preference for Knesset repre-
sentation—which saw 60 percent support for the United Arab List in 1996 
and 72.5 percent for the Arab parties in 1999—and that for Prime Min-
ister, which continued to favor the Labour candidate (Parizot 2006: 184). 
Choosing from the Arab party lists has increased signifi cantly since the Six 
Day War (ICG Report 2004: 5), and, in the most recent election in which 
Likud’s Benyamin Netanyahu ultimately was able to form a ruling coalition 
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(2009), the Arab parties received virtually all of the bedouin vote (“How 
Th ey Voted…,” 17 February 2009).
Like party choice, voting participation patterns have long been informed, 
in part, by a lack of direct bedouin buy-in at the local level. As noted in 
Chapter 3, Segev Shalom and the other neighboring bedouin towns were 
not governed by local bedouin offi  cials until the elections of Fall 2000 (see 
“Four Negev Bedouin towns hold fi rst local polls,” 19 September 2000). 
Th us, the impact of instituting local control cannot be overstated. Th e 2000 
elections and those that have occurred since have served to give the bed-
ouin direct rule over their own communities and destinies, not only refl ect-
ing “rights and recognition” so essential to a communal sense of respect 
and honor, but, further, they have also provided the community with a new 
vehicle through which to express their newly developing sense of post-
nomadic bedouin identity.
Th e data gathered in Segev Shalom bear out these contentions. Th e 1996 
voting rate as determined by the survey results (Table 5.4) was quite similar 
to previous Arab community participation rates. A number of signifi cant 
correlations concerning voting patterns also were found among the Segev 
Shalom survey data. Men, for example, were found to be more likely to vote 
than women (p=.03); in some instances, women who voted stated that their 
husbands coerced them in their voting choices, a phenomenon that has 
Illustration 5.1. Arabic and Hebrew Election Poster in a Bedouin Town: “A 
Strong Israel with Peres”—1996
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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been documented in other bedouin towns as well (Marteu 2005: 281). Also, 
those whose primary identity label was bedouin were more likely to have 
voted than those with other labels such as Arab or Muslim (p=.00).
Voter participation in the 1999 election in which Ehud Barak was elected 
Prime Minister found similar, though clearly lower, voting participation 
rates for men and women alike. Th at said, those using the Israeli identifi er 
were more likely to have voted than others (p=.01), although those prefer-
ring the label Arab, Muslim, or bedouin voted at relatively high rates as 
well. Only those using the label Palestinian, some of whom are in fact the 
second and third wives of bedouin men (who are, of course, Israeli citi-
zens), may not be citizens of Israel, and therefore were less likely to have 
voted than others in the survey.
Th e 2007 data sheds further light upon these voting patterns. Although a 
small percentage of the overall population, those choosing bedouin as their 
primary identity label tended to participate more in the electoral process 
than those using other identity labels (p=.01). Th ose selecting the Israeli la-
bel, conversely, were less likely to have voted (p=.03), particularly members 
of the Azazmeh tribe (p=.02), and those under the age of 40 (p=.03). Th ose 
stating a preference for the Israeli identity label, however, were, predictably 
more likely to support the Jewish/Zionist parties rather than the Arab or 
Muslim parties (p=.01). Th is was especially true of those under 40 (p=.01) 
and the Tarabeen (p=.00). Lastly, amongst the Tarabeen (though not the 
Azazmeh), those with higher household incomes had a higher tendency to 
participate in elections than those from poorer households (p=.01). 
Finally, among those recent arrivals to the town (arriving within the past 
10 years), the Azazmeh respondents were signifi cantly more likely to favor 
the Jewish/Zionist parties or, even more likely, to state “no party is any 
good,” when asked which party is best able to represent the interests of the 
bedouin community. Conversely, newcomer Tarabeen tended to favor the 
Arab/Muslim parties (p=.05). Other than time living in the town, no other 
factor was found that presented a signifi cant diff erence between the tribe 
members’ party preferences. 
Voting patterns refl ect a general trend toward an increased sense of ex-
clusion and disenfranchisement. Although Parizot has argued that voting 
Table 5.4. Segev Shalom Voting Participation
 1996 (N=105) 2000 (N=149) 2007 (N=234)
 M F M F M F
Yes 86 63 77 56 61 63
No 13 35 23 44 32 32
Missing/no response  1  2  0  0  7 49
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among the bedouin has been used in the planned towns as “an act of re-
sistance” (2006: 195) and an eff ort to exercise communal will against state 
interests, it remains the case that the bedouin of the Negev “have limited 
infl uence over national politics considering the little weight of their vote” 
(Parizot 2006: 200). Nationally, it can be said that “most Arabs in Israel 
have no confi dence in government policy” (Ghanem & Smooha 2001), and 
this can be measured in part in the bedouin sector by looking at Table 5.5. 
While it is premature to determine any distinct trend in resident responses, 
overall satisfaction with the government’s ability or willingness to respond 
to bedouin needs, at least for the moment, has dropped relative to previ-
ous responses, and is quite low in any case (roughly one out of four or fi ve 
respondents). 
A fi nal survey question concerning political attitudes toward the in-
creasingly popular Islamic parties in Israel further adds to the above data. 
Respondents were asked to state to what degree they agreed with the fol-
lowing statement: “Th e Islamic parties are well-suited to represent the inter-
ests of the bedouin community.” Over half of the Segev Shalom respondents 
agreed with the statement in 1996 (Table 5.6), and about one-third dis-
agreed with it. While the percentage of males agreeing with this statement 
rose substantially in 2000, women’s rates of agreement declined.
By 2007, tribe, education, and income all appeared to now inform the 
rising sense of support for these Islamic parties. Members of the Tarabeen 
tribe, for example, who preferred the primary identity label of bedouin, 
showed some greater likelihood of supporting the Islamic parties, although 
the correlation was not that strong (p=.05). Education proved a stronger 
factor, however; more educated men were more likely to favor the Islamic 
parties than the less educated (p=.02). Th ose with higher incomes in the 
town were also more likely to express such sentiments of support (p=.00). 
Th e 2007 data also off ers some insights into the characteristics of those 
respondents who are most likely to view the government in a positive light. 
Th e longer one lives in Segev Shalom, for example, the more likely it ap-
Table 5.5. Is Th e Present National Government Working for the Social/
Economic Interests of the Bedouin Community? (Prime Minister During 
Survey Period in Italics)
 1996 2000 (N=150) 2007 (N=236)
  Ehud Barak Ehud Olmert
Yes n/a 25 17
No n/a 51 59
Don’t know/missing n/a 24 24
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pears that a respondent might off er a more favorable view of the National 
Government’s development eff orts in the bedouin sector (p=.03). Th is was 
especially true of women (p=.01), low income residents (p=.04), and re-
spondents under 40 years of age (p=.05). And yet, this does not provide a 
full picture of the situation there. Some fi nal correlations may shed yet fur-
ther light on the issue, namely, comparing how respondents in Segev Sha-
lom answered the above questions as compared to those in the neighboring 
pezurah areas. When asked the same questions, several distinctions were 
found between the residents living in the two residential environments.
First, residents of the town were far more likely to express criticism of 
the government and its bedouin-related policies than those living in the 
pezurah (p=.01). Second, it was found that male respondents living in the 
town also were more likely to express more frequent mosque attendance 
than those living in the periphery (p=.02). Th at said, male town residents 
were less likely to express support for the Islamic parties than those re-
spondents living in the peripheral settlements (p=.01), and both male and 
female town residents were more likely to state that they feel equal with 
other Israelis than those living in the periphery (p=.00). Th ese statistical 
correlations each provide an indication of ways in which living in the town 
is serving as a forum for assimilation as initially envisioned by the state 
planning authorities. And yet, to a degree, there are also signs of ways in 
which the towns may be acting as an arena of politicization and further 
contestation of power in the Negev environment.
Identity as an Expression of Lifestyle and Material Wealth
Overall, the descriptive statistics cited above suggest a shifting sense of 
identity among the bedouin community of Segev Shalom—which may, to 
some degree, be a barometer for changes throughout the community as a 
whole. As noted above, the most obvious change found over the past de-
cade and a half is the fact that increasingly, bedouin identity is on the de-
Table 5.6. Expressed Belief that the Islamic Parties Can Help Further the 
Interests of the Bedouin Community
 1996 (N=102) 2000 (N=148) 2007 (N=236)
 M F M F M F
Agree 34 78 56 51 51 49
Disagree 46 12 32 27 32 32
Don’t know 20   9 12 19 17 19
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cline, being replaced mostly by expressed identities as Muslims and, to a 
lesser degree, Arabs.
As noted, this sentiment is not only measured in terms of the labels with 
which the bedouin choose to describe themselves, but in terms of their 
behaviors, attitudes, practices, and beliefs. As a formerly nomadic, now 
settled, “modernizing” population, the material wealth one has acquired 
in the resettled environment also says something about who one is, and 
how one perceives oneself in the ever-evolving global economy. Use of edu-
cation, healthcare, and other government-provided facilities, all of which 
were initiated as part of the larger planning agenda, further reveal ways in 
which change and adaptation play a role in the formulation of the “New 
Negev Bedouin” identity.
In each survey period, respondents’ choices of primary identity labels 
say much not only about how they see themselves, but also how such views 
are shaped by personal life situations in the resettled environment. In some 
instances, correlations between identity formulation and life circumstances 
were reaffi  rmed in follow-up surveys, while in other instances, other fi nd-
ings became apparent. 
I have noted previously (Dinero 2004), for example, that those who chose 
the primary label of “bedouin” had lower incomes than others in the 2000 
survey (p=.01). As a result, they were less likely to own such non-essential 
material goods as a DVD/VCR (p=.04), car (males, p=.05) or TV satellite 
dish (males, p=.05). And yet, despite their economic situation, these re-
spondents were less likely to raise or grow crops in the town (olives, fruits, 
vegetables; p=.03) as a means of supplementing their incomes.  
In 2007, those respondents who chose the term “bedouin” as their pri-
mary identity label were isolated out from the rest of the respondents for 
analysis. Again, it was found that this group was less likely to own a DVD/
VCR (p=.02), less likely to own a car (p=.01), less likely to own a TV sat-
ellite dish (p=.03), less likely to own a clothes washing machine (p=.00), 
and less likely to own a personal computer (p=.01) than those choosing 
the other identity labels. Azazmeh tribal members choosing the “bedouin” 
label were also less likely to own a refrigerator (p=.01). 
As for attitudes toward local services provision, in previous surveys (see 
Dinero 1999; 2004), those identifying as “bedouin” rated facilities in the 
town, such as the health clinics (p=.02), the mosque (women, p=.02), and 
other social welfare services (p=.01), lower than other respondents. More-
over, those using primary identity labels (Israeli, Israeli Arab, and Pales-
tinian Israeli) were quite similar to those who prefer the primary identity 
label of bedouin. Th ose using one of the “Israeli” labels were more likely 
to be critical of town services, such as water service (male, p=.04) and the 
mosque (male, p=.01), in previous surveys. Th ose who used an “Israeli” 
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identifi er were most critical of the town government overall (p=.01) and 
more likely to state that the government’s willingness to respond to resi-
dent complaints was no diff erent or even worse than in the past (p=.01) 
when the town was governed a Regional Council, Masos, headed by a Jew-
ish Rosh Ha’Moatzah, Ilan Sagie. 
Previous fi ndings (Dinero 2004) found that those identifying as Israelis 
tended to live in the town the longest (p=.01), perhaps validating the state’s 
original bedouin town planning agenda of converting the Negev bedouin 
into “Israelis.” Further, at that time, no respondent using the “Israeli” label 
stated that they came to the town “by force,” but rather, stated that they 
relocated seeking the presumed QOL improvements and opportunities of-
fered by town living. 
 In the most recent 2007 survey, much of this sentiment was to change, 
and some clarifi cation appears to now be in order. First, it is becoming 
increasingly evident that those who identify as bedouin and those who 
identify as Israelis have now begun to diverge in terms of their viewpoints, 
lifestyles, and perceived sense of QOL. A signifi cant diff erence can now be 
discerned between those choosing the bedouin label and those choosing 
the Israeli label and how they rate service provisions, such as water (p=.05); 
those who view themselves as Israelis are more critical of such services in 
town, especially the Azazmeh (p=.05). 
Second, as noted above, “Israeliness” is increasingly being equated with 
success and having “made it,” while “bedouinness” seems to be connected 
increasingly with the sense of what one lacks or has lost, materially or oth-
erwise. Th us, it was found in 2007 that those choosing the Israeli identity 
labels were also more likely to be employed in wage labor positions than 
those calling themselves bedouin (p=.04).
Th ose who chose the bedouin label tend to claim that they relocated 
seeking a better QOL, or because of a family decision, while those who 
see themselves as Israelis are now more likely to state that they came due 
to government force, (p=.02). Th is evolving attitude, which was not pres-
ent in previous survey fi ndings, is especially apparent among the Azazmeh 
(p=.02), and those aged 40 and older (p=.01)—that is, the “founding fa-
thers” of Segev Shalom who have been there the longest and are, in truth, 
the most successful and prosperous. Th e 2007 data confi rm that those 
choosing the Israeli label are more likely to have lived in town longer than 
the other respondents (11 years or more, i.e., since 1996; p=.04).
What then is one to make of all of these fi ndings? As the bedouin move 
rapidly away from its historic pastoral nomadic roots and into the unknown, 
it is clear that identity issues—indeed, an internal identity crisis—will con-
tinue to plague the community. Th is evolving sense of who/what a bedouin 
is will likely take generations fully to be resolved. In the meantime, how-
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ever, what is evident by all accounts is the fact that, as a new sense of “bed-
ouinness” and “Israeliness” struggle to gain traction due to the slippery and 
uncertain nature of what these identities truly connote, what is fl ourishing 
throughout the community is a growing sense of Muslim identity, which is 
manifest in virtually every aspect of Negev bedouin life. As Abu-Saad, et 
al. affi  rm, “those unable to identify with the national corporate identity of 
the state [will] ultimately seek out other corporate identities with which to 
identify, such as the Islamic movement and Palestinian nationalism” (2000: 
59). 
While the data from the past surveys reveals that Palestinian national-
ism is not strongly expressed in Segev Shalom, the rise of Muslim identity is 
considerable, and a force that requires further discussion. It is to this topic 
that I now turn.
Islamicization and the “Inevitability” of a Bedouin Intifada
It has been my contention for some years that, though the bedouin have 
been cut from their traditional spatial, social, and economic connections 
with the ongoing resettlement initiative, they have not become integrated 
into the larger Israeli collective (Dinero 1999; 2004). Rather than align with 
Jewish Israeli society, the bedouin have been drawn to the Arab and Muslim 
worlds with which they hold a common sense of social and economic status 
and identity, built in large part upon shared opposition with the dominant, 
Jewish Israeli State apparatus.
Th e issue of Islamicization within bedouin societies in Palestine is not 
new. Layish (1984) was one of the fi rst to document this phenomenon in 
the early 1980s in the nearby bedouin community in the Palestinian West 
Bank. While Layish noted that popular “folk” beliefs and practices “still 
reign supreme” (1984: 39) and that there was only “superfi cial orthodoxy” 
apparent among the bedouin of the Judean Desert at that time, he clearly 
detected an increasing movement toward the embracing of orthodox Mus-
lim values, ideals, and behaviors, most especially as seen through the in-
creasing reliance and use of the then nascent shariah court system. His 
explanation for this development was straightforward: as these nomads 
began to settle, they came into more regular contact with orthodox Islam. 
Further, the more settled bedouin had greater access to formal education, 
both in their secular as well as religious studies (Layish 1984: 39). Th us, he 
concluded, “above all what brings the Bedouin closer to orthodox Islam are 
the exigencies of the modern state” (Layish 1984: 40).
Sheikh Salam Abu-Kalif, Imam of the central mosque (Illustration 5.2) 
in Segev Shalom since 1992, off ers an explanation (28 June 2007) for the 
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increasing level of Muslim practices, observance, and identity in the Ne-
gev bedouin community that parallels Layish’s observations nearly 25 years 
earlier—that is, that the foundation is rooted in the formalized educational 
opportunities brought about through resettlement. He states:
In 1983, there were no mosques in the Negev bedouin community. People 
in those days didn’t [even] know the mourning prayers to recite when 
someone died. Th ey were ignorant, uneducated. But around then ten 
mosques were built [nearly all in the planned towns]. And today there are 
many, in the towns and outside. Th e population has grown so much since 
then. How old is someone born in ’83—24, 25? 
And these young people, what do they want? Th ey feel the need to con-
nect to the Quran. Slowly but surely people want to know more, they want 
to learn, to learn the prayers, to learn how to pray. Th ey want to read
… Yes, there are some people who still do not understand Islam … But 
this is mostly among the older people, those who are illiterate, who are 
uneducated.
Th e above quantitative data con-
fi rm the Sheikh’s point, reveal-
ing that the bedouin today are 
showing an increased sensed of 
identity with the Muslim world 
through their stated sense of 
identity, their voting patterns, 
preferences, and so on. 
Further, they are behaving in 
ways that solidify this connec-
tion; mosque attendance, po-
lygyny, veiling in full hijab and 
niqab (Arabic: modesty dress, 
see Chapter 6), and omra and 
haj participation have all in-
creased substantially over the 
past decade, as the bedouin 
feel a sense of identity and af-
fi nity with the greater Muslim 
world—and, incidentally, they 
have the ability because of ac-
cess to global media (El-Jazeera, 
El-Arabiyya) and improved re-
lations with the Arab states to 
Illustration 5.2. Central Mosque, Segev 
Shalom
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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interact with neighboring Muslim communities who themselves now es-
pouse a sense of heightened Muslim awareness. 
Th e involvement of the Islamic movement in local bedouin politics, a 
process that evolved in the 1980s but truly began to develop fully in the 
1990s (Marteu 2005: 280) as the research for this book was under way, is 
both a cause and an eff ect of these developments. Th e movement is now 
able to make inroads into the community as a result of these changes, and 
in cyclical fashion, it is able to further a more Islamicist, nationalist agenda, 
which does raise concern when it often presents a perspective that is “alien-
ated and opposed to the character of the State” (Ghanem & Smooha 2001). 
Jewish Israelis are, of course, aware of the changes in bedouin social 
behaviors and values. In some instances, government leaders further add 
to this dynamic by instilling fear, concern or distrust about the role and 
growth of the Arab communities (ICG 2004: 19). And yet, rather than see 
their role in the politicization of the bedouin community resulting in large 
part from the forced settlement and dislocation of this historically quies-
cent, insolated population, the state and Jewish citizenry alike have instead 
begun a campaign of “awareness” in preparation for what is believed to be 
an inevitable “bedouin intifada” (“A Beduin Powder Keg…,” 8 September 
2003; “Th e Bedouin intifada: It’s not if, but when,” 27 May 2004). Th e rapid 
increase in the bedouin population, one of the highest in the world, only 
further adds to their fears and is described increasingly as a “demographic 
time bomb.” Jewish Israeli media and even a few academics are complicit 
in this trend, increasingly emphasizing the “non-Israeli” nature of bedouin 
voting behaviors, rising Muslim behaviors, and the like.
One of the foremost academics in this regard is Professor Arnon Soff er 
of the Geography Department at Haifa University. In an oft-cited publi-
cation (mentioned, for example, in “Th e Bedouin intifada: It’s not if, but 
when,” 27 May 2004) entitled, “Trends among the Bedouin in the northern 
Negev—A threat to the entire Negev,” he writes that:
It is no longer possible to postpone addressing the Bedouin problem, un-
less Israeli leaders are prepared to throw up their hands and relinquish the 
entire Negev … In the Negev, there is a combination of the wildest demo-
graphics in modern history (and, perhaps, all time) with physical expan-
sion over land to an extent and with audacity unwitnessed until now. 
Both of these phenomena have been accompanied by acts of crime and 
terror. Th e entire establishment responds to this development with a 
show of weakness and trembling knees, and does not know what to do. 
Th e Bedouin understand all too well, and the Negev has descended into 
anarchy.
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Th e “anarchy” he refers to may take many forms, all of which, in his opinion, 
are examples that the “intifada” is not “on its way,” but rather, has already ar-
rived (Soff er, 21 June 2007). Burglaries, car thefts, vandalism—what might 
in the West be referred to as “petty crime”—has taken on nationalistic pro-
portions in today’s Negev. In a particularly well-known case, for example, 
investigators attributed disappearing road signs in the Negev to bedouin 
who, they suggested, sought through their theft to either encourage an in-
crease in road accidents, or, alternatively, to smuggle the metal from the 
signs to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in order to make more 
Qassam rockets to be used against Israel (“Th e Bedouin intifada: It’s not if, 
but when,” 27 May 2004). 
Statistics also are bandied about in order to prove the “disloyalty” of 
the bedouin and their outsider status vis-à-vis the dominant mainstream 
Israeli society. A Haifa University survey fi nding, that 42 percent of the 
Negev bedouin reject Israel’s right to exist (Ghanem & Smooha 2001), for 
example, is used in the media (“Th ere’s a limit even to Bedouin patience,” 
20 March 2002) to further this point, though it is not clear from this fi nding 
whether those sampled were town dwellers, those living in unrecognized, 
“illegal” pezurah communities subject to demolition (some 40 percent of 
the bedouin population), or both. 
Th us, while one might argue that such charges of bedouin disloyalty 
leading to hostility, violence or worse are speculative at best, this sort of 
paranoia is increasingly commonplace throughout the Negev, if not the 
country. As a result, policies against the bedouin, all in the name of “se-
curity,” are making the lives of the bedouin increasingly diffi  cult, as Jewish 
Israelis continue to “otherize” them in ever increasing ways. 
Beyond offi  cial policy, public sentiment is similarly informed by these 
views. Perhaps the most infamous example of this sentiment is the case 
of Shai Dromi, a Jewish Israeli rancher who accidentally killed a would-be 
sheep thief, a bedouin, when he shot at him as he fl ed Dromi’s ranch in 
early 2007. In a matter of days, Dromi’s story became an instant cause cele-
bre (“License to Kill?,” 17 February 2007). Hebrew bumper stickers sporting 
the text “We are All Shai Dromi” were seen throughout the Negev soon 
after the event (“Th e Wild South,” 1 March 2007), as support swelled for 
Dromi’s immediate release from jail for what was viewed as a fully justifi ed 
act, and not a crime. 
One fi nal example of the degree to which Jewish paranoia, “otheriza-
tion,” racism, or possibly a combination of all of these, is directed toward 
the bedouin is the publication in the summer of 2008 that a new program 
had been launched in the Qiryat Gat schools aimed at discouraging Jewish 
girls from developing “romantic” relationships with bedouin men (“Video: 
Kiryat Gat…,” 1 July 2008). Designed to warn “innocent” girls about these 
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“exploitative Bedouin,” a video entitled Sleeping with the Enemy was de-
signed and shown by the program creators in cooperation with local po-
lice and government agencies in an eff ort to encourage them to steer clear 
of this “abnormal phenomenon.” Th e video explains how girls need to “be 
careful” of encounters with such men, for, as Chaim Shalom of the Qiryat 
Gat Department of Welfare Services explains it, “[the Jewish girl] goes to 
bed with the enemy, and she doesn’t even know it.” 
Th e bedouin are, of course, well aware of how they are viewed in Jewish 
Israeli society. Saeed El-Harumi, Rosh Ha’Moatzah of Segev Shalom, put 
it simply, stating (28 May 2007): “when they look at us, everything they 
see that is diff erent [from them] they determine that it is either ‘extreme’ 
or ‘stupid.’” Kher El-Baz, Director of Social Services in the town, states 
his view about the “otherization” of bedouin identity more bluntly (3 June 
2007; emphasis added):
Th e way Jewish society sees us is much worse than in the past. Th is is im-
portant in terms of the welfare of my community, as well as the welfare of 
the bedouin as Israelis, in terms of how they see themselves. It’s like when 
I go to the airport, and I’m treated a certain way. I very much respect secu-
rity, I care about security, I need it, I benefi t from security, but what they 
do to us is not about security. Th ey know it and we know it … 
Six or seven years ago it wasn’t this bad, but in the last year or so it’s re-
ally gotten worse. Th is to me is an indication that things in general are 
worse. And this happens with my credentials. So how is it for others? So 
our place here, how people feel toward us, is worse I think. Money alone 
won’t change this, it’s about perception. Th ings like the media have to also 
help.
If you are a good Zionist, this situation here shouldn’t be OK. You 
shouldn’t feel that this is acceptable. Not that some of us are not to blame, 
but policymakers are the ones who can make the diff erence … No other 
community in Israel has tried harder to become part of Israeli society than 
the bedouin—to gain a sense of belonging. Th e Jews are drafted, but the 
bedouin will volunteer for the Army, just to belong. We do this because 
we want to, not because we have to. So what else can we do? Ask what the 
bedouin feel about their citizenship these days and you’ll get some ‘weird’ 
answers.
Th ough many are cognizant of these prevailing concerns as minority citi-
zens in a Jewish State, this process of “otherizing” has, it seems, taken on a 
far greater edge in recent days. As Kher El-Baz concludes (3 June 2007):
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Th e Jews are using the fear of Arabs or Muslims to make life here miser-
able. I ask you, “do I, as a bedouin, have a right to feel like a human being 
or not?” And furthermore, Do they see us as citizens, or as enemies?
Th ere are few answers here, and the trends that appear to be underway 
amount to a fait accompli. Other bedouin informants, for example, are 
ready to make the Jewish Israelis’ policies and behaviors self-fulfi lling 
prophecies. Perhaps a fi nal statement (6 March 2007) from a 33-year-old 
named Yusuf who lives in Bir Hadaj, a recently recognized Abu-Basma 
bedouin settlement some 20 kilometers south of Segev Shalom, may best 
sum up how many in the bedouin sector see themselves and their newly 
developing identities as refl ected back to them through the looking glass of 
Jewish Israeli society:
Th ere are over 1,000 people here [in Bir Hadaj] and yet, we have no elec-
tricity service. It’s the 2000s, and we are the only people in the world who 
still have no electricity. How can this be? Th is is supposed to be a democ-
racy! Th ere is a Jew who lives here in the area who has electricity, water, 
everything! But the 1,000 bedouin here have nothing. Th is is a democ-
racy? Th is is not a democracy. Israel is like Iraq under Saddam. Th ere is 
no democracy here.
And there is no work here. Th e Jews say we are all thieves and deal drugs. 
Yes, it’s true, they are right. And you know why? Because of them! Because 
we have no choices. Give us all the chance to work and no one will be sell-
ing drugs. But when you need clothes and food and you want things like 
everyone else has, you choose what you have to choose.
I defended this country. I am a citizen—look at this [he says, showing me 
his teudat zehut, his Israeli photo I.D.], you see, it says ‘Medinat Yisrael’ 
[Hebrew: the State of Israel]. But I am really just a guest here. Where can 
we go? Gaza? Th ere’s a war there. And besides, this is my country. I fought 
them [the Palestinians] in the Army to be here—why should I now have to 
go somewhere else? But we have no future in this country. One day there 
is going to be a ha’fl a’a [Arabic: lit., a big party, that is, a battle] between 
the bedouin and the Jews, or maybe all the Arabs here. You see, there’s 
just no hope for us.
Data collected in Segev Shalom and the neighboring pezurah suggest that 
for the moment, such views are, fortunately, exceptional. But the level 
of fear and resentment is growing, and with it, uncertainty has created a 
sense of anomie that cannot be overlooked. As the previous chapters have 
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shown, role changes are manifest in every aspect of Negev bedouin society 
today. But, as the following chapter reveals, none are as relevant, signifi cant 
or profound as those relating to the changing role of the Negev bedouin 
woman. 
N
*And, thus, the word “bedouin” is in lower case throughout this text, except when 
quoted.
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Th e Resettled Bedouin Woman
He who collects more wives begets more men
— Clinton Bailey, A Culture of Desert Survival: 
Bedouin Proverbs from Sinai and the Negev
As the previous chapter has shown, resettlement has fostered a variety of 
social changes in Negev bedouin life, manifested within a nexus of mecha-
nisms through which new bedouin identity/identities formulations have 
begun to emerge. Much of the rapid change associated with the resettle-
ment initiative also has been manifested through the socially and politically 
contested environment of gender relations and role change. In previous 
studies (Dinero 1997; 2006), I have analyzed these evolving gender roles in 
the Negev bedouin community as well as the changing role of marital dy-
namics, most especially as seen in the rise in polygynous marriage. In this 
chapter, I strengthen this argument considerably with additional analysis, 
using quantitative and qualitative data gathered in Segev Shalom in 2007 
through both the household survey and a series of Bedouin Womens’ Fo-
cus Groups (BWFG) developed for this aspect of the study, seeking to de-
fi ne, measure, and further explain these ever-changing and evolving gender 
dynamics.
What is clear from this material is that, although the role of the woman 
in the Negev at the end of the research period had shifted markedly in vir-
tually every aspect of social life (home life, educational opportunity, politi-
cal involvement) since this project began in 1992, the idea of a “women’s 
rights” agenda on the Western model is limited in bedouin society today. 
Th e control of women, their spaces, activities, behaviors, and basic free-
doms, remains as yet a primary arena through which political resistance 
to the state’s mechanisms of power may yet freely be exercised. Th us, one 
may question whether such resistance, contested over gendered space, can 
successfully serve to empower bedouin society as a whole if women’s rights 
are to be sacrifi ced in the process.
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Th e “Traditional” Nomadic Bedouin Woman
Th e “traditional” roles of bedouin women have been discussed at length 
elsewhere (Jakubowska 1988; Fenster 1996; Dinero 1997) and thus, I do not 
wish to repeat that material here. However, it is necessary to provide some 
background that will help then to contextualize the nature of gender role 
change in the resettled communities of early twenty-fi rst century Negev 
bedouin society.
As discussed at greater length in my previous work (1997), for example, 
Negev bedouin women historically performed a number of diffi  cult and 
physically demanding functions (Illustration 6.1) prior to resettlement and 
urbanization (Marx 1967: 83–84). Th ey helped to build the tent and kept 
it in order, brought water, fetched wood, prepared food, and carried out a 
variety of domestic activities. 
 But, of course, the primary role of the bedouin woman was that of being 
the biological and cultural reproducer. A central responsibility of the bed-
ouin woman was that of bearing children to add to the labor pool, and her 
prestige and status was elevated with each birth of a child, most especially, 
sons (Kressel 1992: 39; Marx 1967: 138). From early childhood, girls were 
socialized in preparation for the time when they, like their mothers, would 
marry and continue with this cyclical reproductive process. 
Illustration 6.1. Bedouin Women’s “Traditional” Roles—Milking a sheep.
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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Th e value of children in traditional bedouin society was based upon eco-
nomic, material, and non-material rewards (Meir & Ben-David 1993: 138). 
Economically, human reproduction in nomadic communities is rational, 
as a family seeks to “perpetuate itself by maximizing fertility” (Meir 1987: 
204). A numeric balance between the number of fl ocks a family held and 
the number of children a family bore (Meir 1997: 33) further supported the 
contention that fertility behaviors among the bedouin were linked directly 
to their pastoral nomadic lifestyle and labor force needs. 
In addition to providing a labor force to meet present demands, children 
also served as one’s “social security” system upon reaching old age. Bearing 
children had normative value as well, as a sign of submission to the will of 
Allah (that is, based on theistic values), and to answer tribal or extended 
family pressures that are culturally encouraged (Meir & Ben-David 1993: 
143–144).
While it is apparent that gender power relations within traditional bed-
ouin society favored males, women in the Negev did lay claim to levels of 
power and status. Th is power, however, was primarily exercised domes-
tically within the family unit, and not in the external communal sphere. 
Some have argued that bedouin women are largely powerless politically 
and are “marginalized” from the spheres of political power (Marteu 2005: 
279). And yet, it is my contention that women have always exercised con-
siderable power, but that this internal strength can be measured through a 
variety of ascriptive status indices (Dinero 1997: 249–250). 
Marriage and the dynamics within a marriage were all components that 
directly impacted the female realm in pre-sedentarized bedouin society. 
Just prior to settlement, Marx documented these complex marriage dy-
namics, through which economic and political power were distributed and 
exercised as tribal sheikhs vied with one another to increase family size, 
position, and control of regional area and resources, both in relation to 
other tribes, as well as in response to the increasing strength of the Mili-
tary Administration (Marx 1967: 138–141). Further, the mechanisms of 
“shame” and “honor” were ideally suited to the management, control, and 
social organization of bedouin society. Girls were socialized not to show 
any knowledge or interest in sexuality and were secluded from the male 
realm to the fullest degree possible (Marx 1967: 104), for example; more-
over, mothers played a central role in teaching their daughters these strate-
gies for protecting themselves from “shame”—which, when carried to its 
natural outcome in bedouin society, could in extreme cases even occasion 
death (Kressel 1992: 43).
Overall, it can be said then that from a popular bedouin legal perspec-
tive (that is, not according to shariah Islamic law necessarily, but within the 
rules of bedouin communal law), women’s positions were not to be viewed 
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as subordinate (Dinero 1997). Still, the ability to seek redress in the shariah 
courts (seeking help with divorce matters, protection from abusive hus-
bands, applying to obtain property upon a father’s or husband’s death) is a 
benefi t that settled bedouin women did not previously enjoy (Layish 1984: 
46). Th us, the literature is clear in emphasizing that women were rarely 
able to act independently in terms of their reliance upon men. For the most 
part, their strength and position in bedouin society stemmed from the sup-
port system that they provided as mothers, sisters, daughters, and wives.
As the bedouin have been resettled, however, the displacement of this 
power has shifted, as the genders contest for control over women’s bodies 
and their reproductive capacities. While one major outcome has occurred—
the changing role of education among bedouin women has signifi cant bear-
ing upon employment—these developments are in part mitigated by ways 
in which bedouin women’s lives are changing and evolving in the areas of 
marriage and their freedom of movement and seclusion in the planned 
town environment.
Th e Resettled Bedouin Woman 1992–2007—
Changing Roles, Changing Futures
As Jakubowska (1988) noted decades ago, the evolving development of an 
increased desire for social control over women’s lives in the Negev bedouin 
towns appeared to be due to a perceived need to counteract women’s closer 
proximity to non-agnatic males (that is, males who are not close relatives). 
And yet, what I contended in my more recent work (1997) and what ap-
pears to be gaining momentum at the millennium is that a lost sense of 
continuity and tradition outside of the home brought on by the forced re-
settlement initiative is lending to greater desire for control and the mainte-
nance of traditional behaviors and practices within the home. 
For example, as I noted previously, “while men’s lives are increasingly im-
pacted by external interactions, the division of realms (domestic sphere/ex-
ternal sphere) based upon gender and age persists, and seclusion and social 
restrictions on women remain largely in place” (1997: 254). Haram (Arabic: 
the separation of women and men through forbidden spaces, places, and 
acts therein) is strongly emphasized in order to ensure marriage with other 
agnates; separation is particularly strong in urbanized bedouin society, 
where it seeks to further a continuity of traditional gender roles (see Kres-
sel 1992: 31–35) and the perpetuation of family alliances through marriage 
ties. Moreover, issues of honor and shame have been seen to take on even 
greater importance among those Arab groups who remained within Israel’s 
borders following their military defeat and the creation of the Jewish State, 
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which are manifested by the desire to “preserve the symbols of manhood” 
by exercising control over female family members’ ‘ird (Arabic: chastity/
honor; see Shokeid 1993: 435).
Meir concurs, arguing that sedentarization has led to the further seclu-
sion of women, more so than was the case in the nomadic environment 
(1997: 43). Th us, it is his contention that the social position of women has 
“deteriorated considerably” as a consequence of the sedentarization initia-
tive (Meir 1997: 161). 
“Middle aged” women have particular diffi  culties in adjusting to urban 
life (Degen 2000). While older women tend to retain traditional behaviors 
in the towns (Illustration 6.2) and strive to live as they once did in the tent 
environment (raising/managing livestock, making food products, etc.; De-
gen 2000: 110), those aged 20–40 tend to be caught up in the challenges of 
negotiating through and between the diff erent milieus in which they must 
bridge the generational, spatial, and cultural divisions that separate their 
mothers, children, husbands, and friends.
While the very causes of the stresses now being placed upon bedouin 
women can easily be traced to the changes brought on by the sedentariza-
tion initiative, it is within the urbanized context that social welfare services 
have been developed to address the newly arising needs of today’s bedouin, 
especially bedouin women. Such services, social workers explain, at one 
time followed a more “Western, feminist model,” which failed to consider 
Illustration 6.2. Baking Pita on the Patio of the Villa.
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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the true-life circumstances and experiences so many bedouin women were 
undergoing. Th ese programs have since been redeveloped in order to better 
include “the family, the tradition … those who are most infl uential among 
the men in the family, perhaps the sheikhs. Th e women don’t have the life 
experience to operate on their own, so we have to work within the extended 
family to help them” (Goren, 7 May 2007).
Awareness and use of the social services designed to help address these 
concerns is predicted by education, and it is the women of the towns who 
are the most educated (El-Krenawi 2004: 53, 61). According to El-Krenawi, 
women in the planned towns use healthcare services more often and regu-
larly than women in the pezurah (2004: 46). Such correlations were found 
to be true in Segev Shalom as well and are part of a larger picture of the 
manifest changes and developments now taking place among resettled Ne-
gev bedouin women.
As Figure 6.1 reveals, while literacy rates among men have obviously 
risen, the rate of female literacy has risen to a far greater extent and is now 
nearly equal to that of men. As suggested in Chapter 4, education is a pri-
mary indicator of female empowerment in Negev bedouin society. Abu-
Rabia-Queder, the fi rst bedouin woman to receive a Ph.D., has argued 
(2006) that educational opportunity for bedouin women is not equal to 
that off ered to men, insofar as women are expected to attend gender-mixed 
institutions while also protecting their honor and reputations. Given this 
virtually impossible challenge, many simply drop out before reaching grad-
uation. Th us, she contends, the “modern state off ered Bedouins [sic] an 
education as part of the modernization process, [but] it did little to con-
sider the needs of the women or the community’s traditional values” (Abu-
Rabia-Queder 2006: 14).
Th ere is no question that, from the outset, the state has done little to con-
sider the specifi c concerns or needs of the bedouin community within the 
context of its planning initiative. And yet, all statistics suggest that bedouin 
women are accessing the accoutrements of “modernity,” (to use Abu-Rabia-
Queder’s terminology) at heretofore unseen and perhaps unanticipated 
levels (Figure 6.2). Employment outside of the home follows a similar pat-
tern to changes in access to formal education and literacy. At one time, 
bedouin women rarely if ever worked outside of the home, and few if any 
drove an automobile, further limiting their mobility. By 2007, however, this 
situation had changed considerably, and employment rates for women had 
skyrocketed, while male rates remained virtually unchanged (Figure 6.3). 
Th at said, a number of distinctions found in the 2007 data must still be 
noted concerning the diff erences found within Segev Shalom, and through-
out bedouin society, as the resettlement initiative and its various impacts 
take root. With regard to education, for example, especially among those 
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residents under the age of 40, men still are found statistically to be more 
educated than women (p=.03). However, women with high school degrees 
live in higher income households, regardless of whether they themselves 
work outside the home or not (p=.00). I will return to the role of education 
in polygynous marriages below.
As for employment, men are far more likely than women to be employed 
outside the home (p=.00). As for the women who do work outside the home, 
they have a much greater likelihood of working inside Segev Shalom, and 
not the Jewish sector, than men (p=.00), especially women under 40 years 
of age (p=.00). Lastly, women in town who were married were less likely to 
be employed than men who are married (p=.00); no such correlation was 
found among single respondents, however.
Put a diff erent way, married men were more likely to be employed ac-
cording to the survey fi ndings, while women, once married, are less likely 
to work outside of the home. And yet, having children in the home does 
not serve as a predictor for whether a married woman works outside the 
Figure 6.1. Percentage of Adults (Male/Female) Literate in at Least One 
Language, Segev Shalom.
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
Figure 6.2. Women Accessing Higher Education vs. Th ose with No Formal 
Education.
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
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home. However, the 2007 data did reveal that men with small children had 
a greater likelihood (p=.02) of being employed than men who did not have 
small children (this was not found for fathers of older children, however). 
Previous studies have shown that employment rates were statistically 
higher among men in the planned settlements when compared to those 
living in the unplanned and unrecognized settlements of the pezurah (El-
Krenawi 2004: 34). Th e 2007 Segev Shalom and pezurah surveys conducted 
for this study do not fully confi rm this argument, however. While it is con-
fi rmed that unemployment is higher in the pezurah overall as El-Krenawi 
contends (2004: 61), data collected for this study were only able to statically 
verify the greater likelihood of women living in the planned towns engag-
ing in some sort of wage labor (p=.02). Male employment rates did not 
vary signifi cantly between the two settlement areas according to the data, 
at least for this study.
New Veiling and Polygynous Marriage—
Retrenchment, Empowerment or Both?
As I noted previously: “improvements in women’s lives rely as much upon 
male attitudes and expectations as upon the women themselves. Women’s 
empowerment will remain hindered so long as male bedouin resettlers re-
main reticent to cooperate and support the women’s development program 
eff orts” (Dinero 1997: 258–259). Over the past two decades, it is apparent 
that two processes are under way that have major ramifi cations for the lives 
of the resettled Negev bedouin woman. On the one hand, the development 
indices shown above are indisputable. Bedouin women today are more 
educated, literate, and in many instances, are now working outside of the 
home in record numbers. 
Figure 6.3. Segev Shalom Residents Employed Outside the Home (Male/
Female).
Sources: 1993, 1996, 2000, 2007 Surveys.
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Some bedouin women, mostly the young, now drive, something that 
was not seen as recently as the late 1990s. In eff ect, women today are ex-
ercising a degree of independence and mobility that allows them literally 
and fi guratively to chart the course of their own lives, something that was 
unheard of when this study was initiated. As Kher El-Baz, a social worker 
who knows the community well, puts it, “Ten years ago [in the late 1990s] 
men and women would never be seen sitting together in meetings in Be’er 
Sheva. Now this is happening all the time. It’s just hard to believe” (3 June 
2007). 
Perhaps of greatest signifi cance from a Western perspective, the fertility 
rate in bedouin society is slowly but steadily dropping—from 9 children per 
woman in 2003 to 7.6 children in 2005—the largest drop in fertility rates 
recorded in the country (“Statistics bureau reports…,” 14 January 2008). 
Not only is this a signifi er to feminists that women’s lives are “improving,” 
but it is also a confi rmation of the scholarly literature and its contention 
that, over time, the resettlement initiative would “create modernity” in the 
Negev bedouin sector as the rationale for bearing numerous children di-
minished (Meir 1997: 40, 122).
And yet, concomitant with these developments are trends that appear 
to be equally strong and of equal relevance, namely, the embracing of what 
much of the Western feminist literature might defi ne as a retrenchment of 
bedouin women’s social development. A strengthening, if not rising, level 
of polygynous practice (see Abu-Rabia et al. 2008), increasingly numbers 
of women donning the veil (in full hijab and niqab), and related aspects of 
changes in personal family life suggest that bedouin women today are tak-
ing on not so much “traditional” bedouin practices, but, rather, neo-tradi-
tional ways in which to interact with the ever-changing social and political 
landscape in which their lives are a central feature. 
Th ese evolving phenomena are an increasingly common development 
recognized in the literature that suggests that with sedentarization, Middle 
Eastern bedouin have become increasingly gender-segregated (Cole 2006: 
382). As Abu-Rabia-Queder notes, post-nomadic women throughout the 
Middle East and North Africa have experienced similar levels of lost free-
dom of movement, such as the Awlad Ali of northwest Egypt (2006: 8). 
Awlad Ali bedouin women do not perceive that this change, such as the 
expectation that they must now veil more than in the past, is forced upon 
them by anyone, least of all by men (Abu-Lughod 1986: 159). Part of the ra-
tionale behind the need for greater levels of veiling in town simply extends 
from the fact that there is a greater likelihood (far less prevalent in the no-
madic environment) that a woman, once outside of her stone house, might 
encounter kin and non-kin males in whose presence modesty is expected 
(Dinero 1997: 255).
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
154 Settling for Less: Th e Planned Resettlement of Israel’s Negev Bedouin
In eff ect, modesty dress in the geographically concentrated and dense 
bedouin environment allows women to move about more freely. Moreover, 
“they can’t be recognized, it provides total anonymity” (Goren, 7 May 2007). 
Th e hijab and niqab provide a “portable tent” of sorts to sedentarized bed-
ouin women, extending their mobility beyond the limits of the four walls 
of their homes. Hanna Papanek used the term “portable seclusion” sev-
eral years ago when referring to modesty dress (as noted in Abu-Lughod 
2002); it is my purpose here to alter this verbiage in order to suggest that 
hijab does not keep bedouin women “back,” as “seclusion” may suggest, but 
rather, allows them to step forward in order to move about freely in urban-
ized bedouin society and, increasingly, in Jewish Israeli society as well.
Th us, the hijab can be seen as a small but essential response to globaliza-
tion and Westernization (Macleod 1991), and the forces that it is presently 
bringing to bear, socially, culturally, economically, and politically, upon 
bedouin society. In an age of the Internet, satellite dish television, and the 
compressed time and space created by these and other transportation and 
communications technologies, the proximity of outside infl uences at times 
can be overwhelming. As Goren, a Segev Shalom social worker for decades, 
summarizes the situation well (7 May 2007):
Th e youth no longer fear being shunned by the family. Th ey don’t value 
the rules and traditions. So in the past, the boys would go looking for 
Jews, Russians [for “inappropriate” purposes]. Now they will approach 
bedouin girls.
Th ey are all watching TV now, and they have cell phones. I knew an ado-
lescent girl who was totally veiled. She lived in the pezurah [near Segev]. 
But she had a cell phone, and she would talk with strange men. Th is is 
what is happening now, they think about sex and drugs. She would watch 
“Sex in the City” on her television. In time, she was murdered. Th ey never 
found her body, or who did it. So here they are sitting in the middle of no 
where, but they have “New York” in their tents.
Saeed El-Harumi, Segev Shalom Rosh Ha’Moatzah, off ers a similar anec-
dote with a less violent outcome (28 May 2007): “In Segev Shalom there 
was a girl, maybe 18 or 19 years old. She wore short sleeves and skirts, not 
dressing modestly. Now she is 29, and still no one will marry her. Do you 
see? Th ere are some [basic] rules that everyone must follow.”
El-Harumi adds, however, that the trends he sees toward increasing 
levels of veiling in Segev Shalom, most especially since the late 1990s, are 
also a refl ection of changing signs of fashion that can be seen in any small 
community. “Th e [dark black] abaya that you are seeing here today, for 
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example, is what they see on the haj. Th ey bring it back with them; it is not 
[originally part of ] bedouin culture, it is Saudi culture” (28 May 2007).
Th roughout Israel, the Palestinian Territories, and much of the Arab 
Muslim Middle East as well as Europe, donning the hijab is in many in-
stances a fashion statement more than, or at least in addition to, its being 
an affi  rmation of one’s religious convictions (“In vogue, hijab style,” 30 June 
2007). In other words, while donning hijab has in the past been viewed as 
something intended to discourage drawing attention to one’s appearance, a 
trend is under way in which some women are using this indigenous form of 
clothing to express themselves both as respectable and honorable daugh-
ters of the umma (Arabic: Muslim community), but also as an expression of 
themselves as individuals with their own personal identities.
As I noted previously (see Dinero 2006: 886), scholars have interpreted 
the meanings and purposes surrounding the donning of the hijab and simi-
lar “traditional” practices in a multiplicity of ways that need not be repeated 
here. Further, I have argued that: “polygynous marriage, veiling, and other 
Muslim family observances have long been viewed by Western feminists 
as signs of patriarchy, male control and oppression. Some of the recent lit-
erature, however, suggests that Western feminists’ views of these behaviors 
are themselves Orientalist in nature. Rather than signifying female subju-
gation, such practices in the post-colonial era can, these authors argue, ex-
press anti-Western or anti-imperialist values and ideals” (2006: 883). 
And yet, while this remains my belief, a proviso is now in order, for such 
views are themselves embedded with Western or class bias. It is one thing 
for the outside, formally schooled observer to academicize a topic such as 
polygyny, for example, and quite another to hear and feel the pain experi-
enced by one’s friends as they struggle with the reality that another wife 
is about to enter into their family structure, irretrievably impacting their 
relationship with their spouse. In other words, I seek here to better situate 
bedouin women’s changing worlds somewhere between the Western fem-
inist’s “oppression narrative” (Abu-Lughod 2002) and the empowerment 
narrative I sketched out previously, by listening to and incorporating the 
perspectives of several women from Segev Shalom about the neo-tradi-
tional developments now occurring in their community. 
Rather than to try to speculate from above about what resettled bedouin 
women think about polygyny, increasing levels of veiling, and other changes 
now occurring in Segev Shalom (and throughout the bedouin community), 
I initiated the creation of two Bedouin Women’s Focus Groups (BWFG), 
which were held in Segev Shalom on 9 and 29 May 2007. Ten women were 
selected for the BWFG from various walks of life, using a snowballing sam-
pling methodology (two were mother and daughter, for example). 
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Th e conversations for each session took place in one of the women’s 
homes in the town over tea, coff ee, cola, and snacks, and each “offi  cially” 
lasted two hours. I was present during both sessions, but both were facili-
tated by a bedouin woman, Amira Abu-Kueider, a non-resident who is bilin-
gual in Arabic and Hebrew. I was not certain if my presence would hamper 
the discussion or aff ect it in any way, but quickly found that after a few intro-
ductory moments, the women carried on as if I was not in the room. In both 
instances, I did in fact leave early; Amira noted afterwards that the discus-
sion continued hours after my departure with little notice of my absence.
Th e women, all of whom were married, but one, who is divorced, ranged 
in age from 20 to 54. Some had as much as a high school education plus 
some college (Rhonda, 31; Fatma, 31) to as little as a second grade educa-
tion (Wadha A., 50). Sabra, 43, had the most children (eleven); Injut, 28, 
though married, has no children.
All wear head coverings, though none wear a face veil. When asked 
about their views of the new veiling now taking place in Segev Shalom, 
there were nearly as many reactions and rationale for donning the veil as 
there were women in the room. Delal, 37, Rhonda, and Sabra said that they 
believe that modesty dress is an indicator or a refl ection of one’s religiosity 
and is a founding principle of Islam. Houla, 20, stated that she felt it was 
simply a fashion statement and nothing more. Wadha A. suggested that 
modesty dress is simply “traditional” dress worn because of custom; Injut 
concurred, but then added, “but that’s also connected to being a Muslim.” 
Fatma added that, “[hijab] makes our lives here easier—I put on hijab and 
I can go anywhere.”
Interestingly, the attitudes toward veiling did not appear to follow any 
particular generation pattern. Wardha, 30, for example, called the new veil-
ing “a beautiful thing; it’s fi ne.” Iman, 28, responded that, “I support the 
women who are now taking on the full hijab [i.e., black abaya including 
niqab; see Illustration 6.3]—though I wouldn’t do it personally.” But perhaps 
the strongest opinion on the subject came from Wadha B., the 54 year old 
divorcee who, when married, was the fi rst wife in a polygynous family with 
two co-wives. Wadha B. did not graduate high school, but she did study 
until the ninth grade. She is the mother of fi ve children, and she has lived 
in Segev Shalom for fi fteen years, having moved there from the neighboring 
Azazmeh region. She states: “I don’t like this change, and no, I do not sup-
port what is happening. Th ere is nothing in the Qur’an that requires this!”
While an increase in the donning of modesty dress can easily be ob-
served, if not documented per se, simply by walking down the streets of 
Segev Shalom or spending time in the central marketplace, polygynous 
marriage is more easily quantifi ed. Of those household representatives 
who stated in 1996* that they were married, 31 percent were living in a 
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polygynous household (N=95). In 2000, this number remained essentially 
unchanged, dipping slightly to 29 percent (N=119). According to the 2007 
survey results, this fi gure rose slightly to 32 percent (N=214), that is, one-
third of the households in town. It is statistically lower than the fi gure 
determined in the neighboring pezurah however, where nearly half, 48 per-
Illustration 6.3. One of Many Young Women who don Full Abaya and Niqab 
in the Streets of Segev Shalom—2007.
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero. 
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cent of the survey respondents, were living in polygynous households in 
2007 (p=.04).
Th us, sedentarization has not led to the elimination of polygyny in the 
Negev and, in truth, it has served to provide much of the impetus for it as 
the desire for larger families with more children increasingly informs so-
cial behavior (Abu-Rabia et al. 2008: 33). Among other bedouin communi-
ties in the Arab Middle East, settlement has correlated with an increase in 
polygynous marriage as well (Cole 2006: 383). A substantial literature has 
developed on the bedouin of the Negev alone, much of it sharply critical of 
the fact that polygynous marriage is yet thriving, despite the fact that it is, 
according to many authors, a “dysfunctional” marital system, with varying 
levels of harm infl icted upon the co-wives, children, and even husbands of 
the families involved.
El-Krenawi, for example, contends that in general, polygynous families in 
the Negev must worry more about food security than monogamous families 
(2004: 39). His work with Slonim-Nevo also traces a great deal of familial 
stress to home economics, that is, to the belief that the economic situation 
is better for monogamous families overall, as is a higher rate of employ-
ment for husbands in monogamous families (El-Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo 
2003: 41). In their sample, though monogamous men were more likely to be 
employed, this was not found to be statistically signifi cant (El-Krenawi & 
Slonim-Nevo 2003: 47). (Th is was the same situation found in the 2007 Se-
gev Shalom sample.) In their sample, too, polygynous men reported feeling 
slightly better about their economic situations than monogamous men (El-
Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo 2003: 47); this was found to be the case of Segev 
Shalom where the polygynous families with higher incomes outnumbered 
the monogamous by a few percentage points (23.1 percent vs. 20.5) as well 
as in the pezurah (30 percent vs. 23 percent). In neither case was this dif-
ference found to be statistically signifi cant, however. 
Overall, these authors contend that there are more confl ictual relation-
ships and disagreements in polygynous families than in monogamous 
families (El-Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo 2003: 71). Th us, they assert that argu-
ments between wives, and between children and other co-wives who are 
not their mothers, are common (El-Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo 2003: 43). And 
yet, more wives in polygynous marriages feel that their husbands do not 
discriminate amongst his wives than they feel that he does discriminate (36 
percent vs. 41 percent; El-Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo 2003: 43). Two-thirds of 
the men in El-Krenawi’s and Slonim-Nevo’s study reported that they do not 
believe that they discriminate among their co-wives (El-Krenawi & Slonim-
Nevo 2003: 50).
Still, what is key to their study is that the ability of the family to function 
well falls upon the women, most especially their sense of well-being, their 
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economic status, and so on. “Women in polygamous families and women 
whose families’ economic situation is tough report more problematic fam-
ily functioning” (El-Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo 2003: 62). Th at is, polygynous 
families function best when economic resources are readily available, when 
these resources are equitably shared, and when a spirit of cooperation, and 
not competition, informs the relationships among and between a husband, 
his co-wives, and their respective children. And given that more often than 
not, such resources appear to be scarce at best, such families, most espe-
cially women and children, are, they contend, likely to “suff er a great deal of 
diffi  culty” (El-Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo 2003: 72).
Elbedour et al. (2002) are less willing to jump on the “polygyny is obvi-
ously bad for women” bandwagon. Th ey also note that a number of “risk 
factors” associated with polygyny prevail—marital confl ict, marital dis-
tress, and the absence of the father in the home being the primary causes 
of concern (Elbedour et al. 2002: 258–259). Th ey also suggest that fi nancial 
distress often exists in polygynous families, and that a relationship can be 
seen between polygyny and poverty (Elbedour et al. 2002: 260). 
And yet, it is their contention that part of what is often left out of 
the calculus when evaluating polygyny is the role of culture in a given 
society. “In communities where the practice of polygamy is valued and 
frequently practiced, no negative stigma prevails, which, in turn, may 
provide a buff er from the adverse stressors associated with polygamous 
marriage” (Elbedour et al. 2002: 265). As I have argued elsewhere (Dinero 
2006), the literature is replete with a variety of studies from throughout 
the Middle East, northern and sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere, all of 
which off ers counterarguments to the contention that polygyny is eco-
nomically stressful to the family structure. On the contrary, such families, 
as will be seen below in the case of Segev Shalom, represent not the weak-
est and poorest among a community, but rather, the wealthiest and the 
most powerful.
Socially, on the other hand, polygynous marriage is becoming increas-
ingly problematic for Israel’s Negev bedouin women. As women become 
more educated and more familiar with alternative lifestyles, they are less 
receptive and willing to accept certain impositions upon them that they 
feel may unjustly limit or jeopardize their freedoms, individuality, power, 
or quality of life. Social Worker Goren explains (7 May 2007):
I think the women themselves [now] see polygamy as oppressive. Th is is 
new. In the past, other wives were seen as extra help. It was very func-
tional. Today, there is jealousy—who is the favorite—each wants their 
own house and things, and men fi nd it hard to support each equally, as 
Islam demands. Th is is especially true for the poorer men.
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Bedouin men marry very young because the marriages are arranged. 
When they are older, they fi nd someone they actually love; they choose 
for themselves. Some of the violence—and I wish to be careful here—could 
even be connected to this early marriage.
Goren’s views on the relationship between arranged and love marriage 
echo Ben-David’s words on the topic some years back (as cited in Dinero 
2006: 908). Th e quantitative and qualitative data gathered in Segev Shalom 
sheds further light on this issue as well, although the relationships between 
a family’s economic status, employment, education of spouses, and marital 
structure (monogamy versus polygyny) is not so easily unraveled. 
According to the previous data gathered in Segev Shalom, polygyny cor-
related most strongly with time spent living in the town, age, employment 
status, income, and political party identifi cation. Early fi ndings (Dinero 
1996) suggested that polygynous Azazmeh tended to be some of the least 
educated, poorest residents in the town; polygynous Tarabeen, however, 
tended to be wealthier, with religious motivations informing, at least in 
part, the rationale behind their polygynous marriage choice. Th ose identi-
fying as “bedouin” were more likely than any others to be part of a polygy-
nous household.
Th e 2000 data added to this profi le. Education and literacy were primary 
correlates once again, as were two economic elements, the raising of crops 
and animals. As for identity, however, those preferring the “Israeli” moni-
ker or related versions (“Israeli Muslim,” “Muslim Israeli,” and so on) were 
least likely to be part of a polygynous household.
Th e 2007 data added a rich, full, and varied complement of signifi cant 
factors to these fi ndings. Much of the data confi rms previous fi ndings while 
some is in direct contradiction, suggesting that the community is yet in fl ux 
and that as the town grows, attitudes have shifted—and will likely continue 
to shift—as residents’ social and economic circumstances evolve.
Overall, it can fi rst be said that age is a—perhaps the—defi nitive factor 
in distinguishing polygynous marriages from monogamous ones in Segev 
Shalom, where older residents are far more likely to have two or more wives 
than younger residents (p=.00). Th is was especially true among poorer res-
idents (p=.00). Wealthier families who are also polygynous tended to be 
members of the Azazmeh tribe, and not Tarabeen (p=.03). 
Polygynous families in town now are more likely to have lived in the 
town the longest (p=.00); this may suggest that these are the same families 
who came to the town over a decade ago with certain social values, but 
that the younger generation is less likely to share these values. Again, this 
was especially true of those with lower incomes (p=.00), most especially 
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members of the Azazmeh tribe (p=.01)—i.e., the founding fathers and co-
mothers of Segev Shalom. 
Th e 2007 data suggested that overall, the polygynous are less educated 
(p=.03), especially those with lower incomes (p=.02). Polygynous Tarabeen 
have less education than those Tarabeen with more education (p=.03). 
Polygyny correlates with being less literate (p=.01), especially among the 
poorer town residents (p=.00). Th e Azazmeh who are polygynous are es-
pecially likely also to be illiterate (p=.02). 
Th e data confi rm that socially, the polygynous families of Segev Shalom 
tend to be less educated, less literate, and older than the rest of the town 
residents. Economically, too, the data suggests that the bedouin are begin-
ning to follow a model in which polygyny correlates with the weaker attri-
butes of today’s changing bedouin community, rather than its strengths. 
Similar to the previous fi ndings, polygynous residents in 2007 were 
more likely than the other residents to own animals (p=.01), especially 
those with low incomes (p=.00). Th e polygynous were more likely to raise 
crops (p=.05), also most especially those with low incomes (p=.04). 
Interestingly, those who are polygynous are less likely to own various ma-
terial goods, such as a telephone (p=.01). Th is was especially true of the 
Tarabeen (p=.03), who, as above, diff er from the Azazmeh in a variety of so-
cial and economic arenas. Polygynous residents were less likely to own a sat-
ellite dish (p=.05), especially the Azazmeh (p=.03) and those under the age 
of 40 (p=.03). Polygynous households were also less likely to own a washing 
machine (p=.03), especially members of the Tarabeen tribe (p=.03). Lastly, 
the polygynous families with low incomes were less likely to own a VCR/
DVD player (p=.00), especially members of the Azazmeh tribe (p=.04). 
Needless to say, the ownership of these goods is, in and of itself, of no 
particular academic interest. But given that these items each comprise 
small components of the developmental enterprise, their ownership (or 
lack thereof ) off ers an indication of general economic success or depriva-
tion among polygynous bedouin families. And yet, for the most part, these 
are luxury/non-essential items; no correlation was found, for example, be-
tween refrigerator ownership and marriage type.
Although these various factors off er a variety of aspects of polygynous 
activity and behavior in the town, the strongest predictors of polygyny 
found were not income, education/literacy, tribe, or signs of material 
wealth. Rather, the strongest predictors (after age), using multivariate lin-
ear stepwise regression (SPSS 13.0), was years living in the town (p=.009) 
and animal ownership (p=.041). Th ose bedouin living in the town the lon-
gest were the most likely to be polygynous; these tend to be older residents, 
of course, who, one could argue, most reluctantly came to the town. 
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Th ey are holding onto behaviors such as polygyny and livestock rearing 
because these are the signifying elements of bedouinism, of nomadism, and 
of who it is/was to be a Negev bedouin. Bedouin men who seek additional 
wives do so because of and despite the economic stresses it places on the 
family unit as a whole, for, ultimately, the social value of taking on a second 
(or third or fourth) wife far outweighs the economic costs that such fami-
lies often experience.
And for many bedouin men, most especially the Azazmeh of Segev Sha-
lom, taking on a second wife is simply a sign of economic success, a “trophy 
wife” as it were, that signifi es one’s position and status that one strives to 
attain within the bedouin community. As is found in some circumstances 
in the West, not all bedouin men, given the economic circumstances of the 
towns (let alone the pezurah), are presently in a situation where they can 
truly aff ord the expenses associated with conspicuous consumption—and 
yet social forces press them to pursue the option nonetheless. 
It was conveyed to me anecdotally that bedouin women today are “far 
more demanding” and have higher expectations than in the past. Prospec-
tive wives, particularly those who have a teudat zehut (Hebrew: identity 
card proving they are Israeli citizens and, thus, one does not have to go 
through the challenges and diffi  culties of bringing a wife into Israel from 
Jordan (Parizot 2004) or the Palestinian Territories (Goren 2007), have a 
great number of material wants, and are simply less willing to live in the 
pezurah when they now have the town option.
Discussions during the BWFG sessions concerning life in the pezurah, 
and attitudes toward polygyny in general, confi rm this contention. Of the 
ten women in the group, three had come from Jordan, one was from Gaza/
Palestine (though she had lived in the pezurah), one had grown up in Segev 
Shalom, and the remaining fi ve had moved to the town from the pezurah. 
In general, views of life in the pezurah were pragmatic and, for the most 
part, not very positive. Rhonda, who moved to the town from Jordan eleven 
years ago, stated that: “in the town it’s better than outside. We have elec-
tricity and water. We are protected from the weather.” Iman, who came 
from Jordan two years later, added: “I prefer the town to the desert. Every-
thing is possible here for the children. Th ere are schools, etc.” And Fatma, 
who came to Segev Shalom from Jordan 10 years ago, concurred: “It’s easier 
living in town. We have schools, stores, clinics, things we need here.” In-
jut, who grew up in town and so has never lived in the pezurah, but, like 
the other women in the group, has many relatives who do, off ered that: 
“Women are better off  in the town because here we have access to all the 
conveniences of daily life.”
Th ose who actually had lived in the pezurah off ered diff ering views 
about their lives there. Sabra, who has lived in town for seventeen years, 
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stated that: “I lived in the pezurah for ten years. It was very diffi  cult for me 
there. It is much better living here.” Added Wardha, who has lived in town 
for eight years: “I too lived for eight years in the pezurah. It was diffi  cult to 
wash clothes, to cook, everything. In the town there are services, things we 
need. Everything for daily life is here.”
And yet not all of the women who had actually lived in the pezurah 
spoke about the experience in negative terms. Still, it appears that those 
who spoke positively about the pezurah tended to be older women who 
spoke in nostalgic, less pragmatic terms about their day-to-day lives there. 
Off ered Delal, who has lived in town for thirteen years: “I preferred living 
in the pezurah. Th ere, I could feel free, I could breathe.” Wadha B. echoed 
these sentiments, adding: “In the pezurah I felt free. Here in town I feel 
suff ocated.” Perhaps Wadha A. expressed the sentiment of many when she 
concluded that: “outside town we lived a calmer life. But here in town, we 
can have electricity and the other things we need to live.”
When the subject of polygynous marriage in bedouin society was raised, 
there was some discussion among the women about its role in the com-
munity today, but disagreement was far more muted than on any other 
topic. Only one woman, Delal (age 37), stated that she supports the in-
stitution of polygyny, and believes that “it can sometimes serve to benefi t 
the family and community.” Wadha B., who has lived in Segev Shalom for 
twenty years and is the daughter of a prominent Azazmeh sheikh who has a 
number of wives and children, was willing to off er that, “if there is a ‘reason,’ 
well OK, but otherwise, no I don’t accept it!” Added Houla: I don’t support 
it, except under ‘special circumstances.’” While the question of what these 
“reasons” or “circumstances” might be was not directly referred to at fi rst, 
as the discussion continued for some time, Sabra fi nally exclaimed, “OK, 
this is acceptable, but only in special situations, such as when a woman is 
barren.”
Still, the rest of the women in the group were unanimous in their animus 
toward polygynous marriage. Injut stated that: “I don’t like [polygyny], this 
I just don’t accept.” Rhonda agreed, adding that, “this has nothing to do 
with being religious.” Some women in the BWFG went a step further, not 
only questioning the value of polygynous marriage, but, in fact, condemn-
ing it outright. Wadha A, the former fi rst wife, said that, “I see this as a 
‘blemish,’ a wound upon our society.” Fatma and Wardha went further, both 
stating at various times during the conversation that, “I don’t believe in this 
at all—it’s forbidden!”
But perhaps Iman summarized the issue in the most telling way. She 
is 28 years old and has a ninth grade education. She is the mother of six 
children and was, for two years, a fi rst wife until her husband divorced the 
second co-wife. When the issue of polygyny was raised, she spoke up im-
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mediately. “I am against it,” she stated without hesitation. “In fact I think 
the Christians have it right: one woman, one man. Th at’s it!” 
Th ere was a momentary silence in the room and then the sound of stifl ed 
gulps of air. Everyone took quick sips of their tea.
Conclusions
I wish to conclude this chapter by echoing the sentiment of Abu-Lughod 
(2002), Abu-Rabia-Queder (2006), and others who state that observers 
must not accept the idea that feminism and the rights of women are West-
ern concepts to be viewed in opposition to Islam and its nationalist virtues. 
An analysis of the present-day developments in the Negev suggests that the 
contested space of gender is developing into an area of tension and confl ict 
in the regime within which the bedouin must negotiate, interact, arbitrate, 
and above all else, survive. Th e above fi ndings, in particular the material 
culled from the focus groups and informal discussions, reveals that if there 
is one issue that signifi es a red fl ag for future diffi  culty and confl ict within 
Negev bedouin society and culture, it is the ever-evolving role of the sed-
entarized bedouin woman.
Th e resettled woman of the Negev today is at the crossroads of bedouin 
society, bridging the worlds of the tent and the town, the pezurah and Segev 
Shalom, the world of their grandmothers and the world of their daughters. 
Th ese are geographies of honor, modesty, and seclusion, and simultane-
ously and concomitantly, geographies of globalization, open borders, and 
interactions with the Jewish, urban, settled consumerist cultures and soci-
eties within which they are now so permanently situated and entrenched. 
On the one hand, there are now more opportunities available to bedouin 
women in the Negev than ever before in the areas of education and employ-
ment; on the other, many bedouin men—fathers, brothers, uncles—have 
never felt more fearful, more vulnerable, or more insecure as the role of 
the bedouin woman changes so quickly before their very eyes. States Segev 
Shalom Social Services Director El-Baz states (3 June 2007):
Th is community is changing so rapidly, perhaps most especially in the past 
ten years. I don’t like how the community has dealt with women’s issues, 
or with kids or the elderly. I think it’s happening too fast … Our mistake 
is that we want our community to become Western in two days … but it’s 
a process. [But here] it’s random, not really planned. Our role [in pro-
viding social services in Segev Shalom] is to facilitate change, to develop 
services for this change—but are these top down or grass roots? Well it’s 
both, it’s confusion. 
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Th e changes then, which are manifest in the daily lives of the sedentarized 
Negev bedouin woman, largely mirror the changes manifest in the commu-
nity as a whole. Th ese changes in many ways serve as the bellwether for the 
bedouin community; as bedouin women’s roles evolve, so does the entire 
society, and its future social and economic development along with it.
N
*Reliable data is unavailable from the 1993 survey.
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Bedouin Tourism Development 
Planning in the New Economy
Th e camel is the family’s father 
— Clinton Bailey, A Culture of Desert Survival: 
Bedouin Proverbs from Sinai and the Negev
Th e bedouin of the Negev Desert have undergone considerable social and 
economic change since the Israeli Government forcibly began concentrat-
ing and then resettling them over the past four decades, in the process alter-
ing their lifestyle away from pastoral nomadism. During this same period 
of resettlement, a small but growing tourism industry has been developed 
in the area around the marketing of “traditional” Negev bedouin nomadic 
culture. 
As my previous study on the topic suggests (Dinero 2002), this sector has 
been dominated historically by Jewish Israeli entrepreneurs, who sought to 
express a narrative not of post-nomadic bedouin life in Segev Shalom, the 
other planned towns, and the unrecognized communities—that is, as it is 
presently lived and experienced—but rather, of an Orientalist’s version of a 
glorifi ed, romanticized past that has been largely erased by today’s political 
realities.
In the fi rst decade of the 2000s, however, a counter-trend began to de-
velop in the region. Organizations such as the NGO Bustan created what 
they called “Unplugged” tours and other related activities, which sought to 
show the visitor the “real” situation in the Negev, and to encourage politi-
cal action on the community’s behalf. In essence, they made such issues as 
poverty, private suff ering, and human tragedy attractions for tourist con-
sumption. Such tours act as agents of an increasingly global trend, “volun-
tourism,” which seeks to inspire “well-intentioned” outsiders to learn about 
what is happening in a particular locale, and then, more importantly, to act 
on behalf of those who, presumably, are incapable of mobilizing indepen-
dently because they are too small, too weak, and too dependent upon their 
governments for fi nancial, political or other types of support. 
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More recently, bedouin entrepreneurs have been developing their own 
tourism-related businesses in the Negev, through which they seek to pre-
sent a counter-narrative to that off ered previously in other venues. Th ough 
most are quite new on the tourism scene and all are relatively small in size, 
these vendors are economically empowering to the individual owners, em-
ployees, and the bedouin community as a whole, allowing the bedouin to 
speak for themselves about who they are, and how they want outsiders to 
perceive the social, economic, and political forces that now formulate the 
circumstances comprising their post-nomadic existence.
Th e “Perpetrator” Narrative: Th e Noble Desert Savage
Previously and at some length, I have detailed the use of tourism in the per-
petuation of a Disneyfi ed, Orientalistic image of the bedouin as the “Noble 
Desert Savage” (Dinero 2002). In brief, this phenomenon may be situated 
within a form of heritage tourism that commoditizes “exotic” native cul-
ture, but is premised upon the assumption that the experiences being con-
sumed are entirely “real” and “authentic.” 
But, in truth, the experiences and images marketed through heritage 
tourism are decontextualized. As I have noted: “the marketing of culture 
through the packaging and selling of the tourist product leads to a loss of 
communication or understanding between the host [native] and tourist 
populations. Instead of destroying misconceptions between the two … tour-
ism perpetuates them and often creates new prejudices” (Dinero 2002: 71). 
It is from this perspective then that I have argued that the packaging 
and marketing of Disneyfi ed images of native cultures has both internal 
social and economic costs for local populations, and has the potential sim-
ply to reinforce and to reify stereotypes while solidifying the position of 
native peoples into a proletariat class periphery. Moreover, heritage tour-
ism takes on a particularly insipient nature in permanently colonized lands 
(the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand provide ideal ex-
amples). For here, former colonizers may foster the creation and perpetu-
ation of images of local peoples that validate their colonization, in what 
Nash has called a neocolonialist tourism superstructure (1989: 43; 1996: 
64). Colonizers—sometimes with native complicity, I might add—seek 
here to emphasize the primitive or savage nature of the remnants of the 
native community, in an attempt to rationalize and justify their conquest of 
the “wilderness,” human inhabitants included (Dinero 2002: 71). 
Th e “Negev Bedouin,” as constructed by the Israeli tourism industry 
throughout the 1980s and to a far greater extent in the 1990s, was most 
clearly articulated in a handful of specifi c forums. Th ese included the 
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realms of the developing Negev Desert ecotourism industry, the “Bed-
ouin Shuk” (Hebrew: market), located on the Eilat Highway in Be’er Sheva, 
and the Joe Alon Museum of Bedouin Culture located at Kibbutz Lahav. 
Th roughout these and related environments, a narrative was constructed, 
primarily by Jewish Israeli entrepreneurs—with bedouin Israeli staff  in 
many instances along side them helping to perpetuate the story—which 
followed the colonizer’s justifi cation/validation paradigm, promoting a 
“Noble Desert Savage”-type image (Dinero 2002: 90), which is very similar 
to the “Noble Savage” imagery of the American West. What distinguishes 
this image is its regional context, associated with, among other stereotypi-
cal nineteenth century attributes, harem girls, camels, snakecharmers, and 
thieves (Dinero 2002: 73). 
A typical experience, for example, included on the itinerary of virtually 
every American Jewish youth group trip to Israel (including the United Syn-
agogue Youth [Conservative Movement], the North American Federation 
of Temple Youth [Reform Movement], the National Conference of Syna-
gogue Youth [Orthodox Movement], the B’nai B’rith Youth Organization, 
Young Judaea, Habonim Dror [Labor Zionist Movement], and Birthright) 
is to visit a “Bedouin Tent” for tourists. Th ese venues are located through-
out the Negev, although those near Eilat, itself a tourist destination, are es-
pecially popular (Illustrations 7.1, 7.2). Th ere, these youth can ride camels, 
drink sweet tea, smoke water pipes, and be waited on by a veiled woman 
named “Fatma,” living, as it were—for a few hours at least—as if they were 
on the Hollywood set of a 1950s movie. Th e bedouin are simply part of the 
production, mysterious props concealed in some bizarre, surreal, staged 
drama in which these students are both actors (i.e., the producers) and 
consumers of “traditional” drink, music, stories, and the like. And if they 
remain long enough that “traditional bedouin food” is served, they can be 
assured that it is indeed kosher (i.e., that Jewish dietary laws are observed; 
see Dinero 2002: 88).
Th us, the Negev bedouin are presented by tourism vendors, the Israeli 
Ministry of Tourism, guidebooks, and others (Dinero 2002: 75–76) as in-
scrutable; like the camels that they ride, their lifestyle and culture is wild, 
raw, untamable, and part and parcel of an expansive and unknown desert 
wilderness that appears unwilling to succumb to the demands and expec-
tations of development and modernity (2002: 82). From the faces hidden 
behind the veils to the tents in which they dwell, all is presented as hidden, 
mysterious, and exotic, and bordering on the edge of erotic discourse.
What is signifi cant about this narrative, of course, is that by extension, it 
places the onus of economic and social development of the bedouin in the 
modern era squarely upon the shoulders of the community itself, which is 
viewed as having complete agency over the present state of aff airs. Th rough 
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Illustrations 7.1 and 
7.2. Th e “Bedouin 
Tent” Outside Eilat.
Source: Photos by Steven 
C. Dinero.
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the promotion by tour vendors of these seemingly harmless, romantic, 
“Lawrence of Arabia”-type images, a political point is being expressed: “If 
the bedouin are not developing, if the planned towns are failing, if adequate 
wage labor employment is a problem, if health, education, and welfare are 
all areas of struggle—well, what do you expect, anyway? Look at their cul-
ture, will you?! Th e State is doing the best it can!” And, of course, the added 
corollary to the narrative is this: “Any improvement you do see—well, you 
have the State to thank for it.”
Th us, it has been my contention that: “the Israeli Jewish agenda of set-
tling the land and controlling its borderlands, when combined with the aim 
of developing its growing capitalist economy, are central to the construc-
tion of Bedouin society as a tourist attraction. When viewed within the 
context of neocolonialism, this process may be seen similarly as the fi nal 
piece of a programme of resettlement and proletarianization of the Bed-
ouin which has been taking place in the Negev now for over fi ve decades” 
(Dinero 2002: 91). And yet, despite what appears to be part of a narrative of 
colonization and conquest, it is also my belief that the bedouin involved in 
Jewish tourism ventures have actively succeeded in playing a role in shap-
ing and forming the agenda of how others perceive who and what they are, 
what their culture was and is becoming, and that “it would be a mistake to 
present the situation in the Negev today as one of total Bedouin victimiza-
tion” (Dinero 2002: 90). 
Still, an alternative narrative has arisen in Negev tourism since the year 
2000, which is attempting to do just this. Striving to provide a corrective 
to the “bedouin as perpetrator” narrative, which places the blame for slow 
bedouin development upon such rationale as primitivism, barbarity, and 
various other cultural obstacles, this newly evolving narrative shifts the 
focus, placing the blame upon the state, and presenting the bedouin com-
munity as weak, disempowered, and impoverished victims.
Th e “Victim” Narrative: A Call for “Voluntourism” 
in Segev Shalom and Elsewhere
While Karl Marx’s “Th eory of Commodity Fetishism” appears to hold true 
in the consumption-oriented global economy, it has long been believed that 
there are some things that can never be bought or sold—that is, converted 
into commodities—and these might include poverty, suff ering, pain, and 
the like. Recently, however, there is evidence to suggest that even these neg-
ative abstract conditions can, under certain circumstances, be marketed 
to those open to their consumption in the ever-expanding global tourism 
marketplace.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Bedouin Tourism Development Planning in the New Economy 171
John Hutnyk, for example, in his book, Th e Rumour of Calcutta, put 
this concept forward in the mid 1990s by suggesting that poverty serves 
as a particularly attractive tourist product for “well intentioned” Western 
youth, who are drawn to places such as India in order that they might carry 
out some sort of charity aid work there as a part of their backpacking/eco-
trekking agenda. It is his contention that Western tourism has grown in 
Calcutta in recent years not despite the existence of impoverishment and 
pain found in the city, but because of it. 
He argues that Western travel guidebooks oriented to the young “budget 
traveler” play a particularly central role in the production of a version of 
Calcutta as a city of extremes, of social and economic stresses that feed the 
tourists’ appetite for the bizarre, the diff erent, and the exotic. Moreover, he 
states that these young tourists themselves serve to produce/reproduce this 
imaged Calcutta by telling/retelling stories that reaffi  rm and confi rm the 
realities of what might be called an imagined and constructed “exotiscape” 
(Hutnyk 1996).
Over a decade later, a similar phenomenon appears to have spread, 
and is now at play in the slums of some of Africa’s capitals. In Nairobi’s 
Kibera slum, for example, journalists, curious and concerned Western-
ers, and others can take “pity tours” (“Slum Tourism…,” 9 February 2007), 
where they can participate in paid walks to observe the poorest of the poor 
as a leisure-time activity. At the same time, it is presumed that such “tours” 
can lead to action and support of those who are in the greatest need of 
assistance. Th eoretically, the tours raise awareness of local concerns; tour 
operators return a percentage of their payment to each participant to do-
nate to a cause they have seen on their tour, “such as a health or school 
project.” 
It is somewhat questionable whether such tourism truly aids those in 
need or perhaps is designed simply to ease the consciences of those who 
participate (Lancaster 2007). “While all recognise the potential for good 
from such attention, plus the pressure it puts on the government and oth-
ers to help slum-dwellers, most [Kibera slum-dwellers] said tangible ben-
efi ts so far [are] few, while the embarrassment factor [grows] every day” 
(“Slum Tourism…,” 9 February 2007). Th e resentment toward such tourism 
based upon personal suff ering is understandably palpable:
Th ey see us like puppets, they want to come and take pictures, have a 
little walk, tell their friends they’ve been to the worst slum in Africa … 
But nothing changes for us. If someone comes, let him do something for 
us. Or if they really want to know how we think and feel, come and spend 
a night, or walk round when it’s pouring with rain here and the paths are 
like rivers.
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Th e Kenyans are not alone in sponsoring such “slum tours.” Th e commod-
itization of poverty and suff ering for tourist consumption by various entre-
preneurs in the industry, Kenyans included, usually comes with a charge, 
and includes the following partial list (Table 7.1) of examples (“Poverty 
Tourism,” 4 February 2008):
So-called “poorism” (see Lancaster 2007) and its related trend, “vol-
untourism” (see, for example, Winerman 2006), provide a context for the 
construction of a bedouin tourism counter-narrative that began to develop 
in the Negev in the early 2000s largely in response to the narrative of the 
Noble Desert Savage. In this narrative, the bedouin are presented as the 
battered, impoverished, and disempowered victims of the Jewish conquest, 
concentration, and resettlement of their community. Th eir plight is great, 
and therefore they are in great need of help and support from concerned 
observers able and willing to speak out against the injustices being foisted 
upon them. Such a narrative, which like any discourse may hold some ele-
ments of truth, nonetheless presents the bedouin in a manner that is in 
many ways emasculating and suggesting of a population “in distress”; a ten-
sion appears then both in the tourism literature and in the tour experiences 
Table 7.1. “Slum Tours” Th roughout the Developing World
• Mumbai, India 
  Reality Tours and Travel half day $8, full day $15
  Source: realitytoursandtravel.com
• Johannesburg, South Africa 
  Imbizo Tours half day $57, full day $117
  Source: imbizotours.co.za
• Nairobi, Kenya 
  Victoria Safaris, half day $50, full day $100
  Source: victoriasafaris.com
• Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
  Favela Tour half day $37 
  Source: favelatour.com.br
• Mazatlán, Mexico 
  Vineyard Ministries free
  Source: vineyardmcm.org
• Cape Town, South Africa
  Nomvuyo’s Tours half day $97, $48 per person for groups of three or more
  Source: nomvuyos-tours.co.za
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themselves between presenting the bedouin as disempowered and weak, 
and yet striving simultaneously to show them as a strong, proud commu-
nity that is yet functional and whole.
Bustan, a nongovernmental organization at the forefront of seeking 
to speak on behalf of Negev bedouin rights, has developed a series of 
tours and workshops that well fi t this dichotomous dynamic. On the one 
hand, Bustan is one of very few organizations willing to take the time and 
eff ort to provide outsiders with a perspective that is more informed than 
what might otherwise be received through the more mainstream tour-
ism outlets. Moreover, their goal is to serve as a catalyst for action; as a 
result of experiencing one of their tours, it is their hope that participants 
will become active in the bedouin rights movement in some type of capac-
ity. Yet, on the other hand, one must problemacize the content of their 
presentation as well, for it too, like poorism, may have unintended conse-
quences. Th e goals of Bustan’s tours, according to the NGO website make 
this apparent: 
Negev Unplugged Tours off er hands-on examination of sustainability and 
the impact of development on the Negev and its people. Th rough Negev 
Unplugged Tours we’ve reached at least 2,500 people in past three years. 
Expansion of settlement projects, a toxic waste incinerator, polluting in-
dustrial zones, an airport and other environmental hazards are spawning 
unchecked in densely populated regions. As a geographical and cultural 
periphery, this insidious development is out of the public eye. If action is 
not taken to combat this highly-politicized overdevelopment, the situa-
tion will grow exceedingly worse, likely instigating social, political and 
environmental disaster [in] the Negev. 
BUSTAN believes that change is rooted in knowledge and awareness of 
facts created on the ground, as an antidote for the ignorance, disinforma-
tion and apathy so rampant in today’s society.
BUSTAN engages diverse groups to take part in Access vs. Excess tours: 
human rights activists, environmentalists, authorities and policy makers, 
experts and academics. See background on two of BUSTAN’s tours re-
vealing the stark reality of unrecognized villages and recognized town-
ships, Jewish settlements and industrial zones. (http://www.bustan.org/
negevunplugged)
Devorah Brous, founder and former Director of Bustan, emphasizes that 
emotion and education play key roles in the implementation of the “Un-
plugged” tours. In essence, the foundation of the tour concept is the belief 
that tourists are in fact students, and that once a student learns something, 
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they will want to go out and “use” that information. I quote her at length 
(2 July 2007):
Most of those on the tours are Jewish. We also get human rights delegations 
who are not committed to any particular faith or religious background. 
What I think attracts the ‘typical’ participant fi rst of all is that we use Eng-
lish. Our website is accessible to them. We also try to show that there are 
two narratives, you can’t just show the bedouin narrative. You have to al-
low the Jewish leadership to have their say. It doesn’t serve us to demonize 
them. We need to listen to them, to hear their part of the story …
We are trying to create a format for ‘citizen diplomacy,’ to meet with deci-
sion-makers. We are trying to create a mechanism then to pressure them 
in the decisions they are making. We want to make them more conscious 
of our policies [here in Israel, and that they] are understood abroad, and 
also to listen to the bedouin side of things …
So I provide access to getting inside these governmental offi  ces, to hear-
ing answers instead of getting ‘prepared food, already chewed.’ So we are 
trying to have real experiences here, not contrived ones. Th ere is some self-
selectivity in who participates. We are not in the mainstream. Th is works 
for us and against us. We aren’t included in a lot of NGO fairs and other 
activities that would better publicize and get the word out on what we are 
doing—we’re not that type of organization. People who get to us, who fi nd 
us, usually through word of mouth, not mainstream channels. Th ey come 
looking for us—we don’t go looking for them.
In order to get a better understanding of who the participants were and 
how the “Unplugged” tours were carried out, I was a participant observer 
in just such a full-day excursion on 12 July 2007. Th e tour bus departed a 
meeting area near the Be’er Sheva bus station at about 9:00 , and did not 
return to Be’er Sheva until about 6:00 that evening. Th e cost was 25 NIS 
for food and 50 NIS for the bus, or roughly US$18.75/person. Th ere were 
twenty-fi ve people in the group, of whom fi ve or six were Jewish Israelis, 
most from north of Be’er Sheva. Th e rest tended to be tourists from the 
United States and elsewhere. Many came because they “had heard about 
the bedouin situation, and wanted to see it fi rst hand.” 
Th e tour had four stops. First, the group went to Segev Shalom. A se-
ries of speakers introduced the topic at hand, and then a speaker from 
“BIMKOM,” a planning organization long involved in bedouin concerns, 
provided the primary remarks about the resettlement initiative, the unrec-
ognized settlements, the diff erences between the two areas, and similar is-
sues. Th e presentation was well informed but at times exaggerated certain 
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ideas in order to make a point, suggesting (erroneously) in one instance, for 
example, that the fi rst bedouin towns “were planned in a grid pattern with 
gardens.” Although “both narratives” were to be presented, no mention was 
made during this particular tour* of any benefi ts that had been fostered by 
the resettlement initiative; nothing was said, for example, concerning the 
developmental role of the towns in life improvements and in the standard 
of living of many in the bedouin community, despite the fact that the meet-
ing took place in the Segev Shalom Middle School.
From Segev Shalom, the group continued on to a private farm in the 
desert owned by a Jewish family practicing subsistence and organic farm-
ing. Th ere, a discussion ensued about how and why Jews are able to live 
independently on the land, but Arabs are not. Th e Jewish farmer pointed 
out that he also does not own the land where the farm is located, that his 
presence there is tenuous at best, and that it is likely that soon he will be 
forced out at the state’s behest. At this point, the purpose of the visit to the 
farm became somewhat cloudy, and the group soon departed.
From there, the tour continued on to the pezurah villages of Hiram/
Attir, where some houses had recently been demolished by the state as the 
areas are “unrecognized” by the state. Crammed into a small room, the 
group heard a series of recounts of how the demolition had occurred, the 
slander that had been used against the bedouin villagers during the act, and 
the outrage and pain experienced by the community. Th e tension in the 
room was palpable, as a bedouin man in his thirties holding his small child, 
his face reddened, explained how he had just been called up for miloim 
(Hebrew: reserve army service)—this, at the very time when his country 
had just betrayed him. His anger was clear, and he verbally attacked the 
state, the soldiers who carried out the demolition, and the entire Jewish 
Israeli population for supporting such a contemptible government.
As the majority of tour group members did not speak Hebrew, all of 
this had to be translated. Th e translator, a Bustan guide, chose his words 
carefully, but those in the room who understood Hebrew quickly realized 
that not all of this vitriol was being translated verbatim. Some of the Jew-
ish Israelis took umbrage that the translator was glossing over the meaning 
rather than honestly representing what was being said. Angry outbursts 
were exchanged all around and many called for a more complete transla-
tion that clearly represented the man’s sentiment. Th us, his words were 
more appropriately and correctly translated into English. 
Th e room still fi lled with murmurs about what had just been said, the 
group settled in for a traditional bedouin lunch. Th e family of the man who 
had just spoken served the food.
Th ereafter, we took the bus to the area where the houses in question had 
been demolished. As the tour guide gave a vivid description of how the 
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demolition had occurred, the tour group members took photographs of the 
destroyed homes (Illustration 7.3). Several children ran about, posing in 
front of the detritus, as village elders sat in the shade of crushed tin and ce-
ment nearby to avoid the midday heat. Th e voyeuristic nature of the act was 
unmistakable. Th e bedouin guide who took us there, perhaps cognizant of 
the manner in which this very recent trauma had now become spectacle, 
placed the moment in a slightly diff erent light, suggesting that “it’s good 
that the kids see that while it was the Jews who destroyed these houses, it is 
also Jews who now come here to support us, and to show concern.”
We again boarded the bus and continued on to the planned bedouin town 
of Hura for a fi nal debriefi ng. A circle of chairs was formed in the Commu-
nity Center, and each participant was asked to share his or her feelings and 
thoughts about the day. Bustan Director Brous facilitated the meeting.
In general, the discussion centered upon a narrative of “loss.” Many of 
the participants spoke about “losing culture,” although there was little talk 
of what the culture was that the bedouin were losing. Very few tour group 
members seemed to know anything about the bedouin beyond the fact that 
there was a confl ict between them and the state. Th e tour appeared to re-
inforce the participants’ understanding of the confl ict, but it was limited 
in teaching them anything about the bedouin community at large. Further, 
they were exposed to an exceptional minority group, namely, those who 
have recently experienced the trauma of a housing demolition. Th ey had 
very little exposure to bedouin living “normal” lives. 
Illustration 7.3. Photographing Grief, Hiram/Attir—July 2007.
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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For example, immediately before the debriefi ng, the Rosh Ha’Moatzah 
of Hura came to welcome the group to the town. He spoke for about ten 
minutes, and yet, he said virtually nothing about Hura itself, about the 
planned towns, about living there, or about its development and success—
despite the fact that Hura is the most successful of the planned towns, is 
the wealthiest of the seven, has the highest education rate in the Negev 
bedouin community, the highest number of residents in the professions, 
and so on. Instead, in the few minutes he had to talk, he spoke solely about 
what had happened to the houses at Hiram/Attir. 
As the debriefi ng concluded, Brous noted that listening to suff ering must 
inevitably lead to the question “What do we do now?”—that is, the tour’s 
orientation was clearly designed with the expectation that each participant 
would formulate a personal plan of action. By this point, some in the circle 
literally had tears in their eyes and many were choked up with emotion as 
they spoke. Th e room’s dynamic had taken on the atmosphere of a prayer 
meeting, as each individual in the group stood and testifi ed about what they 
felt they had experienced hours earlier. “Tell others!” Brous exclaimed as 
each tour member spoke, “don’t just experience this one day. You must act 
upon what you have experienced.” Th us, the idea of placing well-intentioned 
tourists into a crucible environment, and then drawing out of them the 
strength to move forward and to act, was reinforced. By the time everyone 
left for the bus, all appeared to be exhausted, yet invigorated in the belief 
that they were now empowered to enable some sort of change.
Signifi cantly, Bustan is not the only organization that is carrying out 
such tours, although it was the fi rst to do so and does more of this work 
than any other agency. In January 2008, the United Jewish Communities—a 
well-established, mainstream organization comprised of Jewish profession-
als, nearly all of whom had been to Israel several times working in donor 
capacities as representatives of the Jewish Federation and other charitable 
sectarian and private funding agencies—participated in a “Study Trip” to 
teach their membership about Arab issues in Israel, including bedouin con-
cerns. Under the auspices of the “Inter-Agency Task Force on Israeli Arab 
Issues,” these seventy participants of mostly professional American Jews 
were not predisposed to the ideals that an “Unplugged” tour participant 
might possess. And yet ironically, the outcome of participation appears 
comparable. Jeff  Klein, one of the members of the North American delega-
tion, notes (16 January 2008):
I expected that all Arab communities would be the same. I didn’t know 
anything about the bedouin, though I knew people who had visited one of 
those ‘bedouin tents’ where they had a fun time. We spent one day in Se-
gev Shalom and then a nearby ‘unrecognized’ settlement. Who ever heard 
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of that—‘unrecognized?’ We had all been [to Israel] so many times—none 
of us knew what this was or had ever even heard of it. [In Segev Shalom] 
we met with [Rosh Ha’Moatzah] Saeed El-Harumi, [Social Services Direc-
tor] Kher El-Baz, and others. Much of the briefi ng centered upon the lack 
or inadequacy of infrastructure, health, education, and jobs. Th ey told us 
about their industrial zones, and how they are not used.
I feel like I’ve been with the wrong tour guide for the past twenty-fi ve years. 
It was really an eye-opening experience. We saw massive amounts of pov-
erty. But on top of that they aren’t given any services, any opportunity. 
Th ese things aren’t provided by the Government, and then their culture is 
also holding them back. Th ere is such a disparity—we met some [bedouin] 
doing so well, yet some have not thrown off  the cloak of tradition. 
Th ere is really a lot of inequality. Our news gets fi ltered … you come back 
and you say ‘is this democracy? How do you have a democracy without 
equal rights?’ It’s like taking a can opener and opening your head to all this. 
In the past, I would have never thought of telling people to give money to 
Arab concerns in Israel. But in partnership, this is how change can occur 
there. I keep saying, “so we’re back—what can we do now?”
Such attitudes of action are at the very heart of the “voluntourism” expe-
rience, and yet once again the participant’s response is based on perhaps 
forty-eight hours of exposure to the bedouin issue. Th is is not to say that 
“voluntourism” and “poorism” in the Negev bedouin environment do not 
serve positive roles, for clearly they do; it is surprising just how little really is 
known among Jewish Israelis and outsiders alike about the bedouin experi-
ence, and these sorts of ventures are designed to fi ll that void. At the same 
time, these experiences, like the examples noted above, commoditize suff er-
ing, albeit for what many might consider worthwhile goals and outcomes.
Still, the “pain and poverty” narrative is not one that many Negev bedouin 
willingly embrace. Rather than be viewed as sympathy cases, Negev bedouin 
entrepreneurs are increasingly developing their own ventures in the indus-
try, with a narrative that seeks to blend the romantic notions of the bedouin 
past with some of the present-day concerns, but in a context of strength and 
pride, not victimization. It is to these tourism vendors that I now turn.
In Search of Authenticity: Th e Bedouin are 
“Doing it” for Th emselves
On 4 July 2007, YNet.com, one of Israel’s premiere online news sources 
published in both Hebrew and English, proclaimed bedouin tourism’s in-
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dependence with a full-length, feature article. Rarely has any of the Israeli 
media ever given the bedouin such prominent, largely positive attention. 
What made the coverage all the more notable was that many of the ven-
dors and businesses noted in the article were bedouin-owned and operated 
(“A Bedouin Welcome,” 4 July 2007). Further, the article off ered begrudging 
recognition that tourism off ers the bedouin economic opportunities that 
are simply lacking in most of the other sectors of the Negev economy:
In the urban settlements there is no opportunity to continue traditional 
agriculture, mostly raising sheep and working the land for personal con-
sumption. Th erefore, thousands of families, who were not able to adapt 
to an urban lifestyle, fi nd it diffi  cult to sustain themselves with dignity. 
Unemployment is on the rise, as is crime and violence. Th e diffi  cult eco-
nomic situation and embitterment lead to demoralization and religious 
and political extremism. 
Th e State of Israel, which concerned itself with settling the Bedouin in 
permanent homes, did not concern itself with helping them continue on 
this road. Not with appropriate infrastructure, nor with preparing the 
Bedouin for alternative livelihoods. Th e tourism branch is an example, 
one of many, of the unrealized potential that is hidden in Rahat and in 
other Bedouin villages. (“A Bedouin Welcome,” 4 July 2007)
For such a small country, it may seem rather odd that places like Rahat, a 
city of 50,000, are still considered obscure getaways when Tel Aviv is only 
an hour or so away. Still, much of the Negev has long been ignored by Is-
raelis as a desirable tourist destination, but rather, is seen as that area that 
is “on the way to Eilat.” As the YNet.com article suggests, this dynamic is 
beginning to change, and with it, the birth of bedouin tourism, though it 
remains an admittedly small sector of the Negev economy, has slowly but 
surely arrived.
One of the bedouin tourism sites highlighted in the article is Ohel 
Ha’Shalom (“Th e Peace Tent”), owned and operated by Ibrahim El-Afenish 
in Rahat (http://www.ohelhashalom.co.il). Th e tent opened in early 2006 
and is a family business comprised of El-Afenish’s wife, his children, and 
himself. Th e tent/restaurant is expansive, clean, and beautifully designed. 
And yet, the site is off  the beaten track just outside Rahat, and signage di-
recting one to the location is small and obscured. Unless one is actively 
looking for the “Peace Tent,” it seems unlikely that anyone would acci-
dentally stumble upon it. No Jewish youth groups make their way to “Th e 
Peace Tent,” according the proprietor. Th is is not surprising, as it is actually 
located within an Arab town, an environment that is off -limits for many 
such tours.
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El-Afenish estimates that, initially, the majority of the tourists who vis-
ited, perhaps 80 percent, were in fact Israeli Jews. Very few were foreign 
tourists. Still, he contends, the purpose of his business, beyond the obvious 
economic incentive, is to tell the story of his people, in eff ect providing a 
corrective to the aforementioned “perpetrator” and “victim” narratives:
I bought this tent for the business. It’s real, you don’t see these around any 
more. Th ere are very few around, and very few businesses like mine. We 
teach about bedouin culture here. Our rababa player is the best in the Ne-
gev. We serve tea, coff ee, pita, labaneh. We teach them about how we are 
now, the transition that’s taken place. We have people in the professions 
now. We talk about the advancement of bedouin women, how the girls are 
educated, and some even have businesses. In Rahat, for example, there is a 
fl orist, and she has 7 girls working for her. Th ere are hair salons for brides. 
Th ere are DJs and photographers. You can’t compare it to years ago.
We haven’t had many tourists since we fi rst opened—maybe 300. Th ey 
come from all over the country, the center, the north. Teachers, retirees. 
What do they know of us before they come? Th at we are thieves and rob-
bers! Th at’s all that is communicated here, and so when they arrive here 
they know little else about us, about who we really are. 
But today there are not many tourists coming at all. Maybe 10 percent 
of my business is tourists now. Th is American singer [Peter Yarrow from 
Peter, Paul and Mary] came a few months ago and sang here and the chil-
dren really enjoyed that. But most of my business now is with the people 
from the city (Rahat) who come here for their weddings. (El-Afenish, 5 
July 2007)
Just east of Rahat on Route 40N (the road connecting Be’er Sheva with 
Tel Aviv and Jerusalem), “Abu Youssef” is the proprietor and owner of the 
“Bedouin Hospitality Tent and Restaurant.” Th e site has been there since 
2000 and is staff ed by two additional assistants. Abu-Youssef estimates that 
5 percent of his customers are foreign tourists, 80 percent are Jewish Israe-
lis, and 15 percent are local Arabs, that is, bedouin. Th e emphasis of the 
place is the production of homemade foods that are natural, with no pre-
servatives added, and with no artifi cial ingredients. His motto is to prepare 
and serve food “like it once was.” In essence, the restaurant is very similar to 
a small health food emporium, and yet it is located in the northern Negev 
Desert. Notes Abu-Youssef over a lunch of freshly baked pita sandwiches 
soaked in olive oil that he just made moments earlier on his gas-powered 
saj (Arabic: stove for making pita):
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We [are] located in a strategic place. Th ere are tourists coming from the 
Dead Sea, from Eilat, and from Sde Boqer. We are in the middle. People 
who come here want to see something authentic. Th e Jews who stop in 
are interested in the natural foods, the non-packaged foods that aren’t 
made by Strauss [a major food manufacturer in Israel]. Th ey are looking 
for something special. So it’s not just the foreign tourists who come here. 
People might stop in for olive oil, but then they see the cheese or some-
thing else. Or they stop to eat in the restaurant but then buy something 
packaged. So they stop for one thing, but they leave buying more.
We try to present something authentic about ourselves. We created this 
little library here in the corner for people to read about us [bedouin] while 
they eat, so they can learn about us. If someone comes here and the food 
is good and it’s clean, the service is good, we smile—they will come back. 
Th ey will tell others about us too. Th ere is a story here. It’s not just the 
food here though this is important. Th ere aren’t many authentic places 
like this that have what we have. Th e place itself is part of the story, to sit 
here, to drink the coff ee or the tea, it’s all authentic. Th e taste of the food 
is all a part of it. Th e trees out front, the olives, all of this is part of what 
we are.
Much of what I sell here comes from my land. I know that the water is 
clean, the land is good. How could I live crammed into a 500 m2 house 
and be able to grow these products? So yes, there is a connection between 
what I have here and my land and my culture as a bedouin. (Abu-Youssef, 
4 July 2007)
A third and fi nal example of bedouin tourism entrepreneurship is “Sulei-
man’s Shiq,” owned and operated by Suleiman El-Hrenik (Illustration 7.4) 
in the small, unrecognized pezurah village of El-If ’dai, a community with 
fewer than 200 residents, which is about twenty minutes north of Mitzpe 
Ramon. Th e residents of the village are all members of the Azazmeh tribe 
and, in theory at least, should relocate to Segev Shalom. Pressures are in-
creasingly coming to bear on the community to resettle in town.
Suleiman has run his tourist shiq since the early 1990s (Illustration 7.5). 
He estimates that he hosts approximately fi fty tourists each year, most Jew-
ish Israelis, though he notes with pride that some over the years have been 
from the US, many having fi rst visited Petra in Jordan. Th e tent is large 
enough to hold “up to one hundred visitors at once,” however. Th ough he 
recently put in a small paved parking area and a fl ush toilet outhouse, “Su-
leiman’s Shiq” is, perhaps, as “authentic” as Negev bedouin tourism can get. 
So too is his life experience as a Negev bedouin, and his perspective on the 
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Illustration 7.4. Suleiman El-Hrenik Making Tea for the Author—2007.
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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present-day circumstances of what it means to live in twenty-fi rst century 
Israel. As such, I quote him at length, translated but purposely left without 
edits that would remove the redundancy and cadence of the narrative:
We are the original bedouin. We have sheep, goats, camels, everything 
here. We make pita on the saj. We have tea, coff ee, lebaneh, humus, and 
bread that we cook right in the fi re. We slaughter a sheep for our guests 
right here. It is a family business—I run it. We take the people out to see 
the [local] area. Th ey can sleep here in the guest side of the tent if they 
wish. We have a kitchen here, and I have set up bathrooms for them. Ev-
erything is all set up to receive them. Th ey can come here and see how 
everything is open. Th is is how we live, not in a stone house [in town]. 
Th at’s no way to live, we can’t live like that.
Everyone is welcome here to learn about us. We want [the tourists] to 
understand that we want to live here freely. Th ey are welcome to come—
ahalan w’sahalan [Arabic: Come in, welcome]—and see how we live. Th is 
is how we live, how we always have lived—not in a stone house. My [real] 
job is working with my animals. But we can’t live here freely, [because] the 
Government won’t let us live. Th ey want us to live in a stone house and we 
don’t want these things. We’re bedouin, we don’t want to live in a stone 
house. If we did, then we would leave here. But we’re bedouin, this is how 
we live. In Mitzpe [Ramon] and other places they can live in stone houses, 
but that’s not for me.
Th e Government wants to change our lives. I can’t live in a stone house, 
a house that’s closed in! Th at’s not the life of a bedouin! We [bedouin] do 
everything in this country, we are guards, we serve in the army. We just 
want to be left alone. But they want to destroy our houses. Th ere is a de-
molition order on my son’s house right now! If they destroy our homes, 
where will we go, what will we do? I am a bedouin! I have chickens, cam-
els, goats, sheep! I can not live in a city! If they destroy my home, what 
will I have?! We are bedouin, not Arabs! Th e Arabs live right next to each 
other, on top of each other. We can’t live like that. We just want to live out 
here and be free! 
I was in the Yom Kippur War, in the Tank Corps, under [former Prime 
Minister] Ariel Sharon. Th ere were seven Azazmeh in the unit, myself, 
Sheikh Ouda—you know him?—and fi ve others. We were there, in Egypt, 
fi ghting in Sinai, in ’73. Yes, I was there, look at this beard [he says show-
ing the grey]! And now look at me! Look at this situation! Everything here 
is a belagan [Hebrew: chaos, turmoil]. Th is country treats me like this. It 
makes trouble for me and my family all the time, wanting to destroy our 
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homes, wanting to destroy our lives. Th is country is shit! (El-Hrenik, 9 
July 2007)
Conclusions
Suleiman El-Hrenik’s words and deeds embody the pursuit of authen-
ticity for which the bedouin tourism industry in the Negev Desert hun-
gers. El-Hrenik is not the “Noble Desert Savage,” nor is he a “Noble Victim.” 
Rather, he is a proud and active participant in his own fate, and he is using 
tourism to communicate his perspective to anyone who will listen. And yet 
his story—what may arguably be one of the most “genuine” and “authentic” 
that can be heard amid the cacophony of voices in the tourism industry 
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low-key, and is located literally and fi guratively on the periphery, far-re-
moved from the beaten path.
It is, of course, a perverse irony that voices such as that of El-Hrenik are 
often drowned out, and that the Disneyfi ed images of bedouinism over-
shadow realities that for many may simply be too ugly or diffi  cult to face. 
But this process is common and global; as my colleagues and I have found 
elsewhere (Dinero et al. 2006), these images in time threaten to overtake 
the real, replace the real, become the real.
Hobbs (1996) noted that though tourism is increasingly embraced 
among the Sinai bedouin and is seen as a positive force, both socially and 
economically, in the region, tension has developed between bedouin entre-
preneurs and their Egyptian, non-bedouin, competitors:
Already there is an explosion of ersatz bedouin-tent restaurants run by 
Egyptians in the desert northwest of the Sharm ash-Shaykh tourist re-
sorts. Th e Muzayna complained that these restaurants were false, because 
the people who were hosting tourists in them were not bedouin and be-
cause the facilities included not only wool tents but also brick and ce-
ment gateways, outbuildings, and parking areas that were unnecessary, 
unsightly, and unnatural.
Similarly in the Negev, the Bedouin Heritage Centre in Rahat never did 
attract an adequate market and as a result, failed; the Joe Alon Centre at 
Kibbutz Lahav, on the other hand, continues to draw thousands of visitors 
annually from Israel and abroad (Dinero 2002: 86).
Still tourism, particularly ecotourism (Dinero 2002: 75), is an economic 
sector with a great deal of promise in the Negev, as it has shown particular 
expansion since the early 1990s. As hubs of this expansion, the planned 
bedouin towns, it is contended by most regional planners and government 
offi  cials, off er particular possibilities and opportunities. Many see Segev 
Shalom as one of, if not the major bedouin economic centers in the Negev 
by 2020. Th is development cannot be founded solely upon tourism alone, 
of course, but must be nurtured and concretized internally and externally 
through both planned and market forces. It is to this confl uence of condi-
tions, and to the future possibilities that Segev Shalom might theoretically 
enjoy in this newly evolving Negev economy, which will be addressed in the 
eighth and fi nal chapter that follows. 
N
*Due to some last-minute cancellations, no government offi  cials off ered their 
perspective during this particular tour.
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Segev Shalom—A City 
on the Edge of Forever?
People like to romanticize the bedouin lifestyle. Th ey spend time 
with us, but they still write based upon their initial expectations, 
the fantastic things they hear about us. Even bedouin academics 
end up writing about the fantastic side of bedouin culture; they 
take things that do exist, but they exaggerate them. So people 
don’t realize how we’re developing, how our society has changed. 
—Muhammad (Abu-Tarek) Hamamdi, Segev Shalom, Israel, 
10 December 1992
Th e issues raised in the preceding chapters now bring me back to the ques-
tion, once again, of the role of planning in the bedouin sector today, and 
how/if/whether it is even reasonable or fair to believe or to expect planning 
to be the interlocutor in resolving what appears, prima facie, to be such an 
intractable set of political, economic, and social problems in this minority 
sector. In order to answer this question, I wish for the moment, and for the 
sake of deconstructing what is so clearly a highly charged issue, to change 
the subject (though in truth I am doing nothing of the kind), to an area 
that is seemingly unrelated: the world of science fi ction. Using the realm of 
fantasy as a momentary digression, I will then return to the issue at hand, 
and will argue that the bedouin condition today could easily be viewed as 
just as “disorienting” (see Dinero 2009) and multi-layered in some ways as 
an experience out of an episode of Rod Serling’s 1960s television series, Th e 
Twilight Zone.
Conceptualizing Multiple Visions of Possible Futures
Th e genre of science fi ction and the realm of New Town Planning are not 
very far apart. As Kumar (1987) cogently argues, notions of utopianism and 
the belief that human beings are capable of controlling and socially engi-
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neering the physical environment can be traced as far back as Greek and 
Roman times—if not sooner. From the moment humans began to believe 
that Utopia not only existed, but that they also could play a role in mak-
ing such environments an actual reality, the earliest beginnings of Planning 
were born.
In humanity’s desire to control the environment, to master natural and 
social forces through the planned community, however, unanticipated con-
sequences are, some writers have suggested, seemingly inevitable. Th us, 
whether it be Huxley’s Brave New World, Orwell’s 1984, or various other 
novels, which became required fare in high school English classes across 
the United States in the latter part of the twentieth century, the message 
is clear: “Be careful what you wish for.” As Kumar shows through his ana-
lytically critical lens, many (though certainly not all) Utopian visions as 
presented by these and other authors quickly degrade into the dystopian 
malaise that comes from the realities of human behavior and circumstance. 
Th at is, Planning can go just so far—human beings are not programmable 
robots. 
Th is conceptual framework is developed further in Kumar’s discussion 
and critique of B.F. Skinner’s Walden Two. Kumar notes that Skinner’s work 
refl ects an ideology of humans striving to control and to manipulate one 
another—that is to say, that relations between individuals are based largely 
upon the desire to persuade and infl uence, and that we should “not fear 
control, but make of its exercise a science for the improvement of the hu-
man condition” (1987: 372). Such a science, needless to say, might be called 
“Planning.” And yet, he notes that there is an inherent contradiction in such 
eff orts that renders Planning ineff ectual, or at least, impractical, by its very 
nature. He writes:
Th ere can be, in a strict sense, no ‘planning for the future’, for planning 
can be only in terms of current realities and current knowledge. In the 
face of an unknown future, the only hope lies in preserving as many vari-
eties of thought and practice as are compatible with survival. We do not 
know, but one or some of these practices may turn out to be the successful 
response in an altered environment. But such practices are necessarily, 
in the present, ineffi  cient and ‘irrational’, and as such, anathema to the 
benevolent elite. Th ere is therefore a persistent tendency, in a society gov-
erned by a rationalizing elite, to suppress or eliminate them. With every 
such suppression the species or society launches itself further along the 
path to extinction. (Kumar 1987: 377)
In other words the only way, one might conclude, that Planning can be 
successful under these assumptions is to know ahead of time what the out-
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come will be—and if the outcome is a given, then why does one need to 
plan? Is the outcome not “inevitable”? Or put diff erently, are there multiple 
futures or just one, already predetermined, set, and immutable? For, only if 
there are multiple possible outcomes can Planning play a role in infl uenc-
ing what the future in fact will hold. 
Perhaps one of the most well-known examples in which such concepts 
were presented and addressed was during an episode of the popular Star 
Trek television series, City on the Edge of Forever (1967; StarTrek.com). In 
the episode, the crew of the Starship Enterprise steps through a “time por-
tal” and in so doing goes back in time to the 1930s. Th ere, they meet a social 
worker, Edith Keeler, who, they discover, will play a key role in history. In 
the “fi rst version” of history, she dies after being struck by a car; due to the 
crew’s presence in the past, however, they save her from the oncoming car 
and the accident is averted. As a result, in the “second version” of history, 
she lives, and soon thereafter plays a role (inadvertently) in the Nazi con-
quest of Europe and soon thereafter the rest of the world. Th us, the Star-
ship crew discusses and determines their role in the situation; they plan 
what they can and cannot do before determining that they must return to 
the ship and step through the “portal” an additional time in history before 
the car accident was to occur. Th is time they purposely stand idly by as 
the car approaches, for in order for the “original” version of the future to 
be restored, a better future for all of humanity, themselves included, Edith 
Keeler must die. 
How then might one reconcile the views, ideals, and fears expressed 
within the fantasy world of science fi ction with the purview of New Town 
Planning? While both may think in utopian terms, planners must plan for 
the unanticipated, as contradictory as that may sound. Th ey must think 
not only of what they want to occur, but what is also likely to occur, that 
is, to consider a variety of scenarios, a variety of futures. For in truth, like 
the multiple pasts of Edith Keeler, there are also multiple futures. Planners 
who believe that the present is fi xed, that there is only one way to view 
things, and that there are not a myriad of ways of seeing, ways of knowing, 
and ways of understanding the present, are also predestined and predeter-
mined to believe that there is only one possible future, that this future is 
already a given, and that present constraints are also future barriers. Not 
only are such people particularly uncreative and culturally insensitive, but I 
would go a step further by suggesting that they are not really planners; they 
are bureaucrats.
In the present case, when accusations fl y and charges are made about 
the failures inherent in the bedouin new town initiative, it is, more often 
than not, the bedouin who are accused of being the most “fatalistic” about 
life, the most sanguine and resigned to whatever outcomes the future may 
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hold. But Israel’s planners do not have this luxury, and there are a number 
of plans in the works for the Negev being discussed and in various stages of 
implementation. And yet, what appears to be true about all of these plans is 
that once again, the concerns of the bedouin are not considered as central 
to the Negev planning agenda. Yet clearly, bedouin concerns must be ad-
dressed—for the good of the bedouin as well as for the good of the state—if 
the future is to be a utopian dream and not a dystopian nightmare. More to 
the point, as I will argue in greater detail below, the town of Segev Shalom, 
as one of the more successful of the fi rst seven planned towns, can and 
must play a central role in the future development of the region.
Planning for the Bedouin of the Negev 
in the Twenty-fi rst Century
Concerns over development of the Negev Desert, some 60 percent of Is-
rael’s land base excluding the West Bank, are hardly new. Israel’s Founding 
Father and fi rst Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, was a staunch believer 
in the potential of the Negev and had long believed that the future of the 
State of Israel was to be found there. His home in the Negev community of 
Sde Boqer was a testament to his commitment and belief in desert living. 
Many believed, following the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt as a 
part of the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979, that this signaled a 
likely shift in policy and a refocused commitment to investment and devel-
opment in the Negev. A similar sentiment was anticipated upon the Israeli 
military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, and pending negotiations 
for a resolution of the Palestinian crisis. 
And yet, as the land mass of the State of Israel becomes increasingly 
smaller, the assumption that the Negev will grow in importance, and that, 
once and for all, investment will fi nally come to this peripherally and greatly 
overlooked region has not come to fruition. Nonetheless, since the year 
2000, a number of governmental plans have been disseminated that seek to 
guide the future planning and development of the Negev region. Projects 
such as the construction of Route 6, a North-South transit corridor con-
necting the Negev to the Tel Aviv-Haifa-Jerusalem urban agglomeration/
city-state, have given the residents of the south reason to believe that their 
future may be a brighter one than historically has been the case. 
For example, a new district plan for the Negev region, which explicitly 
addressed bedouin concerns, was approved by the government on 23 Janu-
ary 2000. Among this plan’s goals was the desire to more eff ectively “inte-
grate the Bedouin population in the south” (United Nations Economic and 
Social Council document, http://www.unhcr.ch). Although most of the 
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plan’s initiatives were oriented toward the Jewish sector, the government 
did seek, for example, to increase the geographic area of Rahat and of the 
six other recognized towns. 
Th e bedouin response to this plan, however, was to petition Israel’s Su-
preme Court, contending that it did not refl ect the community’s need to 
maintain a balance between rural and urban settlements in the bedouin 
new town system. Only with the 2004 proposal to create the Abu-Basma 
settlements, and the recognition on the part of Israel’s planners that such 
a balance was essential to bedouin social and economic development (see 
Moshe, 15 February 2007, Chapter 2), would this issue fi nally begin to be 
addressed. 
An alternative plan put forward by Abu-Saad and Lithwick of Ben Gu-
rion University that same year (2000) sought to include the agricultural 
sector within the urban development context, given its historic and cul-
tural signifi cance in bedouin economic and social development. And yet, 
the authors suggested, “there are signifi cant potential benefi ts to be derived 
in many of the [bedouin new] towns from a concerted and high-powered 
eff ort to modernize the agricultural base of the Bedouin economy … What 
we are proposing in particular are hi-tech applications for agriculture” 
(Abu-Saad & Lithwick 2000: 45; emphasis added).
Overall, the primary emphasis of their plan was centered upon an eco-
nomic development agenda, which, they believed, would be acceptable to 
both the bedouin and Jewish communities (Abu-Saad & Lithwick 2000: 
24–25), and which was premised upon the concern for “economic viabil-
ity” of the towns:
Without jobs and businesses, incomes are low, the tax base is virtually 
non-existent, and very little can be done by the towns to help themselves. 
Th is makes them dependent on [the] government, whose policies when 
forthcoming have been seen to be more a source of the problem than the 
solution. Th e inevitable conclusion is that the heart of any approach to 
urban policy must lie [in] an economic development strategy. (Abu-Saad 
& Lithwick 2000: 21)
Abu-Saad and Lithwick enumerated several “preconditions” for this de-
velopment, which include, among other inputs, improvements to regional 
transportation links, communications links, energy development, and 
greater human resource/labor development (most especially through im-
provements in bedouin education) and investment in job creation (2000: 
28–35). Th ey also called for further investment in urban infrastructure, 
roads, and housing. Essentially, they sought what amounted to an over-
hauling and retooling of the entire bedouin town.
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Th e centerpiece of this economic development initiative was to view 
the bedouin towns as economic “poles.” Using a revised version of Central 
Place Th eory, which provided the foundation of Israel’s Jewish new town 
initiative, this plan used the seven existing towns (and, presumably, extrap-
olating further, the nine that have since been added under Abu-Basma), as 
centers of growth, development, and innovation, which would eventually 
trickle out in spider-web like patterns to the surrounding areas. 
Th e end result, as envisioned both in the generic theory and in the plan 
put forward here, was to develop a bedouin town network supported by 
these economic poles within which everyone could benefi t, thrive, and 
grow. Th us, Rahat, it was suggested, would perform a major role as an Ad-
ministrative center in such a network, while Tel Sheva might perform the 
role of “Economic Pole” (Abu-Saad & Lithwick 2000: 46–48). Th e smaller 
towns had other roles they might play as well. Nevatim Airfi eld, built in the 
context of the Tel Malhata project, remains a military base, but if/when it 
would fi nally be converted into a civilian facility as has been discussed over 
the years (Abu-Saad & Lithwick 2000: 50), nearby towns, especially Arara 
and K’seifa, could benefi t, as these towns emphasize such economic sectors 
as produce processing and packaging.
In a later publication, Lithwick again repeated this emphasis upon the 
need for transportation and communication links, particularly focusing on 
the need for “regional development,” in which the bedouin towns would be 
encouraged to “develop strong linkages with nearby Jewish towns and ru-
ral settlements, and most importantly with Be’er Sheva” (2002: 16). While 
such an emphasis of interaction with Jewish Israeli communities makes a 
great deal of sense—as one of the greatest weaknesses of the bedouin town 
initiative is the degree to which this settlement system is virtually separate 
from Jewish Israel and both, one might contend, would be strengthened by 
greater integration with the other—such emphasis also creates further de-
pendency between the bedouin community and the Jewish sector, as there 
is no parity between the two at present and further integration is unlikely 
to change this. 
Further, he reiterated that the civilian use of Nevatim as a hub for trans-
portation would benefi t the entire Negev and would likely serve as a signifi -
cant center for job creation, especially for the nearby bedouin communities 
of Arara and K’seifa (Lithwick 2002: 25). And yet once again, a classically 
ironic situation would arise, in which the bedouin who were forced off  of 
their traditional lands and who now live in the communities that were cre-
ated as a result of the construction of the Air Force base would have the 
opportunity to work at the very same facility. 
To be sure, these plans have some merit, suggesting, for example, the 
need to create a “Marshall Plan” for the bedouin community (Abu-Saad 
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& Lithwick 2000: 16), drawing in major capital investment to the region 
at a time when many Jewish Israelis barely give the community a second 
thought. And yet, nowhere in such plans is there any recognition that the 
towns are independent actors or that they are home to separate families 
and tribes with diff erent and sometimes competing and confl icting views 
and interests; the ideas expressed seem to assume that, like the Jewish de-
velopment towns of the 1950s and 1960s, a command economic approach 
can be presented to the population and can be used, in eff ect, to economi-
cally and then, in time to socially, integrate and assimilate the bedouin in 
order to address some of the Jewish Israelis’ concerns, such as the “demo-
graphic explosion” (Lithwick 2002: 10). Moreover, little recognition of the 
role of market forces is made, and yet as was seen above (Chapter 3), it is 
these forces that appear to be making the greatest impact in the economic 
development of communities, such as Segev Shalom, today.
More recent plans for the Negev released in mid decade (2000–2010) 
similarly seek to address the growing “bedouin problem.” “Blueprint Ne-
gev” is a project of the Jewish National Fund, a quasi-governmental agency 
entrusted with the primary responsibility of holding and facilitating the 
development of Israel’s land base. Th rough the use of $4 billion of invest-
ment, the plan seeks to draw 250,000 new residents to the Negev, to reside 
in twenty-fi ve new communities by 2015. Th ese include English-speaking 
communities for North American immigrants who have not learned He-
brew. In the “Blueprint’s” 12-point plan, one, point eleven, concerns the 
bedouin, noting that “improving the educational and economic opportuni-
ties for the Bedouin must be addressed” (JNF.org). It should be noted that 
the destruction of the homes at Hiram/Attir (see Chapter 7) was imple-
mented in the context of the building of one of the new settlements under 
JNF’s “Blueprint Negev” initiative.
Th e “Daroma 2015 Plan” also off ers a comprehensive master plan for 
the social and economic needs of the Negev region, Jewish and bedouin 
residents alike. It is centered upon the premise that by drawing a “strong 
population” to the Negev from the center of the country over the next de-
cade (i.e., 2005–2015), development can be generated, the likes of which 
have not been realized in decades of previous planning (Swirski 2007: 95). 
Th e plan is premised upon the assumption that with new transportation 
and communications links now being developed (improved rail services, 
Route 6, and the like), new Negev communities off ering large lots, expan-
sive houses, and amenities will provide a draw; one will be able to access 
and aff ord to live a comfortable lifestyle not easily found in the country’s 
center, yet will also be able to commute into the Tel Aviv conurbation each 
day for work and other needs that desert living cannot meet. Th e plan has 
been called the “most comprehensive” eff ort to foster Negev regional de-
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velopment in recent years (Swirski 2007: 101). Th us, three goals will be 
accomplished simultaneously: 1) the population will be drawn away from 
the Tel Aviv-Haifa-Jerusalem conurbation; 2) the Negev will get a needed 
economic “shot in the arm;” and, 3) the Jewish population in the Negev will 
be increased in order to off set the rising Jewish/Arab demographic imbal-
ance caused by the high bedouin birthrate. 
In other words, the concerns of the 1950s and 1960s, which fed into the 
creation of the “Development Towns,” are once again at play in the “Daroma 
2015 Plan.” In this new initiative, however, the utopian ideology feeding this 
planning initiative is not one of Socialist Labor Zionism (building the state, 
absorbing immigrants, developing Israeli identity through the demanding 
eff orts of working the land). Rather, the “Daroma 2015 Plan” is premised 
upon an ideology of privatization, individualism, and bourgeois capitalist 
consumerism.
As for the role of the bedouin in this plan, 1.8 billion NIS ($450 million) 
was earmarked for infrastructure to the seven original planned towns, plus 
those of the Abu Basma localities. No money was designated for the un-
recognized towns (Swirski 2007: 88). Moreover, the “Daroma 2015 Plan” 
identifi es the bedouin as the source of the Negev’s environmental diffi  cul-
ties (as opposed to the Ramat Hovav Industrial Site, a notoriously hazard-
ous area that is in the news on a regular basis (see, for example, “Bad Air 
in Base City,” 18 March 2008) due to its numerous accidents and violations 
of Israeli environmental law). Th is, it is contended, is because of their high 
birthrate, low socioeconomic status, and spatial expansion. 
Blaming the bedouin for the Negev’s environmental problems is diffi  cult 
to understand, notes Swirski:
given the fact that since the establishment of the State of Israel, the wide 
open spaces of the Negev have [been] altered almost beyond recognition 
as a result of activities undertaken by Jews: the construction of roads, 
landing strips, high tension wires, urban housing projects, army camps, 
fi ring ranges, sites for chemical and radioactive waste, exhaust fumes 
from vehicles and aircraft, jeep tours, and so … it is hard not to interpret 
[this] focus on the Bedouin, of all people, as an expression of racism or, 
alternatively, as the refl ection of a desire common to many government 
bodies: to force the Bedouin to abandon their lands and move into a small 
number of recognized localities. (2007: 85-84)
Indeed, one cannot feel that, if nothing else, such emphases blame the 
victim, not the perpetrator, of so many of the Negev’s present-day diffi  cul-
ties. It is virtually impossible to separate the challenges the bedouin face 
from those faced by the regional prospects of the Negev as a whole. For 
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decades, the region has been viewed and treated as the literal and fi gura-
tive trash bin of the State of Israel—the region one must tolerate driving 
through on the way to Eilat—and the bedouin, as its peripheral minority 
residents, were doubly damned as a result. While some aspects of these 
various plans put forward for the Negev may hold some promise, the fact 
that there is no one single, regional development initiative for the area, but 
rather a hodgepodge of programs, sponsored by diff ering agencies with dif-
ferent agendas and with no singularity of purpose, gives one pause. Beyond 
this, the primary planning agency for the bedouin is the Bedouin Author-
ity, which falls between the cracks of all of these agencies. Th us, the bed-
ouin community may be excused for being skeptical—or worse—of state 
planning motives, experiencing a nagging sense of déjà vu as yet another 
set of new plans is announced out of Tel Aviv or Jerusalem that purportedly 
include a “bedouin development component.”
Finally, so long as the forty-plus communities of the so-called “pezurah” 
remain illegal, unrecognized, and lacking in many of the most basic of pub-
lic services, including high schools, fully operating health clinics, running 
water, sewerage, electricity, and paved roads, no member of the bedouin 
community—whether residing there or in one of the planned towns—will 
trust or believe that the state truly recognizes the rights of this minority 
community. While there is no doubt that those yet residing in the pezurah 
are often distinguishable from those who have relocated in a variety of 
ways, ultimately, the Negev bedouin community is one community, albeit 
much divided based upon tribe, hamula, and the like. By helping to foster 
development in these communities (including in may cases full legalization 
and the provision of all municipal services in recognition of the need for far 
more towns than the present number, given the community’s growing pop-
ulation), the entire bedouin settlement system—planned and unplanned 
alike—can be strengthened. Th is is not a counterintuitive argument. For 
unless and until the unrecognized communities’ concerns are resolved in 
a manner that is viewed as fair and equitable by the community at large, 
including government recognition of historic land ownership, if, when and 
wherever possible, the success of the planned bedouin town initiative as a 
whole will remain jeopardized.
Future Prospects for Segev Shalom and Recommendations
Th e economic and social development planning for Segev Shalom/Shqeb, 
Israel, must be placed within the context of the comments noted above. If 
the town’s future is a captive to its present—a product of its past—then 
why even bother to plan? But if, alternatively, there are multiple possibili-
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ties, and numerous potential futures, and if each outcome depends upon 
what Israel’s State planners, Negev regional planners, Segev Shalom Roshei 
Ha’Moatzah (Hebrew: Heads of Council, i.e., “Mayors”), Local Council 
members, residents, and other interested parties do now—today—then the 
future of Segev Shalom may not be what it used to be.
Abu-Saad and Lithwick, for example, note that Segev Shalom’s close 
proximity to Ramat Hovav may (ironically) have possible positive ramifi ca-
tions. Th ey suggest that the town may be able to take advantage of its loca-
tion by developing “environmental industries,” such as recycling (2000: 50), 
a sector that is increasingly drawing interest in Israel today. 
Moshe Moshe (15 February 2007) adds that the town’s location has other 
benefi ts. He points out that the road just north of Shekhuna Bet that leads 
out to the Industrial Zone is eventually going to be extended (see Map 2.1) 
and will, once some informal/non-recognized bedouin settlements near 
Emek Sarah are removed and the residents relocated, join up with the cut-
off  road that bypasses Be’er Sheva to the south and eventually links up with 
Route 25. Th is will, in eff ect, connect the Segev Shalom Industrial Zone 
with the Emek Sarak Industrial Zone, as well as the other economic activ-
ity (much of it automobile related) located throughout the southern side of 
Be’er Sheva on the southern side of the Dimona Road.
He points out as well that a car inspection site has been developed in 
Rahat and it has transformed the city’s economic base.
Th ere’s an offi  ce to have your car tested, and it’s even open on Shabbat 
(Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath when shops in Jewish Israel are closed). To-
day, if you’re in the Negev, you go to Rahat for car repairs, and believe me, 
you can’t get in there. It’s fi lled with Arabs and Jews too, fi lled with cars. 
Th ere’s a million people in there. And ten meters from the testing center 
are the repair garages. So if something’s wrong with your car you can im-
mediately have it taken care of and go back for the test. And you can get 
your groceries and clothes [in the nearby market], all at the same time. 
Th at’s the way it’s going to be in Segev Shalom, plain and simple. Th at’s the 
way it’s going to be fi ve or ten years from now. 
Ilan Sagie of the Ministry of the Interior reinforces this perspective (24 
March 2007). He suggests that:
the town’s location, it’s proximity to Be’er Sheva, gives it an advantage. 
Th ere’s less unemployment, people can fi nd work easier, and they are 
closer to centers of industry in Be’er Sheva. Th ere’s another advantage to 
Segev Shalom that they haven’t exploited yet, and that’s the fact that as 
close as Segev Shalom is to Be’er Sheva, Be’er Sheva is also close to Segev 
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Shalom. What do I mean by that? Th at if they would just take advantage 
of it, they could bring to Segev Shalom the idea of a shuk (Hebrew: mar-
ketplace) on Shabbat (Hebrew: Jewish Sabbath; Saturday), a bedouin shuk, 
an Oriental shuk. In Segev Shalom, there’s a much better chance of suc-
cess with such a thing than there is with any other bedouin settlement. In 
the other settlements in the area they don’t have very good reputations. If 
you are in Be’er Sheva, would you go to Tel Sheva? You wouldn’t because 
it has a bad reputation. In Segev Shalom, there’s a better reputation, from 
the perspective of the Jews, I mean. Th ey’re less afraid to travel there. But 
that, in my opinion, is something that [the residents of Segev] haven’t yet 
taken advantage of. 
And lastly, Ilan Yeshuran of the Bedouin Authority confi rms this senti-
ment (10 May 2007). He states: “Segev Shalom is unique. It is built for a sin-
gle tribe, the Azazmeh. Its proximity to Be’er Sheva is very important. Th e 
other towns, other than Tel Sheva—are much further away. Some would 
say [being further out] is a good thing, but for Segev Shalom, they benefi t 
by being like Omer and Meitar, a part of Metro Be’er Sheva. It’s convenient 
to reach, [and thus] to bring industry there as part of Greater Be’er Sheva.”
In general, Segev Shalom’s reputation among government offi  cials and 
within the bedouin community alike is a positive one. But the town cannot 
function alone. Rather, it is part of a rapidly growing community of minor-
ity Israelis who today are experiencing considerable social and economic 
need—and the outlook for tomorrow is no diff erent. But what is quite clear 
is that the community enjoys a comparative advantage in a number of ar-
eas, and that these areas can and must be exploited for the good of the 
bedouin, as well as for the state within which they are an increasingly sig-
nifi cant minority group. 
First, while historically, the bedouin labor force was largely weak and un-
educated, this is beginning to change. Not only are bedouin men accessing 
skills and training equal to their Jewish counterparts, but bedouin women 
are beginning to acquire these skills as well. Th is is not to suggest that the 
need to continue to work toward the betterment of improvements in bed-
ouin education are not huge, but it is to suggest that the bedouin are access-
ing a higher quality education and higher levels of education every year, 
and that the number of those who are educated but are unable to use the 
skills they have acquired and are not fi nding their education an asset are, 
in fact, growing—and for the state, it is this issue that is already becoming 
a long-term liability. To think then of the bedouin as weak and uneducated 
herders is to underestimate their potential, both for the positive contribu-
tion many can make to the economic development of the society as a whole 
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or, alternatively, for the negative impacts that such a highly educated and 
yet disgruntled population can have upon society as large. 
Second, bedouin healthcare provision has come a long way since the 
days of the siyag—and also has a long way to go. Privatization in the health-
care arena is something that must be considered in the long-term planning 
concerns of the bedouin. As more wealthy and more successful bedouin are 
able to acquire higher quality care, a bifurcated system is now developing 
in which those who can aff ord healthcare are getting the specialized treat-
ment needed in such unique living environments, while those who can-
not are competing for poorer quality care in regional clinics, or worse, are 
reliant upon the Soroka Hospital Emergency Room in Be’er Sheva as their 
primary care giver. Th is is not good for the bedouin in the long-term, nor 
is it good for the state.
Th ird, infrastructural development in the towns is far better than in the 
past. And yet once again, superfi cial changes will not do. Eff orts must be 
made to make the bedouin towns clean, attractive, and worthy of being re-
ferred to as “towns,” and not “slums,” “ghettos,” and the like. Basic services 
such as regular trash pickup can go a long way in making the towns mag-
nets to resettlers, rather than ill-designed “Bantustans” that provide all of 
the elements of disincentive (high taxes, high unemployment, limited lands 
for fl ocks), and few of the elements paralleling similar towns of similar size 
in the Jewish sector.
But above all, planners must be willing to dream. Why not, for exam-
ple, use the comparative advantage that these communities have, namely, 
the strong social, cultural, and economic ties with the Palestinians of the 
West Bank and Gaza (Palestine), Jordan, and to a lesser degree the Sinai 
(Egypt)? Farsighted planning would consider and encourage these ties as 
well, rather than to discourage and dismiss them out of hand as unrealistic 
or farfetched—or worse, dangerous.
One area of cooperation and economic development can be found in the 
travel and desert tourism industry. Were the Nevatim Air Base privatized 
as Abu-Saad and Lithwick have suggested (2000: 28), for example, rather 
than the state continuing to pursue a policy to further encourage greater 
militarization of the Negev (“Bad Air in Base City,” 18 March 2008), visitors 
from around the world could, in theory, fl y directly to the Negev rather 
than into Tel Aviv’s Ben-Gurion Airport. Further development and expan-
sion of Israel’s rail and bus service out of Be’er Sheva off ers numerous tour-
ism and trade-based potential as well. 
In other words, Be’er Sheva might be developed into a hub through 
which visitors could travel to various destinations in the frontier of the 
Negev and beyond; connecting fl ights, trains or buses would take visitors 
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throughout the nearby Middle East to capitals in Palestine, Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and possibly elsewhere. Th e Negev, in other words, 
literally would connect Israel to the Arab/Muslim world, and the bedouin 
community would play a key role in that process.
As but one example, not long after the signing of the Israel-Jordan Peace 
Treaty, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Aff airs proposed a joint venture with 
Jordan in 1997 centered on the shared Jordan River Valley (i.e., the JRV; 
Israel Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, 1997). In brief, the proposal stated that: 
“the objective of this project is to maximize benefi ts to the tourism in-
dustry in both countries while maintaining the regions archeological and 
environmental integrity. A pre-feasibility study conducted on the projects 
estimates that, given the number and diversity of attractions in the region, 
tourist stays to the region can be lengthened to an average of two to three 
nights.” Th e idea of the project was to draw in visitors to spend more time 
in the southern regions of both countries, and to enjoy the wealth of at-
tractions for local and international tourists that were to be found on both 
sides of the river. 
A number of bedouin tourism opportunities were included in the pro-
posal. For example, it was suggested that the Nabatean Spice Route, an 
historic trade route that passed through what is today Israel and Jordan, 
be developed by the two countries as a joint initiative. Th e route passes 
through Avdat and other renowned bedouin regions in the Negev, as well 
as parts of Jordan and the Sinai. In the proposal, it was noted that: “along-
side the sites it will be possible to set up lodging facilities and restaurants 
which recreate the ambiance of the region’s history. Centers featuring Bed-
ouin culture and lifestyles can be incorporated into the tourist develop-
ment of this area.”
Clearly such an enterprise requires substantial fi nancial support and 
upfront economic inputs. Th e Ministry projected that US$119 million 
in public funding would be required for this project, with an additional 
US$166 million worth of investment coming from private sources. More to 
the point, no joint venture such as this is possible without goodwill; while 
such opportunities are numerous in the Negev and while the bedouin can 
play a key role in their development, none can occur without a welcoming 
political climate. At the same time, however, such enterprises can foster 
good relations, adding value to an already worthy endeavor. Th us, although 
two new border crossings between Israel and Jordan were created soon 
after the signing of the treaty to facilitate travel across the Valley, little has 
been done, like much of the planning between Israel and her neighbors, to 
facilitate regional cooperation (Ezrahi 2003: 21).
One fi nal recommendation then need not rely upon other regional ac-
tors, although it is the contention here that its success would be improved 
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through regional cooperation. Signifi cantly, however, it does not require a 
change in bedouin cultural ideals, huge educational inputs, or other con-
straints. What it does require, however, is some imagination, and a willing-
ness to think beyond the confi nes and limitations of today’s circumstances. 
But more signifi cantly, it requires a re-ordering of land-use priorities, at 
least in the Northern Negev region, which may be delineated by Bir Hadaj 
to the southwest and Dimona to the southeast. 
Lithwick and Abu-Saad have noted that Segev Shalom has potential in 
the area of “Agricultural Development” (2002: 52, 73), an acknowledgement 
of the strong connection that the Azazmeh hold to their fl ocks and to the 
land. What is notable, however, is that whenever agricultural production 
and herding are referred to, the assumption is that one is referring to sheep 
and goat holdings (see, for example, Abu-Rabia 1999; Degen 2000). Rarely 
if ever does one see the potential in camel herding or production and yet, I 
would contend, this sector may provide a niche market well suited to bed-
ouin economic and social development interests.
Th e retention of fl ocks and a resistance to undertake dry farming has 
often been seen as a limitation, as the Azazmeh were the last to surren-
der their animals and many still retain fl ocks despite living in an urban 
environment. It is notable also that Segev Shalom—and its as yet largely 
empty Industrial Zone—is ideally 
located at the confl uence of the Ei-
lat Highway and the Dimona Road, 
along which a substantial number of 
non-recognized bedouin towns are 
located, all of which hold fl ocks of 
various sizes, comprised of sheep, 
goats—and camels. 
Increasingly, the camel (Illustra-
tion 8.1) has come to be viewed in 
the Negev by many as a problem-
atic animal and a nuisance more 
than anything else, with question-
able purpose or use, and has been 
at the center of more than one con-
troversy due to a number of traffi  c 
accidents involving wayward, unte-
thered animals (“Negev: Car Strikes 
Camel…,” 11 September 2007). And 
yet, many bedouin continue to re-
tain them, for cultural if not eco-
nomic purposes.
Illustration 8.1. Could Th is be the 
Face of the Future?—Tel Sheva, 2007.
Source: Photo by Steven C. Dinero.
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Th e plan I wish to propose, the genesis of which can most closely be as-
sociated with Ben Gurion University physiologist Reuven Yagil, is to return 
to the use of the camel as one possible foundation of bedouin economic 
support and livelihood—a foundation that many never left. Yagil’s three 
decades of research and consultancy on behalf of the United Nations Food 
and Agricultural Organization (FAO) is centered upon one basic premise: 
that camel milk and dairy products off er developing communities in des-
ert environments, where camels are culturally appropriate, physical well-
being and, simultaneously, the potential for substantial profi ts in the form 
of marketing and sales. 
According to the FAO, for example, camel’s milk has three times the vi-
tamin C and up to 10 times the iron content of cow’s milk. In recent years, 
camel milk has cost about a dollar per liter in African markets, and it is 
believed there is the possibility of a global market for camel dairy products 
worth $10 billion (“Milking the Benefi ts from Camels,” 21 April 2006). Th us, 
Yagil has traveled throughout Africa and Asia meeting with local herdsmen 
and entrepreneurs in an eff ort to both research the “medicinal” properties 
of camel dairy products, but also to encourage the further development 
and possible commercialization of camel milk production (“Camel Milk 
Transforms Mauritania’s Herding Lifestyle,” 20 August 2007).
Th ere are limitations and uncertainties that must be considered, how-
ever. Th e camel population of Israel dropped somewhat between the 
early 1990s and the late 2000s; in 1990, the FAO reported the population 
at 10,000 (though others reported as high as 20,000; see “Israel’s Dr. Do-
little…,” 23 May 2007); this number has recently stabilized to somewhere 
around 3,000. Still, Yagil suggests that these numbers have begun to in-
crease slightly as camels are “smuggled in from Sinai for an extremely low 
price” (22 March 2008). 
Degen (25 March 2008) concurs, estimating that there are about 2,500 
camels in the Negev region. He notes, however, that “the number today is 
a very rough estimate from Veterinary Services of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture [as] many Bedouin do not vaccinate (register their camels) and there 
are [also] many … that are smuggled in from the Sinai.” As for how many 
camels are being raised in planned settlements as compared to those in the 
pezurah, Degen notes that it “is not easy as well [to determine this num-
ber]. I would say there are more in the pezurah—my estimate [is] about 
60–70 percent.” 
Given this camel population decline relative to the past, Yagil has sought 
to pursue the possibility of fulfi lling the increasingly high demand for camel 
dairy products locally by formulating a joint program with Jordan. Like Is-
rael, Jordan has experienced a precipitous decline in its camel population 
throughout the 1990s, numbering over 30,000 in 1991 to somewhere be-
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tween 5,000–13,000 by 2000 (Awawdeh et al. n.d.). According to Hussein 
Migdadi of the National Center for Agricultural Research and Technology 
Transfer, University of Jordan (30 April 2008), the exact number of camels 
in the country is unknown. A general consensus, however, is that the total 
number is 8,000 head (20 percent are male). Further, he off ers that “the 
potential for camel dairy production in Jordan is 360kg milk/head/year” 
and that “more attention nowadays [is being] directed to camel raising and 
breeding, and especially activities regarding nutrition and manufacturing 
the product” as camel milk in Jordan is fetching “the highest prices.” He con-
cludes with the speculation regarding developing the camel dairy industry 
that, “yes, I think through offi  cial and preplann[ing] there is potential.”
Th us, a joint project would take advantage of the strengths, skills, and 
collective herds of the two bedouin communities, those in the Negev and 
those of southern Jordan, and would use the camels not only in dairy pro-
duction, but also to “carry tourists over ancient desert highways, includ-
ing the ‘spice route from Petra to the Mediterranean’” (“Desert Dessert,” 1 
September 1999). 
And yet, such a project to this point has faced resistance. As Yagil ex-
plains it, “the Jordanians are keen but not our [Negev] Bedouin. Th ey refuse 
any control set up concerning the number of camels [they may utilize],” (22 
March 2008). Despite his eff orts over the years, he contends that “the Bed-
ouin are very ‘touchy’ when you suggest camels. ‘Is that all we are fi t for?’ 
… [Th ey say] that for them the camel is like a TV—you sit and [just] watch 
them.” 
Nancy Abeiderrahmane, the entrepreneur and developer of the Mau-
ritania-based camel dairy Tiviski, also encountered some uncertainty and 
resistance when she initiated her now very successful and internationally 
recognized camel dairy in Nouakchott, noting that she did not fully ap-
preciate or understand the concerns of the camel herders of North Africa. 
She notes: “I did not realize how bad it was that there was a traditional 
reluctance to sell milk, you would call it a taboo … selling milk in the desert 
is considered miserly. It is considered mean and they say it leaves poverty 
as a heritage. Anyone who has any pride would never dream of selling milk. 
I suppose it is like water and air. Something God gives and you share it 
around, you do not sell it” (“Camel Milk Transforms Mauritania’s Herding 
Lifestyle,” 20 August 2007).
Th e question is whether, like the nomads of Mauritania, the post-no-
madic bedouin of the Negev might seek to create such an enterprise (which 
may also include meat sales), the reluctance and skepticism that Yagil ex-
perienced among some sheikhs in the 1990s notwithstanding. It is clear 
that in today’s Negev, the bedouin are increasingly moving into the fi elds of 
medicine, engineering, law, and numerous other professions. And yet, not 
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all are able to nor do they have the desire to make such a transition to the 
professions. Th e world of business—in this case a business that has cultural 
and historical associations that off ers potential inclusion with a number of 
sectors both within the planned town and pezurah communities—is a di-
rection that many bedouin, given the opportunity and support, can pursue 
today, not in ten or fi fteen or twenty years. 
Perhaps there is already reason for cautious optimism. Degen notes that 
he has witnessed increasing bedouin interest in recent years in develop-
ing camel milk products, albeit on a small scale. He notes that “a plant 
making skin cream from camel milk has opened up at Kibbutz Lahav and 
the product is being marketed in Europe (through German agents)” (25 
March 2008). In addition, a small enterprise has been developed by a bed-
ouin woman in Tel Sheva called “Bat Midbar” (Hebrew: “Daughter of the 
Desert”), in which she makes soap and other related products out of camel 
milk. As of 2007, however, her market was limited to Israeli buyers. 
Ultimately, this business idea may face some initial skepticism or even 
prove to have limited interest or success. But weak economic development 
in the Negev bedouin sector over the last several decades has shown that 
though there may be no single silver bullet that can be used to address 
the concerns of the bedouin community, a variety of possibilities ought to 
at least be considered. Just as Jewish society is economically and socially 
stratifi ed, so too is the bedouin community, and a multiplicity of ideas and 
opportunities recognizing this diversity should be considered. At a time 
when the Negev bedouin community is struggling economically while 
experiencing drastic social change, it is the planner’s responsibility—and 
opportunity—to at the very least, pose the most hypothetical and yet pow-
erful of queries: “What if?”
Conclusions
Th e purpose of this book is not to be overly nostalgic or romantic about the 
past, to criticize the powers of globalization, or to blame the government 
of the State of Israel for every woe that exists in the bedouin community in 
the Negev today. Rather, the goal here has been to examine and assess how, 
over forty years after the resettlement initiative was created and nearly 
thirty years after Segev Shalom was developed, this unique and aggressive 
planning project may be evaluated.
Th e previous pages reveal that the answer is at best mixed. On the one 
hand, there is no doubt that in numerous ways, social and economic mea-
surement indices all seem to point skyward. Th e bedouin community is in 
many ways a healthier, stronger, more educated community than it has ever 
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been in recorded history. Th e bedouin Quality of Life today is, by and large, 
higher than ever before. 
Ask most bedouin community members on the street how they or their 
families are fairing, however, and the answer almost to a person will not be 
positive. While the state can see this initiative as “successful,” showing nu-
merous signs of “development” and “modernization,” many of the bedouin 
community members themselves would describe the resettlement initia-
tive thus far in terms of “failure.”
Th e previous pages also suggest that this could have been avoided. More 
community member buy-in from the start, a greater sense of planning with 
the bedouin rather than for the bedouin, a greater sense that the commu-
nity was being resettled for their own good and not the good of the state 
and in the context of a land-grab—these reasons and more help to explain 
the present malaise that is the resettlement initiative in the early part of 
the twenty-fi rst century. Th e question is, can this planning initiative be sal-
vaged, and if so, how?
I have attempted in this chapter to off er some possible solutions and 
ways out of the rat’s maze that is bedouin planning in Israel today. As a 
non-bedouin and non-Israeli, I am both advantaged and disadvantaged; I 
am able to see things in perhaps a light that the players themselves cannot 
see, for they are simply too close to the issue to be truly objective. On the 
other hand, as an outsider to the issue, I am not fully experiencing what it 
means to be a bedouin in Israel today—or a Jewish administrator in a gov-
ernment offi  ce, for that matter. And thus, there are elements of the picture 
that I can never fully appreciate.
Still, there is one thing that I, as an outsider, can attest to after fi fteen 
years of studying the growth and development of Segev Shalom, and that 
is this: the mistrust, fear, and yes, hatred that can be found between the 
government and Jewish people, on the one side, and the Negev bedouin 
community on the other, is both palpable and is only growing. It was some-
what apparent in the early 1990s when I initiated this research; fi fteen years 
on, it is everywhere, as thick and as toxic as is the black smoke that billows 
out of the factories at Ramat Hovav each day. And it is just as poisonous. 
During the period that I undertook this study, relations between the Jews 
and the bedouin of Israel seemed to worsen by the day, concomitant with 
improvements in education rates, access to healthcare, and so on. As the 
aforementioned statistics suggest, such correlations are not coincidental, 
nor are they easily ignored.
Th us, Israel’s planners have a considerable role and responsibility to play 
in the years ahead, for they must begin fi nally to understand that in the 
bedouin community, settlement in one of the planned towns may suggest 
“victory” from the state’s perspective, but it is nothing of the sort from the 
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bedouin’s perspective. Rather, settling in a town such as Segev Shalom is 
in truth viewed as a loss, something which in time may change, but for the 
moment at least, is still stigmatized with the sense that the community has 
surrendered, has given up its lands, its pride and independence, its social 
and economic systems, its way of life—indeed, its very identity. True, this 
is something that is now being carried out, especially among the younger 
generations, voluntarily and with increasing alacrity. 
Still, this phenomenon is not yet something a bedouin—any bedouin—
should be expected to celebrate or fully embrace without a certain degree 
of trepidation. Having been the “Stranger in a Strange Land” themselves 
numerous times over the millennia, the Jewish people should understand 
this.
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Miami Beach, Florida—18 May 2009
It has been nearly two years since I last spent time in the Negev conducting 
intensive research on the bedouin community. During that time, life con-
tinues for everyone in this study; timely discussion of this subject is, as with 
most things in the Middle East, like aiming at a moving target. 
On this day, I am walking down the beach with Kher El-Baz, Director 
of Social Services in Segev Shalom. He and I are both in Miami—more 
than 10,000 km from his home in Tel Sheva—for the same reason, namely, 
to attend the convening of a small conference devoted to Negev regional 
development. Th e day is perfect, in the high eighties though rather humid. 
White puff y clouds hang just above the horizon beyond the azure Atlantic. 
Sunbathers abound, and we stop and ask one if he will kindly photograph 
us with the tourist hotels of South Beach in the background. Th e photo is 
surreal; we are still in our dress shoes after all, and do not exactly look like 
we are prepared for a day at the beach.
Finally, we fi nd a Starbucks and sit at an outdoor table in the stiff  breeze 
as a front begins to slowly move in. Sipping our steaming coff ee, we remi-
nisce about the fi rst time we met, nearly 20 years ago in West Mt. Airy, a 
neighborhood of Philadelphia, not far, coincidentally, from where I now 
teach. We retell the story once more: how Kher borrowed a mutual friend’s 
car the day we met, only to have the car and his many belongings in its 
trunk stolen from right in front of their home. We laugh now—though we 
certainly were not laughing then.
Our conversation weaves back and forth from the past to the present, 
and from the “personal” to the “professional,” in a seamless fashion. We talk 
of family and friends, work and school. He notes that Amir Abu-Mu’amar 
has again been elected for a fi ve-year term this past November (2008) as 
Rosh Ha’Moatzah of Segev Shalom, replacing Saeed El-Harumi. His elec-
tion just followed the death of his father Sheikh Ouda, who passed away in 
early 2008 at a very ripe old age—96.
Amir is taking over at a time when, in Kher’s opinion at least, Segev Sha-
lom is showing increasing signs of economic growth. He notes that that the 
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town has succeeded in its bid to acquire a number of positions in the newly 
developing labor force for the new military base, Ir HaBahadim (Hebrew: 
City of the Training Bases), to be built just south of Be’er Sheva. As the 
name implies, Ir HaBahadim will be more of a new town in the Negev than 
merely a base, designed to house the Israel Defense Force’s Armaments 
School, Logistics Training School, Military Police, as well as providing a 
variety of essential facilities for a population of between 10,000 and 20,000 
servicemen and women. Th is will translate into numerous jobs, though 
Kher notes that virtually all of that will be available to the bedouin in the 
low-skilled, lower paying fi elds (laundry, food services, etc.). It was noted at 
the conference by one civic agency representative whose goal is to increase 
non-discriminatory practices (such as hiring) in the workforce that high 
security jobs in particular will not likely be availed to bedouin community 
members.
Kher adds that the poultry processing plant that was previously only 
in the planning stages is nearly completed in Segev Shalom as well, and 
will be up and running, employing perhaps 450 employees, by early 2010. 
Once the plant has achieved full operating capacity, it is believed that this 
number may double, and that female employees will likely be a signifi cant 
part of its labor force, given the close proximity of the Industrial Zone to 
Shekhuna Bet. 
“So,” Kher asks me as we head back toward my rental car, the sky begin-
ning to darken in anticipation of a terrifi c early summer storm, “when are 
you coming back?” “Soon,” I respond as I distractedly mull over the past few 
hours of discussion, my mind racing in anticipation of yet further study of 
what lies ahead for the bedouin of the Negev in general, and Segev Shalom 
in particular, “Insh’Allah, very, very soon.”
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